

202

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937- 1938

22. Head G.V. - - " - Red Banner

23. Puzitsky S.V. - - " - 2 Red Banners

24. Firina-Pupko S.G. - "- Order of the Red Banner

and the Order of Lenin

25. Chertok L.I. - - " - Badge of honor

26. Rykova A.I. - - " - Red Banner

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 987. L. 100-101. Script. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

No. 92

FROM THE SPEECH OF I.V. STALIN AT THE EXTENDED SESSION OF
THE MILITARY COUNCIL

June 2, 1937

Stalin: Comrades, now I hope no one doubts that a military-political conspiracy existed against the Soviet regime. It is a fact that there is such a mass of testimonies from the criminals themselves and observations from comrades who work in the localities, such a mass of them that there is undoubtedly a military-political conspiracy against Soviet power, stimulated and financed by the German fascists.

People are scolded: some are scoundrels, others are eccentrics, others are landowners, but swearing in itself does not give anything. In order to root out this evil and put an end to it, we must study it calmly, study its roots, uncover and outline means so that such outrages will not be repeated either in our country or around us.

I just wanted to say a few words on questions of this order.

First of all, pay attention to what kind of people were at the head of the military-political conspiracy. I don't take those who have already been shot, I take those who were still outside recently. Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin are, so to speak, political leaders. Among them I also include Rudzutak, who also stood at the head and worked very cunningly, but only turned out to be a German spy. Karakhan, Yenukidze. Next come: Yagoda, Tukhachevsky - along the military line, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, Gamarnik - 13 people. What are these people? This is very interesting to know. This is the core of the military-political conspiracy, the core that had systematic relations with the German fascists, especially with the German Reichswehr, and which adapted all its work to the tastes and orders of the German fascists. What are these people?

They say that Tukhachevsky is a landowner, someone else is a priest. Such an approach, then

comrades, it doesn't solve anything, it doesn't solve anything at all. When one speaks of the nobility as a hostile class of the working people, one has in mind a class, an estate, a stratum, but this does not mean that certain individuals among the nobility cannot serve the working class. Lenin was of noble origin, do you know that?

Voice: Known.

Stalin: Engels was the son of a manufacturer - non-proletarian elements, as you wish. Engels himself managed his factory and fed Marx with it. Chernyshevsky was the son of a priest - he was a good man. And vice versa. Serebryakov was a worker, and you know what a scoundrel he turned out to be. Livshits was a worker, an illiterate worker, but turned out to be a spy.

DOCUMENTATION

203

When they talk about hostile forces, they mean a class, an estate, a stratum, but not every person from a given class can do harm. Individuals from the nobility, from the bourgeoisie, worked for the benefit of the working class and did a good job. From such a stratum as lawyers, let's say, there were many revolutionaries. Marx was the son of a lawyer, not the son of a laborer and not the son of a worker. Among these strata there can always be persons who can serve the cause of the working class no worse, but better than pure blooded proletarians. Therefore, the general standard that this is not the son of a laborer is an old standard, inapplicable to individuals. This is a non-Marxist approach.

I would say this is a biological approach, non-Marxist. We consider Marxism not a political science, but a sociological science. So this general measure is absolutely correct in relation to estates, groups, strata, it is not applicable to all individuals who are of non-proletarian or non-peasant origin. I will not analyze these people from this side.

You have yet another, also a wrong walking point of view. It is often said that in 1922 so-and-so voted for Trotsky. Also wrong. A person could be young, he just didn't understand, he was a bully. Dzerzhinsky voted for Trotsky, not only voted, but openly supported Trotsky under Lenin against Lenin. You know that? He was not a man who could remain passive in anything. He was a very active Trotskyist, and he wanted to rouse the entire GPU to Trotsky's defense. He did not succeed. Andreev was a very active Trotskyist in 1921.

Voice from the seat: What Andreev?

Stalin: Secretary of the Central Committee Andrei Andreevich Andreev. So you see, the general opinion that such-and-such then voted or such-and-such then hesitated is also not absolutely and not always correct.

So this second current point of view, which is very widespread among you and in the Party in general, is also wrong. I would say that it is not always correct and very often it fails.

This means that when characterizing this core and its members, I will also not apply this point of view as incorrect.

It is best to judge people by their deeds, by their work. There were people who hesitated, then withdrew, withdrew openly, honestly, and in the same ranks with us fight the Trotskyites very well. Dzerzhinsky fought very well, Comrade Andreev fights very well. There are other such people. I could count two or three dozen such people who have moved away from Trotskyism, have moved away firmly and are fighting it very, very well. It could not have been otherwise, because throughout the history of our party, the facts have shown that Lenin's line, since the Trotskyists began an open war with him, turned out to be correct. The facts showed that subsequently after Lenin the line of the Central Committee of our Party, the line of the Party as a whole, turned out to be correct. This could not but affect some former Trotskyists. And there is nothing surprising that such people as Dzerzhinsky, Andreev and a dozen or two or three former Trotskyists figured it out, saw that the party line was correct and went over to our side.

I'll say more. I know some non-Trotskyists, they were not Trotskyists, but they were of little use to us either. They officially voted for the party. Is there a big price for such a Leninist? And, on the contrary, there were people who bristled, doubted, did not recognize everything as correct, and they did not have a sufficient amount of cowardice to hide their hesitation, they voted against the party line, and then went over to our side.

204 _ LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Therefore, this second point of view, current and widespread among you, I reject as absolute.

A third point of view is needed when characterizing the leaders of this nucleus of the conspiracy. This point of view characterizes people in their deeds over a number of years.

I'm moving on to this. I counted 13 people. I repeat: Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin, Yenukidze, Karakhan, Rudzutak, Yagoda, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Ubovich, Kork, Eideman, Gamarnik. Of these, 10 people are spies. Trotsky organized a group, which he directly trained, taught: give information to the Germans so that they believe that I, Trotsky, have people. Make sabotage, destruction, so that the Japanese and Germans will believe me, Trotsky, that I have strength.

The man who preached among his people the need to engage in espionage because we, they say, Trotskyists, must have a bloc with the German fascists, therefore we must have cooperation, therefore we must help just as they help us in case of need. Now they are being asked to help with information, give us information. You remember the testimony of Radek, you remember the testimony of Livshits, you remember the testimony of Sokolnikov—they gave information. This is espionage. Trotsky is an organizer of spies from people who either belonged to our party or are around our party - an ober spy.

Rykov. We have no evidence that he himself informed the Germans, but he encouraged this information through his people. Yenukidze and Karakhan were very closely connected with them, both turned out to be spies. Karakhan since 1927 and 1927 Yenukidze. We know through whom they delivered secret information, through such and such a person from the German embassy in Moscow. We know. Rykov knew all this. We have no evidence that he is a spy himself.

Bukharin. We have no data that he himself informed, but Yenukidze, Karakhan, and Rudzutak were very closely connected with him, they advised them, inform them, they themselves did not deliver.

Gamarnik. We have no data that he himself informed, but all his friends, closest friends: Uborevich, especially Yakir, Tukhachevsky were engaged in systematic information of the German General Staff.

Rest. Yenukidze, Karakhan, I already said. Yagoda is a spy, and he bred spies in his GPU. He informed the Germans which of the employees of the GPU had such and such vices. He sent such Chekists abroad for recreation. For these vices, German intelligence seized these people and recruited them, they returned recruited. Yagoda told them: I know that the Germans recruited you as they please, either you are my people, personal and work as I want, blindly, or I report to the Central Committee that you are German spies. Those were recruited and obeyed Yagoda, as his personal people. So he did with Guy, a German-Japanese spy. He himself admitted it. These people are recognized. So he did with Volovich - a German spy, he himself admits. This is what he did with Pauker, a longtime German spy from 1923. So Yagoda. Next Tukhachevsky. Have you read his testimony?

Voices: Yes, read.

Stalin: He handed over our operational plan, our operational plan - our holy of holies to the German Reichswehr. Had a meeting with representatives of the German Reichswehr. Spy? Spy. For plausibility in the West, these swindlers from Western European civilized countries are called informants, but we know in Russian that this is just a spy. Yakir systematically informed the German headquarters. He invented this liver disease for himself. Maybe he invented this disease for himself, or maybe he really had it. He went there for treatment. Uborevich not only with friends, comrades,

DOCUMENTATION

205

but he personally informed separately. Karakhan is a German spy. Eidemann is a German spy. Karakhan informed the German headquarters from the time when he was their military attache in Germany. Ruzu so. I have already said that he will not admit that he is a spy, but we have all the data. We know to whom he passed the information. There is one experienced scout in Germany, in Berlin. That's when you might have to visit the rlin. Josephine Genzi, maybe some of you know. She is a beautiful woman. Old scout. She recruited Karakhan. Recruited on the basis of the women's unit. She recruited Yenukidze. She helped recruit Tukhachevsky. She also holds Rudzutak in her hands. This is a very experienced scout, Josephine Genzi. As if she herself was a Dane in the service of the German Reichswehr. Beautiful, very willingly goes to all sorts of proposals from men, and then ruins her. You may have read an article in Pravda about some of the insidious tricks of recruiters. Here she is one of the scouts of the German Reichswehr who distinguished themselves in this field. Here's to you people. Ten specific spies and three organizers and indulgent espionage in favor of the German Reichswehr. Here they are, these people.

Naturally, they may ask such a question - how is it, these people, yesterday

even the communists, suddenly became a rabid tool in the hands of German espionage? And so they are recruited. Today they are required to give information. If you don't, we already have your receipt that you've been recruited, we'll publish it. Under fear of exposure, they give information. Tomorrow they demand: no, this is not enough, give more and get money, give a receipt. After that, they demand - start a conspiracy, sabotage. First, sabotage, sabotage, show that you are acting on our side. If you don't show it, we'll expose it, tomorrow we'll hand it over to the agents of the Soviet government, and your heads will roll. They start sabotage. After that they say - no, you somehow try to arrange something in the Kremlin or in the Moscow garrison and generally take command posts. And they start trying as hard as they can. Further, even this is not enough. Give real facts of something worthwhile. And they kill Kirov. Here, take it, they say. And they are told, go ahead, is it possible to remove the entire government. And they organize through Yenukidze, through Gorbachev, Yegorov, who was then the head of the school of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and the school was in the Kremlin, Peterson. They are told to organize a group which is to arrest the government. Reports are flying that there is a group, we will do everything, we will arrest, and so on. But this is not enough, to arrest, to kill several people, and the people, but the army. Well, that means they report that such and such command posts are occupied in our country, we ourselves occupy large command posts, I, Tukhachevsky, and he is Uborevich, and here is Yakir. They demand - but what about Japan, the Far East? And so the campaign begins, a very serious campaign. They want to remove Blucher. And there is a candidate. Well, of course, Tukhachevsky. If not him, then who. Why withdraw? Agitation is led by Gamarnik, led by Aronshtam. So they deftly lead that they raised almost all of Blucher's entourage against him. Moreover, they convinced the leadership of the military center that it should be removed. Why, I ask, explain what's the matter? Here he is drinking. OK then. Well, what else? Here he does not get up early in the morning, does not go to the troops. What else? Outdated, does not understand new methods of work. Well, today he does not understand, tomorrow he will understand. The experience of the old fighter is not lost. Look, the Central Committee faces the fact of all the filth that is being said about Blucher. Putna is bombarding us, Aronshtam is bombarding us in Moscow, Gamarnik is bombarding us. Finally, we call a meeting. When he arrives, see him. The man, as a man, is not bad. We don't know what it is. Let's give him a speech

206 — LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGV NKVD. 1937-1938

fabulous. We check it in this order. People from the localities signaled, we are convening a meeting in the hall of the Central Committee.

He is, of course, wiser, more experienced than any Tukhachevsky, than any Uborevich who is an alarmist, and than any Yakir who is no different in military affairs. There was a small group. Let's take Kotovsky, he never commanded an army or a front. If people don't know what they're doing, we'll scold them - go to hell, we don't have a monastery. Put people in command posts who don't drink and don't know how to fight, it's not good. There are people with 10 years of experience as a commander, indeed, sand is pouring out of them, but they are not removed, on the contrary, they are kept. We then scolded Gamarnik, and Tukhachevsky supported him. This is the only case of agreement. The Germans must have informed, they took all measures. They wanted to put another one, but it doesn't work out.

Core consisting of 10 Patented Spies and 3 Patented Spy Instigators. It is clear that the very logic of these people depends on the German Reichswehr. If they follow the orders of the German Reichswehr, it is clear that the Reichswehr will be there to push these people here. Here is the background

conspiracy. This is a military-political conspiracy. This is a handwritten work of the German Reichswehr.

I think these people are puppets and puppets in the hands of the Reichswehr. The Reichswehr wants us to have a conspiracy, and these gentlemen have taken up the conspiracy. The Reichswehr wants these gentlemen to systematically deliver military secrets to them, and these gentlemen communicate military secrets to them. The Reichswehr wants the existing government to be removed, killed, and they took up this matter, but failed. The Reichswehr wanted everything to be ready in case of war, so that the army would go over to sabotage so that the army would not be ready for defense, this was what the Reichswehr wanted, and they were preparing this matter. This is an agency leading the core of the military-political conspiracy in the USSR, consisting of 10 patented spies and 3 patented instigators-spies.

This is the agency of the German Reichswehr. Here's the main one. This conspiracy, therefore, has not so much an internal basis as external conditions, not so much an internal policy in our country as the policy of the German Reichswehr. They wanted to make a second Spain out of the USSR and found themselves and recruited spies who were operating in this matter. Here is the situation.

Tukhachevsky especially, who played a noble man, an incapable, well-mannered person for petty dirty tricks. We considered him a good military man, I considered him a good military man.

<...>

The second question is why these gentlemen managed to recruit people so easily. Here we are, 300-400 people were arrested along the military line. There are good people among them. How were they recruited?

I cannot say that these are capable, talented people. How many times they started an open struggle against Lenin, against the party under Lenin and after Lenin, and each time they were beaten. And now they launched a big campaign and also failed. Not very talented people who failed every now and then from 1921 to 1937. Not very talented, not very brilliant.

How did they manage to recruit people so easily? This is a very serious matter. I think they acted in this way. A person is dissatisfied with something, for example, he is dissatisfied with the fact that he is a former Trotskyist or a Zinoviev and he is not promoted so freely. Or dissatisfied with the fact that he is a man

DOCUMENTATION

207

incapable, does not manage affairs and is reduced for this, but he considers himself very capable. It is very difficult sometimes for a person to understand the measure of his strength, the measure of his pluses and minuses. Sometimes a person thinks that he is a genius and therefore is offended when he is not nominated.

They started small, with an ideological group, and then moved on. They talked like this: "Here, guys, what's the matter. The GPU is in our hands, Yagoda is in our hands, the Kremlin is in our hands, because Peterson with us, Moscow district, Cork and Gor-

bachev is also with us. We have everything. Either move forward now, or tomorrow, when we come to power, stay on the beans. And many weak, unstable people thought that this was a real deal, damn it, but it seemed to be even profitable. You miss that way, during which time the government will be arrested, the Moscow garrison and all that sort of thing will be captured, and you will remain aground. (Cheerful animation in the hall <... >.)

Third question. Why are we doing this so weirdly? There were signals. In February there was a Plenum of the Central Committee. All the same, after all, this business was welling up, but all the same, they screwed up, few of us ourselves discovered from the military. What's the matter here? Maybe we are incapable people or have already become completely blind? There is a common reason here. Of course, the army is not cut off from the country, from the party, and in the party you know that these successes have somewhat turned your head, when every day successes, plans are exceeded, life improves, the policy seems to be not bad, the international weight of our country is growing. Undoubtedly, the army itself at the bottom and in the middle ranks, partly in the upper ranks, is a very healthy and colossal force, the whole thing is moving forward, involuntarily unwinds, visual acuity disappears, people begin to think, what the hell else is needed? What is missing? The policy is not bad, the workers' and peasants' Red Army is for us. The international weight of our country is growing, the way is open to each of us in order to move forward, is it possible that under these conditions anyone will think of counter-revolution? There are such ideas in their heads. We did not know that this nucleus had already been recruited by the Germans, and even if they wanted to deviate from the path of counter-revolution, they could not deviate, because they lived under the fear that they would be exposed and they would lay down their heads. But the general situation, the growth of our forces, the progressive growth both in the army, and in the country, and in the Party, here they have dulled our sense of political vigilance and somewhat weakened the sharpness of our vision. And it is precisely in this area that we found ourselves defeated.

It is necessary to check people and strangers who come, and their own. This means having a widely branched intelligence service so that every Party member and every non-Party Bolshevik, especially the organs of the OGPU, are close to the intelligence agencies, so that they expand their network and watch more vigilantly.

In all areas we defeated the bourgeoisie, only in the field of intelligence we were beaten like boys, like guys. Here is our main weakness. There is no intelligence, real intelligence. I take this word in the broad sense of the word, in the sense of vigilance, and in the narrow sense of the word, also in the sense of a good organization of intelligence. Our military intelligence is bad, weak, it is littered with espionage. Our intelligence through the GPU was headed by the spy Guy, and within the KGB intelligence we found a whole group of masters of this business, who worked for Germany, for Japan, for Poland as much as they wanted, but not for us. Intelligence is the area where we have suffered a severe defeat for the first time in 20 years. And so the task is to put intelligence on its feet. These are our eyes, these are our ears. Too big victories have been won, comrades, the USSR has become too tasty a morsel for all predators. A huge country, magnificent railways, a growing fleet,

208 _ LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Grain production is growing, agriculture is flourishing and will continue to flourish, industry is on the rise.

This is such a tasty morsel for the imperialist predators that this morsel obliges us to be vigilant. Fate, history entrusted such wealth, this magnificent and great country, and we found ourselves sleeping,

they forgot that such wealth as our country cannot but arouse greed, greed, envy and the desire to seize this country. Here is Germany, the first is seriously stretching out its hand, Japan the second is getting its scouts, has its own insurgent nucleus. Those want to get Primorye, these want to get Leningrad. We missed it, we didn't understand it. With these successes, we have turned the USSR into the richest country and at the same time into a tasty morsel for all the predators, who will not rest until they have tried every means to snatch something from this morsel. We missed this side. That is why our intelligence service is poor, and in this area we were beaten like children, like boys.

But that's not all, intelligence is bad. Very good. Well, the calm has gone. Fact. Success is one. This is a very big success and we all strive for it. But these successes have their own shadow side - complacency blinds. But we also have other such shortcomings, which, apart from any successes or failures, exist and which we must say goodbye to. Here they talked about signaling, they signaled. I must say that the signals were very bad from the ground. Badly. If there were more signals, if things were set up in your country the way Lenin wanted it, then every communist, every non-Party person, would consider himself obliged to write his personal opinion about the shortcomings that he notices. Your personal opinion. He so wanted, Ilyich, strove for this, neither he nor his chicks managed to arrange this business. It is necessary that not only look, observe, notice shortcomings and breakthroughs, notice the enemy, but all other comrades should also look at this matter. We can't see from here. They think that the center should know everything, see everything. No, the center does not see everything, nothing of the sort. The center sees only a part, the rest is seen locally. He sends people, but he does not know these people 100%, you have to check them. There is one means of real verification - this is the verification of people at work, according to the results of their work. And this is only the local people can see.

Here Comrade Goryachev spoke about the cases of dizzying practice. If we knew this matter, of course, we would take action. They talked about this and that, that we have a bad deal with a rifle, that our combat rifle tends to turn into a sporting one.

{Voice: Makhnovsky sawn-off shotgun}.

Not only sawn-off, the spring was weakened so that no tension was required. One of the rank and file soldiers told me that things were bad, they instructed someone to look into it. One defends Vasilenko, the other does not. In the end it turned out that he really was a sinner. We could not know that it was sabotage. And who does he turn out to be? Turns out he's a spy. He himself told. Since what year, Comrade Yezhov?

Yezhov: Since 1926.

Stalin: Of course, he calls himself a Trotskyist, where it is better to go around as Trotskyists than just as spies.

You signal badly, and without your signals neither the military nor the Central Committee can know anything. People are sent not 100% sucked, there are few such people in the center. Send people who can be useful. Your duty is to check people in practice, at work, and if there are inconsistencies, you will report

209

goodbye. Every member of the Party, honest non-Party, citizen of the USSR not only has the right, but is obliged to report the shortcomings that he notices. If it is true, at least by 5%, then this is bread. They are obliged to send letters to their people's commissar, of course to the Central Committee. As you wish.

<...>

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No. 93

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL A.Ya. LAPINA (28)

June 4, 1937

No. 57705

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the second protocol of the interrogation of the arrested participant in the anti-Soviet military-Trotskyist conspiracy A.Ya. LAPINA.

Pointed out by LAPIN as participants in the conspiracy, SANGURSKY, DZY ZA were arrested.

I ask for sanctions for the arrest of the rest of the participants in the conspiracy, named LAPIN.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

INTERROGATION
PROTOCOL of Albert Yanovich Lapin dated May 23, 1937

Born in 1899, member of the CPSU (b) since 1917, last position in the Red Army - assistant. commander of OKDVA for aviation, from November 1936 at the disposal of the NPO. Komkor.

Question: During the interrogation on May 19 of this year, by listing the participants in the Trotskyist military conspiracy, you hid from the investigation a number of persons personally recruited by you. The investigation requires truthful testimony from you.

Answer: I admit that I really did not give exhaustive evidence and, in order to diminish my guilt before the Party and the Soviet government, I tried to hide from the investigation my organizational work, which I was carrying out on the instructions of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, of which I was a member. In addition to those recruited by me into the counter-revolutionary

Kist organization: DZIZA - pom. commander of the OKDVA, PASHKOVSKY - commander of the 18th rifle corps, URALOV - commander of the 110th air brigade and KUTOVOY - commander of the 12th air squadron, as I testified during interrogation on May 19 of this year, the following persons were recruited by me at different times: - 1) early Air Force of the Primorsky Group OKDVA, division commander FLOROVSKII, 2) flag-navigator of the headquarters of the OKDVA Air Force captain BOGDANOV, 3) commander of the 301st light bomber squadron, Major KOPCHENOV.

Question: In his testimony dated May 19 of this year. You showed that FLOROVSKII was recruited into the counter-revolutionary organization by PUTNOY, and now

210 _ LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

you say that he is recruited by you. Tell me exactly who recruited FL ROVSKY - PUTN or you?

Answer: FLOROVSKII was recruited into our counter-revolutionary organization not by PUTN, but by me.

Question: Why did you give false testimony at previous interrogations regarding the recruitment of FLOROVSKII into a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization?

Answer: Knowing that I cannot conceal FLOROVSKII's counter-revolutionary activities from the investigation, because FLOROVSKII did a lot of wrecking work, I decided not to hide FLOROVSKII as a member of the organization, because I was sure that the investigation would establish this. But in order to belittle my leading role in the Trotskyist military conspiracy, I gave false testimony, pointing out that FLOROVSKII was recruited not by me, but by PUTN.

Question: When and under what circumstances did you involve FLOROVSKY in participating in a military conspiracy?

Answer: FLOROVSKII was recruited by me in the first half of 1935 in the mountains. Nikolsk-Ussuriysk, where I arrived on official business.

Knowing that FLOROVSKII in 1924 and in later years stood on Trotskyist positions and that in the past he was on friendly terms with PRIMAKOV, for whom he served in the corps in a command position, I decided to use this and recruit him into a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization.

Being in Nikolsk-Ussuriysk by the nature of my service, I began to indoctrinate FLOROVSKII in a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist direction. In one of our joint conversations with FLOROVSKII, I told him that some Trotskyists were interested in him and wanted to establish contact with him. At first he answered vaguely. I enhanced FLOROVSKII's processing. In one of our subsequent conversations, FLOROVSKII told me that he stood on the old Trotskyist positions and was ready to resume the fight against the CPSU(b). After that, he was recruited by me into a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization. When recruiting, I told FLOROVSKII that there was a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization in the OKDVA, which was drawing old Trotskyists into the organization who were ready to take a practical part in the struggle to overthrow the Soviet regime. In a conversation with FLOROVSKII about the situation in Southern Primorye, I drew a picture for him, in accordance with the instructions of the PUTN, from which it was clear that in a future war

the advantage is on the side of the Japanese army and that the Japanese will be the masters of the situation. FLOROVSKII agreed with my defeatist arguments, after which I told him that if he understood the situation, then certain conclusions should be drawn from this, and added that the Trotskyist organization had found a way out of this situation and that: "If defeat is hanging, then we must go to meet this defeat and work to prepare for the overthrow of the Soviet regime. After FLOROVSKII agreed to take part in the military Trotskyist conspiracy, I mentioned to him, speaking about the composition of our organization, DZYU, BALAKIREV and SANGURSKY as members of the organization.

Having received FLOROVSKII's consent to participate in a military conspiracy, I told him about the main guidelines of our counter-revolutionary organization, which boil down to the following: - 1) work to weaken the military power of the Red Army in order to achieve defeat during the war. - niya owls. authorities; 2) organization of sabotage and sabotage; 3) the implementation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government; 4) spying for foreign intelligence agencies.

DOCUMENTATION

211

These installations FLOROVSKII approved and accepted. Based on the general guidelines of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, I set the following tasks for FLOROVSKII: - 1) to train personnel for the counter-revolutionary organization, for which he must involve new members in the organization and 2) to organize sabotage and sabotage in the units of the OKDVA Air Force .

Question: What do you know about FLOROVSKII's practical activities as a participant in the Trotskyist conspiracy?

Answer: Meeting with FLOROVSKII at different times in 1935 and 1936, he informed me about his counter-revolutionary activities and told me that he had recruited the following persons: - 1) commander of the 29th air squadron IVANOV, 2) commander of the 19th air squadron in Galenki (surname forgot), 3) beginning. operas, part of the Spassky brigade KOCHENOVSKII, 4) engineer of the Baranovsky airfield, seconded to the headquarters of the Air Force of the Primorsky group - MARCHENKO.

Informing me about his sabotage activities, FLOROVSKII said that he carried out sabotage in Air Force units by disrupting combat training.

An indicator that FLOROVSKII accurately carried out the organization's guidelines may be the fact that in 1935 and 1936. in the Primorskaya group of catastrophes and accidents, there were 2-3 times more than in other formations and parts of OKDVA. In addition, FLOROVSKII disrupted the construction of the airfield, for example, he disrupted the construction of the following airfields: Bilmanovsky, Kremovsky and Daubikhinek, which, instead of being ready by the autumn of 1936, are not completed even at this time. In Spassk, FLOROVSKII delayed the construction of aircraft workshops more

than for one year.

Question: When and under what circumstances were you involved in

Tyu in the military Trotskyist conspiracy of BOGDANOV and KOPCHENOV?

Answer: The flag-navigator of the OKDVA Air Force, Captain BOGDANOV, was recruited by me in our counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization at the end of 1935 or the beginning of 1936 in my office in the mountains. Khabarovsk.

In 1935, while visiting the Bochkarevskaya brigade, where BOGDANOV was working at that time, I learned that he was afraid of being fired from the Red Army and expelled from the ranks of the CPSU (b) due to the fact that he was exposed by the command and the party organization as a fist, hiding his social background. I decided to use this to get him involved in the organization. Then I turned to BOGDANOV and said that I wanted to have in him a person devoted to me and that I intended to transfer him to work at the OKDVA Air Force headquarters. In order to create a certain mood in BOGDANOV, I told him that although there was a question of his dismissal from the ranks of the Red Army, nevertheless, no matter how difficult it was for me, I would get him transferred to my apparatus. After BOGDANOV declared his loyalty to me, I told him that in the future he would be used by me for counter-revolutionary work. BOGDANOV agreed, declaring that even if he had to prove his loyalty to me by fighting the Soviet regime, he was ready for that too.

I did not give any specific assignments to BOGDANOV. BOGDANOV I had in mind subsequently to mate with one of the members of our counter-revolutionary organization - a pilot, in order to have a pilot and a navigator - both members of the organization, on the combat vehicle, then such an aircraft could always be used for the purposes of the organization.

Major KOPCHENOV, as a participant in the military Trotskyist conspiracy, was recruited by me under the following circumstances. Learning 3rd job is easy

212

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

bomber squadron, I drew attention to the presence of a large number of accidents in the squadron. In 1935, in one of these conversations with KOKCHENOVYM at the airfield of his squadron in Bochkarev or Pozdeevka (I don't remember exactly now), I told him bluntly: "Your accidents are not accidental and they happen because you are a Trotskyist and spend on practice counterrevolutionary work. KOPCHENOV began to deny and explain the accident by objective circumstances. I "pressed" him and said that if he was sincere with me, this issue could be settled, to which Kopchenov replied: "I understand you and am ready to meet you halfway." Then I directly put before KOPCHENOV the question of his participation in the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization that exists in the Far East. He agreed.

When I told KOPCHENOV that through defeatism our organization intended to carry on the work of overthrowing the Soviet regime, KOPCHENOV remarked to me that this was the only correct path and that he saw no other means of overthrowing the Soviet regime.

I set before KOPCHENOV two practical tasks: — 1) continuation of accidents, 2) recruitment of new members into the organization.

I don't know how Kopchenov carried out my plan to recruit new members to the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, but the number of accidents in the squadron after his recruitment into the organization increased.

Question: You showed above that, in informing FLOROVSKII of the composition of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, you, as a member of the organization, named SANGURSKII and BALAKIREV. Give evidence, what do you know about SANGURSKII and BALAKIREV as participants in a military conspiracy?

Answer: Shortly before his departure from OKDVA, at the end of 1934, after visiting OKDVA, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense GAMARNIKOM and early. The General Staff of the Red Army Egorov, Putna, meeting with me in Khabarovsk or Nikolsk-Ussuriysk (I don't remember exactly), told me that he would probably soon be removed from work. As his successor in the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, PUTNA named Commander SANGURSKY, Deputy. commander of the OKDVA, who will head our counter-revolutionary organization in the Far East.

Also, from the words of SANGURSKY, I know that the chief of staff of the Primorsky group of the OKDVA division commander BALAKIREV, who leads the organization in South Primorye, is also a participant in the military Trotskyist conspiracy.

Question: Who else do you know as participants in the military Trotskyist conspiracy?

Answer: From SANGURSKY I know that the participants in the military Trotskyist conspiracy are: 1) early. SKO OKDVA - KASHCHEEV, 2) commander of the 1st rifle division - brigade commander FIRSOV, 3) commandant of the Poltava fortified area, brigade commander PETRUSHIN.

According to SANGURSKY, I know that all these members of our counter-revolutionary organization are sufficiently aware of the tasks and activities of the organization and that they themselves are doing a great deal of counter-revolutionary work.

Commandant PASHKOVSKY for participation in the military Trotskyist conspiracy recruited: 1) commandant of the Blagoveshchensk fortified area KRUGLOV

DOCUMENTATION_ 213

(commander or brigade commander - by rank); 2) early Bochkarevsky construction site, captain UDARTSEV.

PASHKOVSKY informed me about the recruitment into KRUGLOV's organization in the second half of 1935 at his apartment in Bochkarevo, when I was there on a business trip. The prerequisite for recruiting KRUGLOV into our counter-revolutionary organization was his former affiliation with the Trotskyist opposition.

According to PASHKOVSKY, KRUGLOV, in accordance with the directives of the counter-revolutionary organization, carried out practical counter-revolutionary work.

In the spring of 1936, PASHKOVSKY told me about Udartsev's recruitment into a counter-revolutionary organization at his apartment, declaring that Udartsev was practically carrying out sabotage at construction sites.

In 1936, during one of the conversations with SANGURSKII, the latter, informing me about the work of the organization, named the following persons as participants in the military Trotskyist conspiracy: 1) early. department of combat training of the OKDVA headquarters, brigade commander SUKHOMLINA; 2) the head of the 1st department of the headquarters of the OKDVA, Major ROTMISTROV.

Question: Who directed the work of the counter-revolutionary military Trotskyist organization in the Far East?

Answer: As I have already shown earlier, before leaving the Far East, he led the counter-revolutionary military Trotskyist organization OKDVA - PUTNA. PUTNA was a member of the All-Union Military Trotskyist Center and was the representative of this center in the Far East.

After the departure of PUTN from the Far East, the leadership of the organization passed to SAN GURSKY. From 1935, Sangursky carried out the general leadership of the organization, gave guidance on counterrevolutionary work, and was connected with the Japanese intelligence agencies.

The military center of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization in OKDVA included: 1) SANGURSKY - general leadership; 2) BALAKIREV - supervised the counter-revolutionary work in the territory of Southern Primorye; 3) I, LAPIN, supervised counter-revolutionary work in the air force and units of the 18th Rifle Corps; 4) DZYZA and KASHCHEEV - supervised wrecking and other counter-revolutionary work in the field of military development in the OKDVA.

In addition, from the words of SANGURSKY, I know that in addition to him, Balakirev also maintained contact with Japanese intelligence.

Question: What kind of espionage information did your counter-revolutionary organization supply to the Japanese intelligence agencies?

Answer: Both PUTNA and SANGURSKY told me that they had given the Japanese command fairly complete information about the Far Eastern Red Army. What specific espionage information was given to the Japanese?

niya - I don't know.

Question: You have shown that the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization timed its action against the Soviet government for the beginning of the war. Give evidence, how was the implementation of this speech planned in practice?

Answer: Our counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization in the OKDVA relied mainly on decisive action against the Soviet regime during the war. Before the start of the war, the counter-revolutionary organization had to build up strength by expanding the composition of the organization, shi

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

quickly launch wrecking and sabotage activities at construction sites, railway transport, communications, fuel and ammunition depots in order to destroy them.

We had to expand the composition of the organization through new recruitment of the command staff of the OKDVA, which occupies mainly a leading position in the army. Both PUTNA and SANGURSKY pointed out that when attracting new members to the organization, it is enough to confine oneself to 1-2 assignments in order to chain them to the organization.

During the war, the counter-revolutionary military organization had to disrupt the management of the Far Eastern troops, the participants in the organization had to give such orders and direct the units and troops subordinate to them in such a way as to go towards defeat.

Both PUTNA and SANGURSKY told me that during the war, at the appropriate moment, which the leadership of the organization would outline, the participants in the organization would have to physically destroy (shoot) the leaders of military and army formations devoted to Soviet power.

In addition, our military Trotskyist organization was supposed to lead a counter-revolutionary uprising in the rear, for the purpose of which part of the participants in the organization had to be sent to places of accumulation of anti-social
vet element.

Question: What practical sabotage work was carried out by you, as a participant in the military Trotskyist conspiracy, in the air forces of the OKDVA?

Answer: My sabotage work consisted in organizing catastrophes in the OKDVA Air Force. Among the disasters caused by the counter-revolutionary work of the members of the organization are: 1) the disaster in the Spasskaya brigade, 2) the disaster in the VLASOV in the Khabarovsk brigade, 3) the disaster in the METELKINA squadron in the 3rd light bomber squadron, 4) the disaster in the 31st squadron and others.

In the above disasters, 6 people died. Of all the disasters in the Air Force units for 1934-1936. at least 25% is the result of the subversive work of our organization.

Question: Which of the participants in the counter-revolutionary organization was entrusted with sabotage functions?

Answer: Each of the participants in our counter-revolutionary military Trotskyist organization had to carry out sabotage work. The extensive sabotage activity of our organization was timed to coincide with the beginning of hostilities with Japan.

Question: Will you testify about the terrorist activities of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization?

Answer: The question of terrorist forms of struggle against the Soviet regime has always been on the program of our organization.

Recruiting me to the counter-revolutionary military Trotskyist organization,

Putna told me that one of the forms of our struggle against the Party is the organization of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government.

In 1934, PUTNA, in a conversation with me, raised the question of organizing a terrorist act against People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, in the event of his arrival in the Far East. I refused to take over the execution of the terrorist act against VOROSHILOV.

DOCUMENTATION

215

Questions of terror in the future were also discussed by us. At the beginning of 1936, in Khabarovsk, the question of organizing terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government was discussed with me by DZYIZA, the head of the military center of the Trotskyist organization in OKDVA SANGURSKY. SAN GURSKY said that BALAKIREV and especially KASHCHEEV demanded that our organization carry out a terrorist act against the commander of OKDVA BLUKHER. Moreover, SANGURSKY said that it was KASHCHEEV who was responsible for the terrorist attack on BLUKHER.

Interrogation aborted.

I read it, it was written down from my words correctly - LAPIN

Interrogated:

Deputy early 5th Department of the GUGB NKVD Major of State Security - A GA S

Assistant to the head of the 3rd department of the 5th department of the GUGB, lieutenant of state security - ORESHNIKOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 306. L. 77-89. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Important."

The second record of Lapin's interrogation contains Stalin's handwritten notes: "Six questions to Lapin: 1) Which of the aviation industrial workers was involved in the conspiracy? 2) Was Berzin, who took over from Tairov, part of the conspiracy, the authorities in the Far East? 3) Does Tairov continue his subversive work in the MPR? 4) Which of the workers of Deribas is in a conspiracy? 5) Is Winner in the MPR in a conspiracy? 6) How is the situation with the district military intelligence in the Ukraine, in Belarus, in Leningrad? Didn't she connect the Trotskyists with Poland, just as our intelligence in the Far East connected the Trotskyists with the Japanese?"

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 316. L. 86. Original. Typescript.

No. 94

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT LITERATOR A. VESELOY

June 5, 1937

No. 57717

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I ask for your authorization for the arrest of the writer Artyom Vesely (Nikolai Ivanovich KOCHKURO VA) in connection with his counter-revolutionary Trotskyist activities.

A. Merry member of the CPSU (b), member of the Union of Soviet Writers; in 1927-1928 was associated with the Moscow Trotskyist center, on the instructions of which he wrote the counter-revolutionary story "Barefoot Truth". This story was illegally distributed among the members of the organization and used by them for Trotskyist propaganda.

According to the testimony of the arrested Trotskyist VORONSKY, in 1934, in a conversation with him, Artem VESELY showed his hatred for the leadership of the CPSU (b) and his terrorist sentiments, saying: "I would put a cannon on Red Square and shoot point-blank at the Kremlin." (From the testimony of P. VASILYEV dated 7/Sh-37.)

According to the latest undercover data, Artyom VESELY is closely connected with the counter-revolutionary-minded writer V.K. BAGROV. (Kuibyshev).

216

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Together with BAGROV, Vesely intended to write a poem praising the executed members of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev center ("Death of the Glorious"), which they planned to publish abroad.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 303. L. 35-36. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "For. Art. Arch."; "Informed to Yezhov. 6.VI. 19 hours 15 minutes.

No. 95

NOTE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. STALIN AND V.M.
MOLOTOV ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT IN OKDVA

June 8, 1937

No. 216 hp

Owls. secret

Central Committee of the CPSU (b)
comrade. STALIN SNK USSR comrade. MOLOTOV

At present, an investigation has been completed in Khabarovsk in relation to 20 members of the Trotskyist-terrorist spy-sabotage organization operating in the building bodies of the OKDVA.

Members of this organization, employees of the construction department of OKDVA (chiefs, engineers, construction site technicians) prepared terrorist acts against comrade. L.M. Kaganovich during his trip to the Far East and against comrade. Blucher, carried out a number of wrecking actions, had direct connections with Japanese intelligence, which was given spy materials on the state of OKDVA military formations.

I consider it expedient to entrust this matter to the visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, which is now in the Far East, and to sentence all those convicted by the court of participation in this organization to the highest penalty - execution.

I ask for your instructions.

Annex: list of persons in respect of whom the investigation is completed *-

A. VYSHINSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 308. L. 86. Copy. Typescript.

' Published without attachment.

No. 96

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EVICTION OF THE FAMILIES OF TROTSKYISTS AND RIGHTS (29)

June 8, 1937

476 - Question of the Azov-Chernomorsky regional committee of the CPSU (b).

To instruct the NKVD to carry out the eviction from the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory to one of the districts of Kazakhstan of the families of the arrested Trotskyists and rightists.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 306. L. 170. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

There is a typewritten note in the text: "Mailing to comrade. Yezhov, AChKraykom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

DOCUMENTATION

No. 97

NOTE L.Z. MEHLIS I.V. TO STALIN WITH THE
APPENDIX OF THE DRAFT LEADING ON
THE TRIAL OF THE GROUP OF M.N. TUKHACHEVSKY

June 10, 1937

Tov. STALIN

I'm sending *an advanced draft*, written according to your instructions.

L. MEHLIS

THE CRISIS OF FOREIGN 'BOURGEOIS' INTELLIGENCE

Today we are publishing a notice from the USSR Prosecutor's Office about the trial of eight spies caught red-handed. The hirelings of a foreign state, the most vile traitors to their homeland, they had a task from their masters: by all available means to undermine the power of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army - the beloved brainchild of the peoples of the USSR, to undermine the defense capability of the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants. Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, Feldman, Primakov, Putna—these are the thrice contemptible, hateful names of the participants in this, now defeated, spy core of fascist intelligence agents.

Thousands and tens of thousands of spies and spies are sending capitalist states to each other. Using the clearest historical examples, Comrade Stalin, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on March 3, 1937, showed and proved that sending spies and saboteurs is an indispensable attribute of any bourgeois state:

"It has been proven, as two times two is four, that the bourgeois states send their spies, wreckers, saboteurs, and sometimes murderers to each other behind each other, give them the task of infiltrating the institutions and enterprises of these states, creating their own network there and "in case necessity" - to blow up their rears in order to weaken them and undermine their power. That is how things stand at the present time. This has been the case in the past as well. Such is the law of relations between bourgeois states."

There is every reason, from the point of view of Marxism, to assume, Comrade Stalin said in the same report, that "into the rear of the Soviet Union the bourgeois states should send twice and three times as many wreckers, spies, saboteurs and murderers as into the rear of any bourgeois states".

The eight spies who "today** will appear before the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR were a very important detachment of a foreign state, which is especially active in sending spies to the USSR. The fascist masters pinned great hopes on this core, and therefore the wild howl raised by the bourgeois, especially the fascist, press over the arrest of this spy gang is understandable. Inspired by the Goebbels Ministry, which is notorious for its anti-Soviet lies, the German press has been continuously screaming for the past few days about "depositions and arrests of major military men in the USSR", which means almost a "crisis of Soviet power".

Ridiculous attempts to portray the exposure of the eight spies as something testifying to the "weakness of the Soviet government" betray the masters of the fascist press with their heads. The exposure of this gang and the trial of it is a sign of the strength, power and invincibility of the Soviet system.

218

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Fascist lawyers put themselves in a ridiculous position. They themselves send their spies to us, and when the organs of Soviet power expose them, catch them red-handed, then these gentlemen scream about the inhumanity allegedly shown to spies. Only the most naive simpletons can take these cries of the reactionary press at face value. In fact, as all sane people perfectly understand, these cries are nothing but laments for the lost spies in whom so much hope was placed. The defeat of the last military-espionage core of one foreign state is a big blow to the warmongers and their plans to undermine the power of the Red Army and enslave the peoples of the USSR.

This defeat testifies **** not to the "crisis" of Soviet power ****, but to the crisis of intelligence of the capitalist *****countries*****.

The spies are caught red-handed. Their plans and those of their fascist masters are exposed by the dictatorship of the working class. They appear as pygmies—venomous, full of malice and hatred for the workers and peasants—and yet insignificant even in their fury before the great power of victorious socialism. All subterfuges, all the sophistication of camouflage, all the centuries-old experience of bourgeois intelligence are now, and will in the last analysis, be beaten by the increased vigilance of Soviet intelligence, the vigilance of the organs of the dictatorship of the working class created by the great party of Lenin and Stalin.

The eight spies who were caught, who sold themselves to the enemy, who betrayed their homeland, will be judged in the name of the entire Soviet people by the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The court included the chairman of the Military Collegium, comrade. Ulrich and our marshals and army commanders Blucher, Budyonny, Alksnis, Dybenko, Kashirin, Belov, Shaposhnikov, Goryachev are the flower of our glorious Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, the flower of the defense personnel of our great homeland nurtured by the Lenin-Stalin party.

The court will reveal to the end all those vile ways, methods, methods by which the military espionage group wanted to inflict the defeat of our great Red Army, wanted to shed rivers of workers 'and peasants' blood to defeat the USSR and ***** restore the power of the landlords and capitalists *****. These vile dreams will never come true! In the name of the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the name of all the peoples of our country, the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court will reward the spy fascist rabble for their heinous deeds in full measure!

Great*** and sacred is the hatred of all the working people of our country for the enemies of the people—spies, saboteurs, wreckers, for all those who want to pollute the flourishing Soviet soil with the stinking boot of German-Japanese fascism. The Soviet people will judge the spy gang in full accordance with Article 133 of the great Stalinist Constitution, according to which "from

betrayal of the homeland: breaking an oath, going over to the side of the enemy, damaging the military power of the state, espionage - are punished to the fullest extent of the law, as the most serious crime.

There is and will not be any mercy for the scouts of the capitalist world. These scouts will not escape the ever more watchful eye of the dictatorship of the working class. The reptile of fascist espionage is multi-headed. But we will cut off her head, we will find all the tentacles and stings of the snake, we will neutralize it, we will cut it off. For these prickly fingers and stingers are sought out by millions of eyes of Soviet patriots.

The vigilance of Soviet intelligence, the vigilance of the NKVD, headed by Comrade. Yezhov, whose words do not differ from deeds, interrupted the vile activities of the eight fascist spies. This defeat of the military espionage group, with which the fascists had a lot of hope, -

DOCUMENTATION

219

a vivid indicator of the crisis, the decline of bourgeois intelligence. This defeat testifies that any new attempt to send spies and saboteurs into the USSR will be stopped in time.

Soviet intelligence is getting stronger, growing, strengthening. Let all spies, saboteurs and murderers tremble. Soviet intelligence will show what it is capable of!* 5

*1

Is it true. June 11, 1937

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 308. L. 78. Original. Manuscript. L. 79-83. Script. Typewriting.

— the word "bourgeois" is inserted.

the word "soon" is crossed out, instead of it "today" is entered.

- the phrase "very strange" has been crossed out.

ÿ*ÿ*__**** the phrase is entered.

ÿ**ÿ*—ÿ**** the words "of the states and the increased strength of the intelligence of the Soviet Union!" crossed out, "countries" are written instead.

**

in the final version, the following text will be deleted from this: "The vile masters of the vile spies dreamed that they would be able to prepare the invasion of the spring of 1918 on Soviet Ukraine. Then in the spring of 1918, at the beginning of this invasion, Comrade Stalin in the article "Uk-

the rain junction" explained to the workers and peasants what the German imperialists were striving for. Comrade Stalin

wrote at the time that this "invasion has as its goal not only the obtaining of bread, but mainly the overthrow of Soviet power in the Ukraine,

restored

the destruction of the old bourgeois regime". And then Comrade Stalin wrote in the same article,
What

"The goal of the imperialists is to render the Ukrainian workers and peasants incapacitated by taking away from them the blood-won power and handing it over to the landowners and capitalists. The imperialists carry on their bayonets a new shameful yoke, which is no better than the old Tatar one.

The imperialist predators, defeated and expelled in disgrace from the USSR, cannot calm down. They dream of a new campaign against the USSR in order to betray our Great Motherland to fire and sword, as they do in Spain. They want to turn the peoples of the USSR into slaves of German imperialism. And now these fascist unfortunate organizers of the anti-Soviet war have lost their last military espionage core in the USSR.

Step by step, link by link, the court will draw to the end the entire chain of the most vile crimes of the eight spies against our Motherland, the entire chain of their espionage and wrecking activities, their connections with the general staff of a foreign state.

*~***~_***~*~ The words "restoration of the power of the landlords" are crossed out, instead of them
inserted

"restoring the power of the landlords and capitalists."

**
the word "burning" has been crossed out.

*** The paragraph is underlined in pencil.

No. 98

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE "TERRORISM" ORGANIZATION IN THE
FAR EAST

P June 1937

499 - Vyshinsky's question.

Accept Vyshinsky's next proposal.

To instruct the visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, located in the Far East, to consider the case of the Trotskyist terrorist espionage and wrecking organization that operated in the construction organizations of the OKDVA, and to sentence all those found guilty by the court of participating in this organization to capital punishment — execution.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 251. L. 43. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

220

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 99

NOTE A.A. Slutsky I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE
"SURREPTITIOUS" ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPUTY TRADE REPRESENTATIVE IN TURKEY

June 14, 1937

Owls. secret

The 7th department of the NKVD GUGB has the following information about the deputy trade representative in Turkey, STAROZUM:

1. Being in the MPR as a deputy trade representative of BIRKENHOF, STAROZUM was an active conductor of the wrecking k.r. Trotskyist installation of SOKOLNIKOV about the net balance in trade with the Mongolian People's Republic.

The implementation of this installation would have entailed a commodity shortage in the MPR and undermined the confidence of the Mongols in the USSR.

2. STAROZUM participated in the preparation of a special memorandum to the underestimated plan for the delivery of goods to the Mongolian People's Republic for 1936. This plan was carried out in the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade by BIRKENHOF (BIRKENHOF was arrested and convicted at the end of 1936 as an active Trotskyist).

3. STAROZUM's wife let slip in a private conversation that, returning from a business trip abroad to the USSR, STAROZUM offered her to hide a copy of the German edition of TROTSKY's book My Life, which he had acquired in Germany, in order to smuggle this book illegally into the USSR. STAROZUM, who was present during the conversation, tried to prove that he had acquired the book only for the purpose of "learning the German language."

4. STAROZUM's relatives live in Poland. STAROZUM has a lively correspondence with them.

Head of the VII Department of the GUGB NKVD Slutsky

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 308. L. 165. Copy. Typescript.

There are handwritten notes on the sheet: "T. Stalin" and Stalin: "Arrest".

no. yuo

CODE TELEGRAM V.F. SHARANGOVICH I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT
N.M. GOLODEDE AND A.G. CHERVYAKOV

June 14, 1937

No. 1016

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

Arrested: former People's Commissariat Benek, former People's Commissariat of Education Dyakov, former deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee Petrovich, former chairman of the Mozyr District Executive Committee Dubin, former corps commander Shakh-Nazarov, who confessed that they were members of the counterrevolutionary

sabotage and espionage organization, show that this entire organization in Belarus was headed by Goloded and Chervyakov. These same persons show that Goloded was connected directly with Warsaw and with the Polish ambassador in Moscow. Shah-Nazarov shows about the Famine as one of the leaders of the military conspiracy in Belarus, together with Uborevich.

DOCUMENTATION

221

Reporting this, it is absolutely clear to me that Goloded is an enemy of the people, so I ask you to authorize his arrest. In connection also with the testimony about Chervyakov, and also taking into account that at the current congress of the Communist Party of Byelorussia, almost every delegate who speaks presents a direct political mistrust and accusation against Chervyakov, I think that Chervyakov should be removed from the post of Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Byelorussia.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of
Belarus SHARANGOVICH RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 56. L. 114. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten resolution on the cipher telegram: "To Sharangovich. Hunger arrested. We advise you not to prevent the congress from failing Chervyakov. If the congress decides to remove Chervyakov from the post of chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Belarus, we will not object. Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin. No. 27/s - 769/sh 14.VI.37

No. 101

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT THE MEMBER OF THE "ANTI-SOVIET" ORGANIZATION D.P. goon

June 19, 1937

No. 57948

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The materials of the investigation into the case of the anti-Soviet organization of the right in the Azov-Chernomorsky and Ordzhonikidzevsky regions established that the former commander of the cavalry corps, now the director of the Kuban rice state farm ZHLOBA Dmitry Petrovich, a member of the CPSU (b), is one of the active participants in the organization.

According to the testimony of the arrested A.S. RAZORENOVA and I.N. PIVOVAROV, the leaders of the right-wing organization expected to use ZhLOBA as the leader of an armed uprising that was being prepared in the Kuban and the North Caucasus.

"Zhloba also participates in the work of the rightists, on whom, according to PIVOVAROV, the rightists place great hopes as leaders of the uprising, since he can attract a significant part of the former. partisan." (From the testimony

A.S. RAZORENOV dated 11/VI-37)

ZHLOBA grouped around him the former Red Cossack partisans from among the anti-Soviet-minded. He subsidized them from the funds of the state farm, thereby creating at the rice state farm a significant group of people devoted to him, capable of fulfilling any orders for terror and insurrection, about which the arrested I.N. PIVOVAROV testified as follows:

"Zhloba at his Kuban rice state farm gathered a large group of former. red Cossack partisans, extremely hostile to anti-Soviet attitudes, provided them with material assistance in the form of one-time gratuitous subsidies at the expense of the state farm.

"ZhLOBA told me that from the funds of the state farm he provided material assistance to the Cossack collective farmers who suffered from the flood, and, while providing assistance, he said to them: "Here, the Soviet government does not help you, but ZHLOBA helps."

222

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

With such methods, ZHLOBA rallied around him a large group of people devoted to him, capable of any subversive and terrorist activity according to his instructions. (From the testimony of I.N. PIVOVAROV dated 17/VI-37) I consider it necessary for D.P. to arrest.

I ask for your approval.

People's Commissar int. Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State. security N. EZHOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 309. L. 137-138. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "For the arrest. St. "; "Comrade Ezhov reported. Poskrebyshev.

No. 102

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL L.M. KARAHANA

June 19, 1937

No. 57951

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the protocol of interrogation of Karakhan L.M. from 2.VI - 37

People's Commissar int. Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State. security N. EZHOV

INTERROGATION

PROTOCOL of the Arrested Karakhan Lev Mikhailovich
dated June 2, 1937

Question: In your earlier testimony, you named a number of people who took part in the anti-Soviet conspiracy. The investigation has data that you hid a number of state criminals and their treacherous activities.
ness.

We propose to name all the persons whom you indicated in your testimony.

Answer: I really concealed a number of persons known to me from the "high command of the Red Army" who took part in the anti-Soviet conspiracy. I know that TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH and KORK* were active participants in the conspiratorial activity. In addition to them, a significant number of military men were involved in the activities of the anti-Soviet conspiracy, but their names are unknown to me, since I considered it sufficient for myself to know that the persons I named above take part in the conspiracy. This was also due to the need for secrecy. *0 the fact that other leading officials of the RKYu are taking part in the conspiracy, I know from YAGODA and TUKHACHEVSKY.

German government circles were also informed of the participation of the military in the conspiracy. And here I consider it necessary to point out the circumstance that at his first meeting with General MILCH in Budapest, he told me directly that in the upcoming war between Germany and the USSR, the latter would in a short time have a big breakthrough in artillery economy*.

DOCUMENTATION

223

I know about the participation in the conspiracy of TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR from my personal criminal relations with them. *0 that KORK and UBOREVICH* are participants in the conspiracy, I know from YAGODA and TUKHACHEVSKY.

Question: When did you first become aware of TUKHACHEVSKY's participation in the anti-Soviet conspiracy?

Answer: I learned this for the first time during my penultimate meeting with YAGODA before leaving for Turkey, if my memory serves me right, in October 1934 YAGODA told me that a large group of military workers was taking part in the conspiracy and that TUKHACHEVSKY was heading the military organization of the conspiracy. .

Question: When did you personally get in touch with TUKHACHEVSKY on questions of the conspiracy?

Answer: In the autumn of 1935, I arrived in Moscow from Paris. After a conversation with Yagoda about our negotiations with General MILCHOM, we decided that *according to

military questions, I need to meet with TUKHACHEVSKY in order to allegedly explain to him in detail the point of view of the German General Staff of the Reichswehr and ask his advice on the further direction of military negotiations with the German government *.

Immediately, from Yagoda's office, I called TUKHACHEVSKY and told him that I wanted to meet him, and indicated that I was speaking from Yagoda's office. TUKHACHEVSKY agreed to the meeting, and I went directly from Yagoda to the People's Commissariat of Defense. The interview took place in his office. TUKHACHEVSKY knew that I was negotiating with the German government, and our conversation concerning the counter-revolutionary activities of the conspiracy did not have any probing moments: we went straight to the point.

During the conversation TUKHACHEVSKY kept emphasizing that he was becoming more and more convinced that even the most successful activities of the conspiracy within the USSR would not be successful without serious external assistance. He considered a direct declaration of war by Germany to the USSR as the surest means: moreover, according to his calculations and proposals, it turned out that in the shortest period of time Germany would deal a catastrophic blow to the USSR, since a large number of senior command positions in the Red Army occupied by conspirators who will help the Germans achieve this success*.

As a result of the defeat of the USSR and the implementation, thus, of the plans of the conspiracy * the conspirators will come to power, who will conclude peace with Germany, and most likely, a military alliance, in order to launch a military campaign against France together with Germany *. This, according to TUKHACHEVSKY, is the maximum program, which is hardly feasible in the near future, since the Germans are not ready for a direct declaration of war on the USSR. Therefore, the plan of helping Germany to the conspirators, which was proposed by General MILCH, is more realistic.

Tukhachevsky stressed that he personally considered the southern option more expedient, i.e. one that could have taken place if Germany, having taken possession of Czechoslovakia, would later establish itself in Romania, having a naval base in Bulgaria.

He considered the southern option more suitable, because in Ukraine the ground for the actions of the anti-Soviet conspiracy is more favorable than in Leningrad*. TUKHACHEVSKY told me that in Ukraine the conspirators were more organized, that they managed to create a strong military organization there, headed by Yakir, and, secondly, it was more strategically convenient for Germany to strike the south of the USSR, since this would make it possible to attack, as from the sea as well as from land.

224

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

"When I told TUKHACHEVSKY that General MILCH had informed me that the Germans had intensified their work in Turkey and Persia against the USSR and were preparing for sabotage work on our territory, he did not attach much importance to this *, pointing out that sabotage activities on the Asian border would not give necessary effect for the success of the conspiracy, and that the success of our cause

decides the strategic intervention of the German armed forces.

During a conversation with TUKHACHEVSKY, the latter told me that it would be very important to find out in advance *in what extent the Germans could provide assistance with aviation and other military formations*. In this regard, he stated that he paid serious attention to the selection of people in the air defense of the USSR, that the participants in the conspiracy had not been seriously engaged in this selection until recently, and this was necessary to disrupt the repulse of the attack of German aircraft, create panic among population and distrust in the forces of the Red Army, which will entail political demoralization and disorder in the rear.

In this conversation, TUKHACHEVSKY several times pointed out that, from the point of view of the conspiracy, the Ukrainian and Belorussian military districts were the most prepared, where such large military workers as Yakir and Uborevich were at the head of the organization.

Turning to the question of communications during the war, he told me that communications with the Germans would be maintained by radio and, as far as he knew, Yagoda had taken the necessary measures in this regard - codes, ciphers, etc. had been worked out.

"TUKHACHEVSKY developed the following plan for helping the Germans, which the center of the conspiracy considered necessary to support the German offensive against the USSR," namely:

a) transfer of plans for the strategic deployment of the Red Army on the Western and Far Eastern fronts of the theater of war;

b) disorganization of air defense and operations in fortified centers;

c) performances in the rear of individual units led by conspirators and, finally;

***d) the commission of various acts of sabotage in the rear of the army - the destruction of junction stations, the explosion of bridges, etc., with the aim of hindering the advance of the Red Army units to the deployment of strategic operations ***.

Question: Could you tell us in more detail what exactly TUKHACHEVSKY told you about the southern variant of Germany's attack on the USSR?

Answer: Basically, it boiled down to the following: in the opinion of TUKHACHEVSKY, a blow to the southeast is the most advantageous for Germany: she can easily and in a short time capture Czechoslovakia and, in any case, break her resistance before anyone or come to her aid. And then, having friendly Poland on the one hand, and friendly Austria and Hungary on the other, she will easily take over Romania, which, in the opinion of TUKHACHEVSKY, will immediately give Germany an enormous strategic advantage against the USSR. Germany receives a huge raw material base and oil, which she can pump out in the quantity she needs. In addition to all these advantages, this plan enables Germany to create both naval and air bases in close proximity to the territory of the USSR.

Thus, in addition to Bulgaria, Germany will become one foot in Romania, which will immediately change the balance of power in the Black Sea.

As I have already indicated above, TUKHACHEVSKY considered this option the most reliable and successful. In this regard, I want to inform the investigation that the

Neral MILCH, speaking about the possible options for the German offensive on

DOCUMENTATION

225

USSR, declared: **** "The organization of German naval bases in Bulgaria can be organized only under the guise of Bulgarian naval bases, which, in the event of an open war of Germany against the USSR or covert assistance to a counter-revolutionary conspiracy, could be used as bases for a German fleet****. Bulgaria itself, without violating treaties prohibiting it from arming itself, cannot create its own fleet.

At the Montreux conference, Turkey adopted a ban on the passage of submarines in the Black Sea, which ban on submarines was included in the convention. Thus, Germany proposes to transfer submarines to the naval bases of Bulgaria by transferring the submarines in disassembled form or by rail or by commercial steamships, which do not stop in the straits and are not subject to control. All these considerations of MILCH I set out in detail to TUKHACHEVSKY. This ended my conversation with him.

Question: You indicated above that you were in criminal relations with Yakir. Tell us what their crime was and everything you know about the counter-revolutionary activities of Yakir?

Answer: *I first learned about the participation of Yakir in the anti-Soviet conspiracy from Yagoda at the beginning of 1935. Yagoda told me that Yakir was one of the leaders of the military group of conspirators and that he was in contact with TUKHACHEVSKY* throughout his criminal activities.

In the autumn of the same 1935, I had a personal meeting with Yakir in Paris, where I fully told him about the content of my negotiations with General MILCHOM.

In response to my inquiries about the course of preparations for the conspiracy in the Ukraine, Yakir informed me that he had succeeded in enlisting a group of military men, who hold a high position in the army, in the activities of the conspiracy.

Question: What surnames did YAKIR give you?

Answer: I didn't ask him for his last name, because I considered this message from YAKIR convincing enough for me.

Question: You hide these faces. It cannot be that YAKIR did not tell you the names of his accomplices.

Answer: I declare once again that I did not know the names of YAKIR's accomplices.

Question: What time frame did the center of the conspiracy set for joint action with the German military units?

Answer: All preparations for an armed uprising and the simultaneous physical destruction of the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the government were intended

Chen was the center of the conspiracy for the spring-summer of 1937.

Written down from my words correctly and read by me - KARAKHAN.

Interrogated:

Head of the 1st Department of the 3rd Department of the GUGB NKVD - Captain
of State Security - YARTSEV

Deputy Head of the 14th Department of the 3rd Department of the GUGB Senior Lieutenant of
State Security - PETROV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 309. L. 123-130. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Important".
__ underlined in pencil. —

There are Stalin's handwritten notes on the margins:

•* _** "take Berry under attack."

__
"interrogate Apoga (hard)."

****__***** "Recall Raskolnikov from Bulgaria."

226

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 103

NOTE I.V. Stalin on the expulsion of the wives of convicted
leaders

June 19, 1937

Send wives from Moscow immediately: 1. Tukhachevsky 2. Kork 3. Uborevich 4. Yakir (From Kiev) 5. Gamarnik 6.
Rudzutak 7. Eideman 8. Feldman 9. Magalif 10. Berries 11. Lifshits. Radek. Bukharin.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 309. L. 131 - yyÿÿb. Script. Manuscript.

No. 104

JOINT ORDER NPO AND NKVD USSR No. 082 (30)

June 21, 1937

ÿ082

Secret

In a number of military districts, there were cases of surrender of persons of command

senior, commanding and Red Army personnel who were involved in the activities of counter-revolutionary fascist and wrecking organizations or who knew about their existence, but did not inform the Soviet authorities about it.

Having considered these cases of sincere repentance for their criminal activity and voluntary full and comprehensive reporting of it to the command and organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, as well as fully naming all their accomplices and persons whose criminal activities they knew, we order :

1. To commanders, chiefs, military commissars, military prosecutors and special departments of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, military personnel, members of counter-revolutionary and sabotage fascist organizations who repented of their crimes, voluntarily appeared and, without concealment, told about everything they had done, and named everyone his accomplices and like-minded people - not to subject them to detention and arrest and not to initiate criminal prosecution against them.

The corresponding order to all organs of the Procurator's Office is simultaneously given by the Procurator of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Vyshinsky.

2. The military councils of the districts (armies, fleets) immediately report to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on all cases of voluntary surrender of repentant criminals guilty of participating in counter-revolutionary conspiracies against the Soviet Government and naming all their like-minded people and accomplices, and also persons known to them as enemies of the people.

At the same time, present their views both on the possibility, in each individual case, of leaving a repentant and forgiven criminal in the ranks of the Red Army, and on his further official use in the army.

Read this order in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, ships, warehouses, headquarters, directorates and institutions of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army.

People's Commissar of Defense of the
USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security N. Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 310. L. 1-2. Typewritten copy.

DOCUMENTATION

227

No. 105

NOTE S.A. Sarkisova I.V. STALIN*

June 24, 1937

One of the arrested pests engineer Gusev (former deputy of Bazhanov) in his testimony reports from the words of the pest Gadzevich (he worked at Glavugol) that "Georgy Ippolitovich Lomov, who works in the State Planning Committee on coal industry issues, is aware of all the subversive work in coal industry carried out by the Trotskyists. The same Gusev shows:

"Gadzevich, telling me that the counter-revolutionary organization in the coal industry is led by Trotskyists, pointed out the existing contact with the right, while naming the name of Lomov." In another place, Gusev testifies: "In connection with the name of Lomov, I recall the following incident: in June 1932, when I was working in the Stalinugol trust, I was tried to be recruited by someone who had arrived in Stalino and was then working in the long-term planning department of Glavtok » Engineer Getsov. S.A. Getsov, referring to the positive feedback about me from the Social Revolutionary Volkenau, suggested that I go to work at the State Planning Commission, where he could arrange me through Lomov. At the same time, Getsov told me that Lomov was Rykov's closest friend and was a member of the group of rightists led by Rykov.

I consider it necessary to inform you of these testimony of the pest Gusev.

S. SARKISOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 310. L. 85. Original. Typescript.

* Published in part.

There are handwritten notes: "T-shu Molotov. How to be? I. Stalin"; "For the immediate arrest of this bastard Lomov. V. Molotov"; "Agree. St.".

No. 106

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT AWARDING EMPLOYEES OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR (31)

June 25, 1937

40 - 0 awarding Zakovsky L.M., Shapiro-Daikhovsky N.E., Korkin P.A., Karamyshev P.V. and etc.

Approve the next draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 989. L. 10. Original. Typescript.

Protocol N8 51.

No. 107

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ON THE LIQUIDATION OF THE "FASCIST" ORGANIZATION

June 27, 1937

N9 58100

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC AUCP(b) STALIN

The GUGB of the NKVD liquidated a large fascist terrorist organization that had its branches in Leningrad, the West Siberian Territory and Ukraine, and fascist groups in a number of cities in the USSR. A total of 170 people were arrested in connection with the case.

228

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

The organization was associated with the Gestapo and the German consulates in Leningrad and Kyiv and received large sums of money from Germany intended for the needs of counterrevolutionary work on the territory of the USSR.

Members of the organization carried out the tasks of the Gestapo on military and economic espionage and carried out wrecking work aimed at disrupting socialist construction in the USSR.

In 1934, the organization, under a directive received from Germany, began the practical preparation of terrorist acts against the leadership of the CPSU (b).

The investigation of the case established that the Ukrainian branch of the fascist organization is headed by the Ukrainian academician SVITALSKY Nikolay Ig-
natyevich.

Svitalsky N.I. recruited into the organization in 1932 by the head of the organization, professor NUMEROV (arrested), and in 1933, at the direction of the leadership of the organization, he moved to Ukraine and began to rally nationalist, fascist elements, Ukrainian intelligentsia in the ranks of the fascist organization.

By the time the organization was liquidated, Svitalsky had created a number of fascist groups: in Kyiv, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa and other cities of the Ukrainian SSR.

In 1933, during a trip to a scientific mission to Germany, SVITALSKI established contact with the German National Socialist Party and concluded an agreement with the latter, according to which the German National Socialist Party promised SVITALSKI's fascist organization full support, and subsequently armed assistance. in the form of an intervention. On the other hand, the fascist organization took upon itself espionage in favor of Germany and promised to direct all its practical activities to concealing from the Soviet government resources, minerals in the Ukraine, in order to preserve them for Germany.

Carrying out the instructions of the German National Socialist Party, SVITALSKY and the members of the fascist organization headed by him carried out extensive espionage and sabotage work. Thus, SVITAL'SKYM personally handed over to Germany information about the industrial reserves of mineral raw materials on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

In June 1936, with the assistance of Svitalsky, a member of the organization

Professor NICHIPORENKO (arrested) handed over to the Gestapo agent VLASHEK, who was visiting from Germany, a secret scheme of the Dnieper fairway. At the beginning of 1936, the results of scientific research by a member of the organization, Professor MALYNOSKY, were sent to Germany (arrested) for the rest
novation of motors at a distance using ultrashort radio waves.

In 1935, the Ukrainian fascist organization received a directive from the Leningrad center of the organization - to start creating combat terrorist groups and concrete preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and members of the government of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

The investigation revealed that Svitalsky N.I., began the practical preparation of terrorist acts, on the advice of the employees of the Kiev German Consulate, established contact with the Trotskyist Ukrainian organization, and the connection was established not only between the leadership of the organization, but also between their groups in enterprises and institutions.

Through the leadership of the organization, communication was carried out by: from the side of the Ukrainian fascist organization - a member of the center of the Ukrainian fascist organization, deputy director of the Institute of Geology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR - I.A. LEPIKASH, from the side of the Trotskyists - KILLEROG.

They jointly supervised the preparation of terrorist acts.

DOCUMENTATION

229

The investigation also established the active role of the fascist organization of Leningrad scientists: MUSHKETOVA D.I. - Professor of the Leningrad Mining Institute and GERASIMOVICH B.P. director of the Pulkovo Observatory.

Professor MUSHKETOV D.I. heads the fascist group of scientists of the Leningrad Mining Institute and the Research Central Geological Prospecting Institute and directs the wrecking work carried out by the members of the group in the field of engineering geology, and especially in oil.

It was also established that MUSHKETOV was a supporter of terrorist methods of combating the Soviet regime and was actively working to prepare terrorist acts against the head of the CPSU (b) and members of the USSR government.

GERASIMOVICH Boris Petrovich, director of the Pulkovo Observatory, created a fascist group from among the employees of the Pulkovo Observatory and directs its counter-revolutionary work.

In 1932, during a scientific trip to America, and in 1935, during a trip to France, GERASIMOVICH gave counter-revolutionary information about the situation in the USSR to out-of-band fascist White émigré organizations and, upon his return, gave the leadership of the fascist organization a directive from out-of-band White emigre centers about the need for a more active struggle against the Soviet regime.

GERASIMOVICH led the espionage work of the members of the fascist group and was personally connected with the German intelligence officer BONODORF.

In conversations with members of the group, GERASIMOVICH spoke out as a supporter of terrorist methods of combating the Soviet regime.

I consider it necessary to arrest the following:

1. SVITALSKIY Nikolai Ignatievich, member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, PhD Rector of the Research Institute of Geology, Deputy Chairman of the "Council of Productive Forces of the Ukrainian SSR". Organizer of the Ukrainian branch of the fascist organization. Organizer of terror against the leaders of the CPSU (b). Associated with the Gestapo and the German National Socialist Party.

2. LEPIKASH Illarion Avtonomovich, Deputy Director of the Institute of Geology, member of the leading center of the Ukrainian fascist organization. Organizer of terror.

3. MUSHKETOV Dmitry Ivanovich, Professor of the Leningrad Mining Institute, head of the fascist group of the organization. The head of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the members of this group.

4. GERASIMOVICH Boris Petrovich, from the nobility, former cadet, director of the Pulkovo Observatory, head of the fascist group. Conducts espionage work. A supporter of terrorist methods of combating Soviet power.

I ask for permission to arrest them.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 311. L. 35-39. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "For Comrade Yezhov's proposal. I. St. "; "IN. Mo-
lots"; "TO. Voroshilov"; "L. Kaganovich.

230

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 108

MESSAGE G.S. LYUSHKOVA N.I. Ezhov about
M.M. MALINOV

June 27, 1937

Owls. secret

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR Com. Ezhov

I am sending a handwritten statement of the Trotskyist Malinov, who was arrested by us, addressed to you.

Head of the UN KVD for the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory,
Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank LYUSHKOV

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR Com. Ezhov

I consider it necessary to inform you about the following: Secretary of the Far Eastern Regional Committee I.M. VAREIKIS at the end of 1931 or at the beginning of 1932, walking home with me after a meeting of the regional committee, began to talk to me about I.V. STALIN, as far as I remember, about one of his speeches. In this conversation, along with an assessment of the brilliant qualities of I.V. STALIN, VAREIKIS spoke of him as a very difficult person, with whom it is extremely difficult to work, that even some members of the Politburo in his presence feel unfree and as if somehow guilty.

After VAREIKIS was appointed to Stalingrad, on his way to his vacation, waiting for the recoupling of the car, he was at my apartment for several hours. Then he told how his appointment to Stalingrad happened.

According to him, he received a phone call from I.V. Stalin and asked if he would be offended if he was sent to Stalingrad, to which he replied that I would consider it an honor, as a special trust of the Central Committee, that he was sent to a lagging region to eliminate the backlog of the latter.

In fact, his moods were quite different. He told me that I.V. STALIN underestimates him, that less capable and less deserving people are nominated, that he is almost the only one of the old "Mohicans", i.e. secretaries, who remained in the same position that he had nothing to do in Stalingrad.

There were similar sentiments after his appointment to the Far Eastern Territory.

We met with him then in Moscow at the National Hotel.

VAREIKIS' close associates, I mean the people who have been working with him for 10-15 years and he carries around with him, from the point of view of a party person, unfit.

MALINOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 311. L. 83-84. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Stalin. Yezhov. 27.VI.37*.

No. 109

FROM A LETTER TO I.M. VAREIKISA I.V. STALIN (32)

June 27, 1937

Tov. Stalin!

I am very grateful to you for forwarding me the statement of Malinov, not unknown to me, who turned out to be a spy. This statement contains

DOCUMENTATION

231

such "hints", so to speak, which I cannot calmly endure for one hour, therefore I decided to give the following arguments for a categorical refutation:

Firstly. I scornfully reject his hint that, as if once giving a brilliant assessment of Comrade. STALIN, at the same time I said that "it is difficult to work with him," since he is a "difficult person," and so on. Nonsense from the same category of slander with which Mr. KAMINSKY struggled at our Plenum.

Yes, you, and everyone else, are sufficiently aware of my relations, both party-political and personal, to you, comrade STALIN, to the late KIROV, to t.t. VOROSHILOV, KAGANOVICH, MOLOTOV and others that it is not only superfluous, but also simply absurd to waste time refuting Malinov's dirty allusions on this score.

Secondly. Equally far-fetched and false are his conclusions that, in connection with my appointment to Stalingrad, I "complained" to him that "I am underestimated." Nonsense! He himself, the bastard, is forced to write: "Vareikis considered his appointment to Stalingrad a matter of honor and great confidence on the part of the Central Committee."

Third. To make this slander look more impressive, he refers to an allegedly additional fact that he had seen me at the National and spoke before leaving for the Far East.

I didn't have him at the National when I left for DVK. I did not see him. It is strange how this subject could "catch" my dissatisfaction with the appointment to the Far East, when I did not even see him, let alone even talk to him?

The other people he listed, loyal and devoted Bolsheviks, always honestly fought for the Central Committee, for our line against enemies. I could multiply the list of people who have worked with me for many years in the Central Chernobyl and other organizations.

In conclusion about MALINOV. I got to know him in the Central Chernozem. He impressed me as a capable, growing, but careerist, "on his own mind" and cunning.

He was very offended and , that I nominated comrade IVANOV as second secretary, not him. We are talking about the second secretary of the CCHO. In his work as a secretary, a certain looseness towards laws was sometimes visible. That he was a conspirator, a spy, I could never have imagined, frankly, I simply gasped when I found out that SHEBOLDAYEV and he (MALINOV) ended up in the camp of Trotskyist spies.

As for how I have always fought and am now waging a fight against pests of all stripes or writing about my political line, I have no need for a Bolshevik conscience. It's clearer than a clear day. Hello.

I. VAREIKIS

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 311. L. 84-89. Script. Typescript.

On a separate sheet there are: the accompanying Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: "To members and candidates of the PB. T.t. Andreev, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kosior St., Mikoyan, Molotov, Petrovsky, Postyshev, Chubar, Eikhe. Tov. Yezhov. On behalf of Comrade Stalin, the following is sent to you for your information: 1) Note by Comrade. Stalin to Comrade Vareikis and the testimony of the Trotskyist Malinov dated 20.VI. 1937 2) Note by comrade Vareikis of 27.VI.37*; (Ibid. L. 81-82). On Malinov's

statement, there is a handwritten note: "T. Vareikis! Would you like to familiarize yourself with

by

the testimony of the notorious Malinov? Hello. I. Stalin.

232

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 110

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE "REBELLION" ORGANIZATION OPENED IN WESTERN
SIBERIA AMONG THE EXPIRED KULAKS (33)

June 28, 1937

66-0 opened in Zap. Siberia k.-r. rebel organization among the exiled kulaks.

1. Consider it necessary to apply capital punishment to all the activists of the insurgent organization among the exiled kulaks.

2. To speed up the consideration of cases, create a troika in the composition of the Head. UNKVD for the West. Siberia comrade Mironov (chairman), prosecutor for Zap. Siberia Comrade Barkov and Secretary of the Zapsibkraikom Comrade Eikhe.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 31. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 51.

The text contains a note about the distribution: "T.t. Eikhe, Yezhov, Vyshinsky.

No. 111

NOTE N.I. EZHOVA I. TO STALIN
ABOUT SUICIDE N.M. HUNGRY
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE DRAFT ORDER

June 29, 1937

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

According to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Byelorussian SSR Comrade. Berman June 21 at 12 noon. N.M. Goloded, who was under interrogation, jumped out of the window of the fifth floor of the NKVD building of the BSSR Death followed 20 minutes later.

I am enclosing a copy of my order.

People's Commissar of the NKVD Ezhov

ORDER

According to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR of June 21, 1937 No.

June 21 this year in the NKVD. The Byelorussian SSR threw himself out of the window and fell to his death arrested, whose testimony was extremely important for the investigation.

The suicide of the arrested person occurred due to the careless attitude to the case and criminal negligence shown by the detective of the 3rd department of the NKVD UTB of the BSSR, junior lieutenant of state security RULEVA and assistant. detective of the 3rd department, junior lieutenant of state security TURBIN, as well as insufficient instruction of these workers by the deputy. head of the 3rd UGB of the NKVD of the BSSR, lieutenant of state security GIPSHTEIN.

DOCUMENTATION

233

I ORDER:

Operative of the 3rd department of the UGB NKVD of the BSSR, junior lieutenant of state security RULEVA and assistant. detective junior lieutenant of state security TURBIN to be arrested and brought to trial.

Deputy the head of the 3rd department, lieutenant of state security GIPSHTEIN, to announce a severe reprimand.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR - Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank Comrade. BERMAN to investigate in the strictest way all the circumstances of the suicide of the arrested person, in particular, to establish whether in this case there were no deliberate actions on the part of the above-mentioned employees of the UGB.

I draw your attention to Comrade BERMAN on the need to strengthen educational work, mobilize the KGB vigilance of the NKVD workers BSSR.

Warn all people's commissars of internal affairs of the union republics and heads

officials of the NKVD of the territories and regions, that if such cases are repeated, the perpetrators will be brought to the most severe responsibility, regardless of their position.

The order to announce to all employees of the NKVD GUGB on receipt.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 310. L. 58-60. Script. Typescript.

No. ig

FROM THE DECISION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE EXCLUSION OF MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES
FOR MEMBERS OF THE CC AUCP(b) FROM THE LEADING BODIES OF THE PARTY

July 1, 1937

10 II. About Antipov, Balitsky, Zhukov, Knorin-Lavrentiev, Lobov, Razumov, Rumyantsev, Sheboldaev, Blagonravov, Veger, Goloded, Kolmanovich, Komarov, Kubyak, Mikhailov V., Polonsky, Popov N.N., Unschlichte, Altman, Krutov .

Approve the following proposal of the Politburo of the Central Committee:

For treason to the party and motherland and active counter-revolutionary activity
ness to exclude:

- from the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and from the party:

Antipov, Balitsky, Zhukov, Knorin-Lavrentiev, Lobov, Razumov, Rumyantsev, Sheboldaev;

- from the list of candidates:

Blagonravov, Veger, Kolmanovich, Komarov, Kubyak, Mikhailov V., Polonsky, Popov P.P., Unshlikht;

- from the composition of the Central Revolutionary Committee and from the party:

Altman, Krutov.

Transfer the case of the above persons to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 310. L. 122. Original. Typescript.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Andreev.

234

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. FROM

NOTE I.I. MEZHLAUKA V.M. MOLOTOV

ABOUT YOUR DEPUTY IN THE COMMITTEE
FOR HIGHER SCHOOL AFFAIRS

July 2, 1937

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SNK OF THE UNION T. V. MOLOTOV

Today, at a meeting of the All-Union Committee for Higher Education, during the analysis of the case of my deputy Comrade Volynsky, we established the following:

In 1931, when Volynsky worked as the manager of the Academy of Sciences, during one of his frequent hunting meetings with Bukharin (with whom Volynsky became close, allegedly on the instructions of Comrade Agranov), Bukharin told Volynsky: "Why are you boasting about your Chekists. Keep in mind that Rykov and I had a complete agreement with Yagoda on all points, and only at the last moment did he betray us.

Tov. Volynsky declared that he then told Comrade Agranov about what he had heard. Volynsky never spoke about this to anyone else, either in 1931 or after Yagoda was exposed.

In view of the fact that, in addition to this gross political mistake, Volynsky made a number of other gross mistakes (loss of vigilance in the case of Bukharin's ex-wife Travina, who was expelled from the party; blind trust in the Trotskyist Belin; loss of vigilance in the case of the Trotskyites Minkov, etc.), I think that Comrade Volynsky cannot hold such a responsible post. I ask you to release comrade Volynsky from the work of the deputy of the Higher Command. His case should be entrusted to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to investigate.

Chairman of the Committee for Higher School Affairs I.K. MEZHLAUK

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 313. L. 37. Original. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "From comrade Mezhlauka*", "For. Molotov", "T.t. Mo-

Lotov, Zhov. Volynsky, of course, is guilty, but the matter is not so much in Volynsky as
v

Agranov, who, presumably, hid from the Central Committee what Volynsky told him about Yagoda. We need to check this case from the point of view of Agranov's behavior. I. Stalin. "Agree. Molotov.

No. 114

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS" (34)

July 2, 1937

94 - About anti-Soviet elements.

Send the following telegram to the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties:

"It has been observed that most of the former kulaks and criminals who were deported at one time from different regions to the northern and Siberian regions, and then

the expiration of the expulsion period, who returned to their regions, are the main instigators of all kinds of anti-Soviet and sabotage crimes, both on collective farms and state farms, and in transport and in some areas of industry.

DOCUMENTATION

235

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks invites all secretaries of regional and regional organizations and all regional, regional and republican representatives of the NKVD to register all kulaks and criminals who have returned to their homeland so that the most hostile of them are immediately arrested and shot in the administrative order. carrying out their cases through troikas, and the rest of the less active, but still hostile elements would be rewritten and sent to the regions on the instructions of the NKVD.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposes, within five days, to submit to the Central Committee the composition of the troikas, as well as the number of those to be shot, as well as the number of those to be deported.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 32. Original. Typescript.

Protocol N9 51.

The text contains a note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov; To the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the
National Communist Party.

No. 115

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON AKULOV"

July 3, 1937

97 - About Akulov.

Based on the materials given in the testimony of Cherednichenko, - 1) Comrade. Release Akulov from his duties as secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, 2) Starting today, CEC resolutions to be signed by Comrade Kalinin (Chairman of the Central Executive Committee) and N. Filatov, member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (for Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR) N. Filatov.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 313. L. 41. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 51.

No. 116

NOTE I.A. Akulova I.V. TO STALIN IN CONNECTION
WITH THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

July 3, 1937

In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. STALIN

Today I received a note from the decision of the PB from Z.VII, which says: "based on the materials given in the testimony of Cherednichenko - 1) Comrade. Akulov to be relieved of his duties as secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR "

On this date, I handed over the cases to Comrade. Kozlov and at the same time turned to Comrade Yezhov with a request to interrogate me and arrange a bet with Cherednichenko so that I could expose him, a liar and slanderer.

Obviously - I guess - he is talking about Cherednichenko, the former supply manager of the Mining Academy, whom I met on official business in 1922-23 in the Union of Miners, when I was in charge of the cult department of the Union. I never had any personal or domestic contact with Cherednichenko. My official meetings with him ceased from February 1924, when, by decision of the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I was sent to work in the Donbass as chairman of the Dongubot affairs of the union of miners.

236

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to suggest that Comrade Yezhov interrogate me as soon as possible so that I can prove that I have been slandered. I have never been a Trotskyist or a rightist. Trotsky's political concepts have always been deeply alien to me. No less alien to me were the political ideas of the Right. I have always been devoted to the Party and to you.

Y. Akulov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 313. L. 42. Original. Typescript.

No. 117

NOTE N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
REQUEST OF I.A. AKULOVA (35)

July 4, 1937
No. 58248

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of
Bolsheviks Comrade. TO STALIN I am sending a copy of Comrade Akulov's note.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov

Comrade NKVD USSR Ezhov

Tov. Yezhov, today I received an extract of the PB resolution from Z.VII. about my dismissal from my post on the basis of Cherednichenko's testimony. These

the testimony is unknown to me, but I nevertheless maintain that it is false. I beg you to arrange an interrogation and a confrontation with Cherednichenko as soon as possible.

Y. Akulov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 313. L. 62, 68. Original. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. We need to arrange a confrontation. St.".

No. not

NOTE N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT J.K. BERZINE
WITH APPENDIX LETTER N.N. SIDORINA

July 5, 1937

No. 58285

Top secret

T. STALIN

I am sending a copy of N. SIDORINA's statement about comrade BERZINA.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

NARCOMVNUDEL comrade. Ezhov

For further elucidation of Trotskyist connections, I consider it necessary to contact you Comrade.
People's Commissar the following messages:

1. Before the expulsion of L. TROTSKY, they were personally told comrade. Ya.K. BERZIN, ex. to
the chief of the GV Directorate of the Red Army headquarters that the latter in any

DOCUMENTATION

237

The moment can rely on joint work with him, TROTSKY, if he (Comrade BERZIN) either leaves his
present place of work (GV Directorate).

It seems to me that TROTSKY thus considered Comrade BERZIN then
by your man.

2. I was surprised in Comrade BERZIN's home library by a large number of always up-to-date White
Guard books in Russian and German by various authors, including a white book on Comrade. STALIN
and some of TROTSKY's books published abroad, which Comrade BERZIN gave to read

to his comrades.

These books were in the home library before the new appointment of comrade. BERZIN to the Khabarovsk headquarters of the OKDVA. Whether Comrade Berzin liquidated part of his home library is unknown to me.

3. I also want to tell you about the great negligence of Comrade BERZINA in regard to keeping extremely secret papers, although these were only drafts. Among the written papers, various sketchbooks and school textbooks, in an open drawer of his 15-year-old son, lay the work plan of the Main Department and a list of workers abroad, written in ink and addressed to Comrade. URITSKY. When I put away this box, I made out only two inscriptions and, frightened by such negligent storage, I put the whole pack in an envelope in order to hand it over to Comrade. BERZIN upon his return home.

The fact that I found information there in such a place, on Comrade. BERZINA didn't make any impression, and he didn't even ask me if I had read it, perhaps in the belief that I didn't understand the Russian handwriting.

4. Tov. BERZIN was closely connected with EIDEMAN by a long-term friendship.

N.N. SIDORINA

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 313. L. 67-69. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Berzin must be transferred to military service."

No. 119

LETTER TO E.P. SALYNIA N.I. Ezhov

July 5, 1937

No. 252

Dear comrade. Yezhov!

For a long time I was tormented by obsessive thoughts about the death of comrade. MENZHINSKII, and what seemed to me utterly improbable before, now, in connection with the discovery of the k.r. conspiracies in our organs are persuaded to write about one moment of the illness and death of comrade. MENZHINSKY. For a number of years Comrade. MENZHINSKY received me, as it seemed to me, the chiefs of the KRO districts received me more than usual. He forbade me for anyone to appear before him and report on cases of an out-of-band order. Every month I visited Comrade. MENZHINSKY in Moscow.

I was transferred to the Crimea (I will state the circumstances of the transfer at the end), comrade. MENZHINSKY came to the Crimea to rest broken and completely sick, he said that he would die. During one visit, he threw me the phrase: "I was healed, and now that I have freed myself from my doctors, I feel that I am getting better." I answered: "Throw in this case all the doctors recommended to you."

238

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Tov. MENZHINSKY did not see any doctors, two months later he left almost healthy and, as you know, worked successfully for more than a year.

During one visit to Moscow, he again said that he was being healed. A few days before his death, at 4 o'clock in the morning on the night of May 1, a Moscow wire rang in an apartment in Simferopol. For a long time it was not heard who would speak to me, then I heard the voice of Comrade. MENZHINSKY: "They tell me that it's impossible to go to you - it's cold." I told him that there was nothing of the sort. Tov. MENZHINSKY began to say something, but the conversation suddenly broke off. For a long time I looked for the reasons for the breakdown of the conversation along the line, after a while Kharkov announced that the wire was damaged in Moscow, so Comrade. MENZHINSKY can't talk.

A few days later came the news of the death of comrade. MENZHINSKY.

When I was in Moscow, I tried to find out what Comrade I wanted to find out. MENZHINSKY, everyone evaded this. I asked BERRY, he answered, I don't know.

He knew YAGODA since 1919, saw the "doctors" with whom he surrounded t.t. MENZHINSKY and M. GORKY. Products were sent from Moscow of poor quality. The impression was that about Comrade. MENZHINSKY don't want to care.

Thus, all taken together makes me think that Comrade. MENZHINSKY interfered with Yagoda and was deliberately eliminated.

A few words about the circumstances of my appointment from Leningrad to the Crimea.

In Leningrad Yagoda as a deputy. PP sent KARPENKO. I arrested his brother, who turned out to be a major agent of MELGUNOV from Paris, and also suspected the deputy. PP KARPENKO and said this to Comrade. MENZHINSKY.

KARPENKO and YAGODA interpreted this as a squabble. Tov. MENZHINSKY announced that I had obviously made a mistake. They suggested writing a letter. According to this letter, I was scolded for insincerity, I was transferred. However, KARPENKO was nevertheless removed and YAGODA got him a job at the NKPS.

I heard that his brother was not shot, perhaps he is in Moscow. Enclosing copies of the preserved letter, I inform you that KARPENKO is a close friend of Yagoda. The circumstances of their connection, the identity of KARPENKO himself, require verification.

Nan. Directorate of the NKVD for the Omsk region SALYN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 313. L. 161-163. Copy. Typescript.

No. 120

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "QUESTION OF THE NKVD"

July 5, 1937

144 - Question of the NKVD.

1. Accept the proposal of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs to imprison in camps for 5-8 years all the wives of convicted traitors to the motherland, members of the Right-Trotskyist spy-sabotage organization, according to the list presented.

2. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to organize special camps for this in the Naryn Territory and the Turgai District of Kazakhstan.

3. From now on, establish a procedure according to which all wives of exposed traitors to the homeland of Right-Trotskyite spies are to be imprisoned in camps for at least 5-8 years.

4. All orphans under the age of 15 remaining after the conviction should be taken on state support, as for children over 15 years of age, the issue of them should be resolved individually.

DOCUMENTATION

239

5. To propose to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to place children in the existing network of orphanages and closed boarding schools of the People's Commissariat of Education of the republics.

All children are subject to accommodation in cities outside of Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Tiflis, Minsk, coastal cities, border cities.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 107. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 51.

No. w

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS"

July 5, 1937

145 - On anti-Soviet elements (PB dated 2.VII.37, pr. No. 51, p. 94).

To approve the troikas for checking anti-Soviet elements:

a) In the Crimea as part of t.t. Pavlova - NKVD (chairman) members - Monatova - prosecutor of the Crimean ASSR and Trupchu - second secretary of the regional committee;

b) In the Udmurt ASSR as part of t.t. Baryshnikov, Shlenova - NKVD, Shevelkova - deputy prosecutor of the republic;

c) In the Tatar ASSR as part of t.t. Lepa, Mukhametzyanova and Yelshina (deputy of the NKVD).

To allow the Tatar ASSR to submit information on the number of people to be shot instead of a five-day period within a month.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 33. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 51.

The text contains a note about the distribution: Comrade. Yezhov; Krymobkom - a; Udmurtsk. regional committee - b; Tatobkom - in.

No. 122

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS" (36)

July 9, 1937

187 - On anti-Soviet elements (PB dated 2.VII. 37, pr. No. 51, p. 94).

To approve the troikas for checking anti-Soviet elements:

1) In the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of t.t. Maurer, Togoev and Ivanov Approve 169 people scheduled for execution. and the expulsion of 200 people.

2) In the Bashkir ASSR as part of t.t. Isanchurin, Bak and Tsipnyatova.

3) In the Omsk region as part of t.t. Salyn, Nelipa and Fomina. Approve 479 people scheduled for execution. and the expulsion of 1959 people.

4) In the Chernihiv region as part of t.t. Markitan, Samovsky and Sklyavsky.

Approve 244 people scheduled for execution. and expulsion of 1379 people.

5) In the Chuvash ASSR as part of t.t. Petrov, Rozanov and Elifanov. Approve 86 kulaks scheduled for execution, 57 criminals. and the expulsion of kulaks 676 people, criminals 201 people.

6) In the West Siberian Territory as part of t.t. Mironov (chairman), Eikhe and Barkov.

240

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Approve 6,600 kulaks and 4,200 criminals scheduled for execution.

7) In the Krasnoyarsk Territory as part of t.t. Leonyuk (chairman) Gorchaev and Rabinovich. To permit the northern regions of the Krasnoyarsk Territory to submit information on the number of those to be shot and deported by August 1st.

8) In the Turkmen SSR as part of t.t. Mukhamedov, Zvereva and Tashli -

Anna Muradova.

Approve 400 kulaks scheduled for execution, 100 criminals. and the expulsion of kulaks 1200 people. criminals 275 people.

Agree with the proposal of the Central Committee of Turkmenistan on the inclusion in the repression and expulsion of members of the national. k.-r. organizations "Turkmen - Azatlygi", Muslim clergy, etc., instructing the NKVD to determine the number to be shot and deported.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 34-34v. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 51.

There is a note about the distribution: Tov. Yezhov; secretaries of the said party organizations. - acc. branches

No. 123

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOVA A.I.
IKRAMOV ON THE REPLACEMENT IN THE TROIKA

July 9, 1937

No. 906/sh

Tashkent. Secretary of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan IKRAMOV

We propose to introduce someone else into the top three instead of Karimov. According to the latest information, Karimov is a member of Faizulla Khodjaev's anti-Soviet group. It would be good to replace Karimov as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars with another undoubtedly reliable candidate.

STALIN

MOLOTOV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 56. L. 128-129. Script. Manuscript.

There is a handwritten note on the cipher telegram: "Not Karimov and Baltabaev, but Tyuryabekov. Right there." 127.

No. 124

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON CASES OF MASS POISONING OF WORKERS
AND KOLHOZNIKOV IN THE AZOV-BLACK SEA REGION"

July 10, 1937

198 - On cases of mass poisoning of workers and collective farmers in the Azov-Black Sea Territory.

In order to suppress the facts of mass poisoning of workers and collective farmers

at food enterprises and canteens, to allow for the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory to conduct trials in individual cases with the execution of novnikov.

DOCUMENTATION

241

The cases of terrorist saboteurs organizing the poisoning of workers and collective farmers should be allowed to be considered out of court with the use of execution.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 95. L. 136. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 51.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yezhov, Vyshinsky, Krylenko, A.Ch. Kraikom."

No. 125

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS"

July 10, 1937

199 - On anti-Soviet elements (PB dated 2.VII.37, pr. No. 51, p. 94).

To approve the troikas for checking anti-Soviet elements:

15) In the Azov-Black Sea Territory as part of t.t. Lyushkov, Evdokimov and Ivanov (with replacement by Kravtsov).

Approve 5,721 kulaks scheduled for execution. 923 criminals and the expulsion of kulaks 5914 people. and criminals 1048 people.

Allow extrajudicial consideration of cases of sabotage and espionage at the grain harvest with the use of execution.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 37. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 51.

No. 126

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS"

July 10, 1937

206 - About anti-Soviet elements.

To approve the troikas for checking anti-Soviet elements:

3) In the Far East Territory as part of t.t. Deribas (with the replacement by Zapadny), Ptukh and Fedin.

Approve 3017 people scheduled for execution. and expulsion of 3681 people. Extend the directive of the Central Committee also to the special settlements located in the Far East.

Allow the troika to consider the cases of camp inmates who display hostile activity with the use of execution against them.

5) In the Azerbaijan SSR as part of t.t. Sumbatov, Teymurkuliev and Dzhangirakhundzade.

Approve 500 kulaks scheduled for execution. 500 criminals and the expulsion of kulaks 1300 people, criminals 1700 people.

To allow consideration in the troika of cases of counter-revolutionary insurgent organizations with the use of execution for 500 people, deportation for 750 people. and deportation to NKVD camps of 150 families of gangs.

242

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

8) In the North Kazakhstan region as part of t.t. Panova, Stepanova and Segizbaeva.

Approve 658 people scheduled for execution. and the expulsion of 310 people.

To allow consideration in the troika of cases of immigrants from the western borders of the Union, instructing the NKVD to determine the number to be shot and deported.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 39-40. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 51.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov, org-yam - respectively.

No. 127

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS"

July 11, 1937

212 - On anti-Soviet elements (PB dated 2.VII.37, pr. No. 51, p. 94).

To approve the troikas for checking anti-Soviet elements:

3. In the Uzbek SSR as part of t.t. Ikramov, Baltabaev and Zagvozdin. Approve 1489 people scheduled for execution. and expulsion of 3952 people. (all categories indicated in the telegram).

Allow review of the trio of nationalist-terrorist cases. The troika for the revision of anti-Soviet elements in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR was not created
wat.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 41. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 51.

No. 128

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON AWARDING BUILDERS OF THE MOSCOW-VOLGA CANAL (37)

July 14, 1937

Not for print

251-0 awards and benefits for the builders of the Moscow-Volga Canal (Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR).

4. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, in agreement with the Prosecutor, to submit proposals to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on reducing the terms of imprisonment within the limits of up to 3 years for those of the prisoners who particularly distinguished themselves in the construction of the canal (with the exception of those convicted under Art. Art. 58-8 - terror, 58-6 - espionage, 58-9 - sabotage, 58-la - treason, for participation in the Trotsky-Zinoviev and right-wing c.r. organizations and groups, members of other c.r. anti-party organizations, participants fascist and c.-r. nationalist organizations, defectors, as well as all foreign nationals, regardless of the nature of their crimes).

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 314. L. 17. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 51.

DOCUMENTATION

243

No. 129

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ON
THE STATE OF THE AIR FORCE IN THE BELARUSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT
ON THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY OF THE UNKVD OF THE WESTERN REGION (38)

July 15, 1937

No. 58479

Sov. secret

Tov. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the note of Comrade KARUTSKY, head of the NKVD for the Western Region, about shortcomings in the state of the air force of the Byelorussian Military District.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Ezhov

The materials of the 5th department of the NKVD UTB for the Western Region establish the largest shortcomings in the state of the air forces of the Belarussian Military District, which significantly reduce the combat readiness of aviation units.

1. There is a significant shortage of aircraft in the air units of the district - out of 1977 aircraft laid down in the state, there are 1417 and 560 are missing, so the shortage reaches 28%.

For certain types of aircraft, the shortfall is even more significant - out of the 221 SB aircraft (high-speed bombers) laid down in the state, there are 56, instead of 98 SSS aircraft (attack aircraft) there are 56.

The material part of the aircraft, especially in the 5th and 9th air brigades (aircraft TB-3 M 17 and TB M 34) is extremely worn out and repeatedly repaired, a significant part of the fighter aircraft armed with I-16 M-25 and I -16 M-22 due to design flaws is not operated or is operated to a limited extent - only in a straight line. In the 132 air brigade out of 88 I-16M-25 aircraft, only 30 aircraft can fly and only in a straight line. In the 83 air brigade out of 166 aircraft of the same system, 120 are fit for flight, also only in a straight line. In the 142 air brigade, 69 I-16 M 22 aircraft require replacement of the control stick, they are worn out and only a part of them, after putting them in order, can be allowed for further operation.

Ground attack aviation - out of 355 R-5 aircraft - 219 have a flight time of over 400 hours, the aircraft fleet is significantly worn out.

2. Aircraft produced by the industry have serious defects - on I-16 aircraft, during operation, control sticks break and the consular part of the plane falls off in the air, which has already led to several disasters. On R-ZET aircraft, shortly after receiving them from the industry, it was necessary to replace the cables, on TB-3 aircraft, the sub-engine frames need to be replaced, this issue, due to the fault of the industry, drags on for a year.

3. The supply of spare parts to the air formations of the district through the fault of the center and the supply department of the air force of the district is carried out extremely poorly - spare parts are sent irregularly, without a plan, a significant number of spare parts are not sent at all, the lack of the necessary quantity and range of spare parts in the air formations, in addition, which contributes to the rapid deterioration of the aircraft and motor fleet, in no way guarantees the flight of units in full force even in peacetime conditions. The deterioration of the material part and the delay in its repair due to incorrect

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

The improper use of the resources of spare parts available in the district leads to a disruption in the training of the flight crew.

On the part of the Chief of Supply of the Air Force Headquarters, Stupin, numerous facts of direct sabotage in the supply of spare parts for air formations were recorded.

4. Wreckage is revealed in the construction of operational airfields - most of the airfields were built in the Orsha-Minsk-Zhlobin-Orsha triangle. There are absolutely no airfields on the right flank and the airfield network on the left flank is poorly developed. Such deployment of airfields deprives our aircraft of the ability to maneuver both in depth and along the front, leads to crowding of aviation on the triangle indicated above and exposes it to the attack of an air enemy.

Most airfields, due to their size and soil conditions, cannot accept high-speed aircraft, not to mention heavy ships. There are no mobilization fuel supplies and bomb ammunition at the airfields, and thus in the first days of the war the combat movement of aviation will be difficult.

5. The mobilization readiness of units, mob-work at the headquarters of the Air Force of the district is in a state of collapse. Calculations for providing parts with the main types of property have not been clarified, accounting for non-reserves has not been completed, the staffing of parts with reserve officers has not been made.

The above data, which testify to the major shortcomings in the state of the air force of the Belarusian Military District, undoubtedly indicate the presence of sabotage both in the aviation industry and in the leadership of the Air Force of the BVO. I consider the following responsible for the sabotage:

1. Commander of the Air Force of the BVO Divisional Commander Chernobrovkin S.A.
In 1923, while attending letnab courses, Chernobrovkin voted for the Trotskyist resolution proposed by the Trotskyist Kushakov and objected to his exclusion from the party (Kushakov was the head of the Air Force of the BVO, he is allegedly a participant in a military fascist conspiracy). Until May 1937, Chernobrovkin hid this circumstance.

On Chernobrovkin there are testimonies of the following arrested 5th department. GUGB of participants in the military-fascist conspiracy: according to the testimony of Feldman, Primakov intended to use Telfer to involve Chernobrovkin in the organization. After the first trial of the Trotskyists, Feldman asked Gelfer whether Chernobrovkin was involved in the organization and received an answer that Gelfer failed to reach a final agreement.

The fact that Chernobrovkin, as a Trotskyist, was known to the leaders of the military-fascist organization is evidenced by the testimony of Feldman: "I had in mind to engage in recruiting in the Air Force Directorate, but did not do this, but I observed that there, too, Trotskyists were being placed according to the interests conspiracy. So, for example, Chernobrovkin is the head of the BVO Air Force.

Arrested Levichev, in his testimony, indicates that, according to Uborevich, Chernobrovkin is known to him as a participant in the conspiracy.

An analysis of Chernobrovkin's activities indicates that sabotage was carried out in the construction of operational airfields and in the supply of aircraft with spare parts and could not but be unknown to Chernobrovkin and was carried out with his participation.

2. Chief of Staff of the BVO Air Force, Major Krolenko N.I. He was appointed Chief of Staff of the Air Force directly by Uborevich in 1936 and enjoyed his exclusive patronage. Represented by Uborevich

DOCUMENTS _245

before being awarded the order, he did not receive the order, but twice in 1936 he was awarded a gold watch.

Prior to his appointment as chief of staff of the Air Force, Krolenko was the head of the 7th department of the headquarters of the BVO, in charge of preparing the theater of military operations for aviation.

The sabotage deployment of operational airfields and the chaos in the state of mobilization work of units of the BVO Air Force are the result of Krolenko's activities.

3. Beginning Department of Supply and Armament of the Headquarters of the BVO Air Force, brigintendant Stupin.

The above data on the state of the supply of spare parts to the air formation of the district, the exceptional deterioration of the materiel and the complete lack of operational airfields for the supply of aircraft in wartime, indicates obvious wrecking in these matters on the part of Stupin.

The wrecking activity of Stupin has been noted since 1936, which was reported to the 5th department of the GUGB. Stupin, according to intelligence data, is an anti-Soviet person, showing defeatist moods. Despite major shortcomings in his work, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star on Uborevich's recommendation.

I ask you to authorize the arrest of Chief of the BVO Air Force Chernobrovkin S.E., Chief of Staff of the BVO Air Force Krolenko N.I., Head of the Supply Department of the BVO Air Force Stupin B.M.

Addendum: report of the head of the NKVD Department of the Western Region on the state of the air forces of the BVO.

Head of the UNKVD for the Western Region
Commissar of State Security III rank KORUTSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 314. L. 69-75. Copy. Typescript.

Published without attachment.

On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "T. Voroshilov. Karutsky demands arrest. 1. Chernobrovkin. 2. Krolenko. 3. Stupina.

No. 130

FROM THE LETTER OF THE COMMUNIST KULYAKIN TO THE CC AUCP(b)

About M.M. HATAEVICE (39)

July 15, 1937

In the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Special Sector

Several times I wrote letters to the Central Committee, but apparently in the city of Dnepropetrovsk they do not let such letters pass. I draw conclusions only because I asked for an answer to the letters I received, but I did not receive an answer.

Taking advantage of the opportunity of being in Moscow, I decided once again to take a big risk for myself to write this letter and thereby express my opinion on the party organization of the Dnepropetrovsk region, since my attempts to be in the Central Committee were unsuccessful.

My goal as a party member is to get clarifications on one fundamental question of a purely political nature, namely!

For about 5 years, Khataevich M.M. was the secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk CP (b) U. When he arrived in Dnepropetrovsk, he brought with him

246

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

a number of persons to various positions of responsibility, and as a result, they all turned out to be enemies of the people.

I will cite just a few characteristic facts.

1. Tov. Khataevich brought Krasny - he turned out to be an enemy of the people.
2. "-" Brought Leitzer - turned out to be an enemy of the people
3. -Brought Levitin - turned out to be an enemy of the people
4. "-" Easy - early. region management local industry is the enemy of the people.

'Khataevich had extremely many signals about Lung, but he defended him all the time. What was being done one floor below Comrade Khataevich's office*.

5. Before, the regional executive committee Gavrillov is an enemy of the people.
6. Deputy before, the regional executive committee Brown is an enemy of the people.
7. Secretary of the regional executive committee Vronsky is an enemy of the people.
8. Easy - nachuprmestprom - enemy of the people.

9. Nachobiplan - Alekseenko - enemy of the people.
10. Deputy Goldenberg is an enemy of the people.
11. Sabsay - factory trader - enemy of the people.
12. Filippov - an employee of the regional committee - an enemy of the people.
13. Mikhailov - "- enemy of the people.
14. Leibenson - secretary of the city committee - enemy of the people.
15. Komarovsky - an employee of the city committee - an enemy of the people.
16. Yagnetinskaya - an employee of the city committee - an enemy of the people
17. Golubenko - city council - enemy of the people.
18. Akhmatov - regional prosecutor - enemy of the people.
19. Hetman - the director of the bank - the enemy of the people.
20. Nyurin, Budkevich...

Here are some more facts:

1) Khataevich, as soon as he was elected secretary of the CP (b) U, immediately dragged the secretary of the Zaporozhye city committee * Struts * to himself in Kiev, who left a whole bunch of Trotskyists in Zaporozhye, and after all, Struts is now the head. industrial and transport department of the Central Committee of the KGT(b)U. Struts was an employee of the regional committee in the past, it must be assumed with what kind of personnel Struts will supply industry and transport.

2) Under the patronage of Khataevich, he was sent as secretary of the Pavlograd Republican Committee of the CP (b) U * Skrypnik *, former second secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk city committee under Levitin, and then the head of the cultural department of the regional committee ...

3) It is necessary to check the pre-city executive committee ** Fedyaev ** exceptionally deeper ...

4) Check the connection in the past, now the secretary of the city committee, comrade. * Vetrov *, who was in exceptionally close relations with Levitin, Komarovsky, Golubenko, Sabsay, Krasny and a number of other Trotskyists.

Drawing a conclusion from all of the above, I must declare with all confidence that Comrade. Khataevich is not indifferent to treacherous work.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 316. L. 113-116. Script. Typescript.

* Published in part.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten resolution: "To Molotov, Yezhov, Malenkov. I. St. " "Arch. St.". On a separate sheet there is a printed resolution: "T. Margolin. Please pay attention to Kulyakin's note. Strictly check the persons marked in the note. I. Stalin.

— the surname is circled, in the margins of Stalin's litter: "Return, attention."

— in the margins of Stalin's litter: "Arrest."

DOCUMENTATION

247

No. 131

CODE TELEGRAM M.D. Bagirov and A.S.
Zashibaeva I.V. STALIN

July 15, 1937

No. 1257/sh From Baku

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

The situation at Kaspar is exceptionally difficult, the leadership has been brought to justice, the main participants of the shipping company have been damaged by sabotage. By the measures taken, we are completely renewing the leadership of all departments of the service by promoting young cadres.

The only candidate for the head of Kaspar, which we planned, Engver Nikolai Yuryevich, who worked as the head of the maritime transport department of the NKVD of Azerbaijan, was recently recalled to work in the Transport Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

In order to quickly eliminate the consequences of sabotage, ensure the plan for oil transportation and strengthen the leadership, we earnestly ask you to approve Kaspar Engver, who knows Kaspar's people and economy very well, as the head.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the AKP(b)
BAGIROV People's Commissar of Water ZASHIBAYEV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. II. D. 65. L. 50. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the sheet: "Comrade. Yezhov! It would be necessary to satisfy Comrade Bagirov's request. I. St. *.

No. 132

CODE TELEGRAM A.I. I. V. IKRAMOVA STALIN (40)

July 15, 1937

No. 1263/sh - From Tashkent

Moscow. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade.
STALIN Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR comrade. MOLOTOV

After checking all the workers (Uzbeks), we selected two comrades who could be the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Uzbekistan, whom we consider unconditionally loyal to our party and its Stalinist Central Committee.

The first candidacy Baltabaeva S. (now works as the third secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan). Until 1927, he worked in production, has experience in public work: one year in the Central Executive Committee, two years in the Central Control Commission and the People's Commissar of the RCT, and for the last three years he has been the first secretary of the Tashkent City Party Committee.

The second candidacy Tyuryabekov. He also worked from 1925 in a managerial job - for one year he worked as secretary of the Okrug Committee, from 1931 to 1934. Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan, studied in Moscow for two years, recently returned to Tashkent. Tov. Baltabaev betrayed

248

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

more and a respectable worker, only lacks literacy, did not study anywhere. If approved, then it is necessary to take the courses of the Central Committee, at least for one year to study.

Tov. Tyuryabekov is more literate, but hot-tempered and he needs to acquire solidity.

We consider a more suitable candidate for Comrade. Baltabaev, Tyuryabekov can be approved as a deputy. I ask for your advice on the form of registration of this shift in the Soviet order.

Your telegram about Karimov came as a complete surprise to me, because Karimov, with whom I worked together for 13 years, has always been an active and steadfast worker in the fight against nationalists, especially against the group of Faizulla Khadzhaev.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
(b) of Uzbekistan IKRAMOV RGASPI. F. 558. Op. II. D. 65. L. 51. Original. Typescript.

On the sheet there is Stalin's resolution: "Comrade. Yezhov. Check both urgently and report to the Central Committee. I. St. ";
"Fulfilled. P.".

No. 133

CODE TELEGRAM A.S. ZIMINA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
TROTSKIST ORGANIZATION AT THE
RYBINSKY AUTOMOTOR PLANT (41)

July 16, 1937

No. 1267/sh Yaroslavl

The Regional Committee received information about the presence of a Trotskyist organization at the Rybinsk Automotive Plant No. 26. According to the information received, secretary of the party committee Pushkin, chief engineer Abramov, former secretary of the Rybinsk city committee Chanturia, former party organizer of the plant Shumin I.S. are exposed as members of the Trotskyist organization. We'll shoot Pushkin tomorrow and arrest him.

For a quick unwinding of the entire gang, we ask you to give instructions on the arrest and direction to Yaroslavl * Chanturia *, working in the Kursk region and * Shumin *, working in Moscow.

Apparently, the one and a half month delay in holding the election meeting, which at one time required the intervention of the Central Committee, was a direct Trotskyist provocation.

Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ZIMIN RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 52. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the telegram: "To T. Yezhov. Chanturia and Shumin should be arrested. Execute notify the Central Committee. I. St. "; "Fulfilled. Poskrebyshv], circled in pencil.

DOCUMENTATION

249

No. 134

CODE TELEGRAM A.S. ZIMINA I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT
THE "REBELLION" GROUPS IN THE YAROSLAVL REGION

July 16, 1937

No. 1272/sh Yaroslavl

Moscow. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The investigation into the case of the counter-revolutionary organization of the right in the Yaroslavl region established that the right, together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, created insurgent groups in a number of districts of the region and in individual factories. These insurgent groups united right-wing, socialist-revolutionaries, monarchist and criminal elements. The organization of the insurgent groups was led by *Zheltov*, the head of the regional communications department, who received direct instructions from Rykov and the former chairman of the regional executive committee, Zarzhitsky. We are removing these groups.

Secretary of the Yaroslavl Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ZIMIN RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 53. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the telegram: "To T. Yezhov. Zheltov must be arrested. St>. "Fulfilled. Poskrebyshev]. - -

No. 135

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON INCREASING WAGE RATES FOR EMPLOYEES
OF THE GUGB NKVD OF THE USSR

July 77, 1937

284 - On the salary of employees of the GUGB NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Moscow and Leningrad regions.

Approve the following decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR:

To allow the NKVD to increase from July 1, 1937, the wage rates for employees of the GUGB working in the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR in the Moscow and Leningrad regions in the amounts indicated in the list.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 989. L. 57. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 51.

No. 136

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON AWARDING N. AND EZHOV WITH THE ORDER OF LENIN

July 17, 1937

300 - About rewarding Comrade N.I. Yezhov with the Order of Lenin.

Approve the following draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR
Union: The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decides:

For outstanding success in the management of the NKVD bodies in fulfilling government assignments,
award Comrade N.I. Yezhov with the Order of Lenin.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 989. L. 60. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 51.

250

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 137

CODE TELEGRAM L.P. Berii I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
AUTHORIZATION OF THE ARREST OF 3. LORDKIPANIDZE

July 17, 1937

No. 1286/sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Stalin

In Adzharia, a counter-revolutionary organization was uncovered, connected with Turkish intelligence and setting as its goal the annexation of Adzharia to Turkey. The organization recruited for itself supporters and followers in the villages of Adzharia, linking its work with emigrant elements in Turkey. The testimonies of almost all those arrested, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Adzharia, Lordkipanidze Zekeriya, are exposed that he is the head of this counter-revolutionary organization and is connected with the Turkish consul in Batumi and Turkish intelligence. Please authorize his arrest. Currently, Lordkipanidze is under surveillance to prevent a possible flight abroad.

In the coming days, I will present the candidacy of an Adjarian for the post of chairman of the CEC of Adjara.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia BERIA

Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (further RGANI) F. 89. Op. 48. D. 5.

L. 1. Copy. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "Comrade. Beria. The Central Committee authorizes the arrest of Lordkipanidze. Stalin*.

No. 138

CODE TELEGRAM M.N. Erbanova I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE TROIKA (42)

July 17, 1937

No. 1288/sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Tov. STALIN

Your No. 1047/sh. I ask for an explanation. Does the troika for Buryat-Mongolia, approved by the Central Committee, have the right to pass judgment or will it only check the lists?

I also ask for instructions on the time of work.

YERBANOV.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 47. Original. Typescript.

No. 139

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTION OF THE NKVD" (43)

July 20, 1937

324 - Question of the NKVD.

Suggest that Comrade Yezhov give an immediate order to the NKVD to arrest all Germans working in defense factories (artillery, shell,

DOCUMENTATION

251

rifle-machine-gun, cartridge, powder, etc.), and the expulsion of some of those arrested abroad.

Send a copy of the order to the Central Committee.

Report reports (daily) to the Central Committee on the course of arrests and the number of those arrested. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 79. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 51.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov.

No. 140

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE ARRESTS OF THE LEADERSHIP OF TURKMENISTAN

July 20, 1937

326 - Telegram comrade Anna-Mukhamedov.

Authorize the removal from work, expulsion from the party and transfer to the NKVD bodies of Tashnazarov, Kurban-Sakhatov and Aytakov.

Instruct the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Turkmenistan to nominate a candidate for the post of chairman of the CEC of Turkmenistan.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 315. L. 23. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 51.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Anna-Mukhamedov, Yezhov, Malenkov, Kalinin.

No. 141

SPECIAL MESSAGE M.P. Frinovsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
"DIVERSION" ACTIVITIES OF THE
GERMAN SPECIAL SERVICES WITH THE HELP OF CROWS

July 20, 1937

May 31 this year a crow was killed on Lake Ladoga, on which a ring No. D-72291 with the inscription "Germany" was found.

At the same time, near vil. Rusyn, Batetsky district. Leningrad region, a crow was shot down by a kite, on which there was a ring for D-70398, also with the inscription "Germany".

It must be assumed that the Germans, with the help of crows, investigate the direction of the winds, with the aim of using them for purely sabotage and bacteriological purposes (arson of settlements, stacks of bread, etc.).

Nan. 3 departments of the GUGB of the
NKVD of the USSR Commissar of State Security 3rd rank MINAEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 253. L. 141. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "T. Stalin. M. Frinovsky. 23/V11/37*. —* the paragraph is underlined in the margins with a pencil.

252

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 142

NOTE L.P. Berii I.V. TO STALIN ON
"COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" GROUPS IN GEORGIA*

July 20, 1937

No. 1716/s

Dear Koba!

The investigation into the cases of counter-revolutionaries in Georgia is unfolding further, revealing new participants in the most heinous crimes against the Party and Soviet power. The arrest of G. Mgaloblishvili, L. Lavrentiev (Kartvelishvili), Sh. Eliava, M. Orakhelashvili, Lukashin and others, and the testimonies given by them during the investigation, shed a bright light on the treacherous sabotage and sabotage espionage and terrorist work that they carried out, consisting in k.r. organizations of the right.

From their testimony, it is established that k.r. The organization of the rightists was created in Georgia * in 1928, on the one hand, on Rykov's directive, brought from Moscow by G. Kurulov, and on the other hand, on the instructions of Bukharin personally handed over to Orakhelashvili by him during Bukharin's visit to Tbilisi

in the summer of 1928*. The organization then included the former prev. ZakSNK M. Orakhelashvili, ex. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia Sh. Eliava, G. Mgaloblishvili, G. Kurulov, N. Lakoba, S. Dzhugeli and T. Zhgenti.

* In 1930, L. Lavrentyev (Kartvelishvili) *, who came to Tbilisi from Ukraine to work as secretary of the ZKK of the CPSU (b), entered this organization. Lavrentiev actually led the work of the right in Georgia and the Transcaucasus.

The organization was working on putting together a Ph.D. personnel for sabotage, espionage, sabotage and maintained contact with Bukharin, Rykov and the Ukrainian center of the right, with which it was agreed on a simultaneous armed uprising in Ukraine and in the republics of Transcaucasia at the time the war began.

... At the end of 1934, Rykov gave a directive on the need to create a single leading center for the Ph.D. organizations of the right in Transcaucasia. The Transcaucasian Center chose Moscow as its residence, from where it supervised all the wrecking and subversive work of the K.-R. right-wing organizations in the republics caucasus.

In the Transcaucasian k.-r. center right entered:

from Georgia: Eliava Sh, Orakhelashvili M., Lavrentiev L. and Yenukidze A.;

from Armenia: Ter-Gabrielyan Sahak, Lukashin Sergey;

from Azerbaijan: Huseynov Mirza-Davud and Karaev.

The Transcaucasian Center outlined and organizationally designed * republican centers * c.-r. organizations of the right, which included:

to the Georgian center — Mgaloblishvili G., Kurulov G., Matikashvili Sh, Sukhishvili L., Zhgenti T.

to the Armenian center — Ter-Gabrielyan S., Makintsyan GT., Pirumov S., Yertzinkyan A., Yesayan A., Yeghiazaryan I. and Shaverdov D.

to the Azerbaijani center - Buniat-Zade D., Agha Sultanov, Efendiev Mejid, Huseynov Davud, Karaev, Dovlatov, Babaev.

... * In 1935, on the instructions of Rykov, transmitted through Eliava, the republican centers established contacts for a joint struggle against the party and the Soviet government with all counter-revolutionary groups and organizations in Transcaucasia - Trotskyists, Mensheviks in Georgia, Dashnaks in Armenia and Musavatists in Azerbaijan*.

DOCUMENTATION

253

The Rykovs were also instructed to switch to sharp forms and methods of struggle, in particular, to terror against the leadership of the CPSU (b) and the government both in the center and in the regions.

At the end of 1935, Rykov gave a new task - to establish contacts with the government circles of the capitalist powers, in particular, with fascist Germany, England, France.

The republican centers were also to contact foreign countries, with the Rant circles of the anti-Soviet parties—Mensheviks, Dashnaks, and Musavatists. These directives of the All-Union Center of the Rights were implemented: in fact, a united front of struggle against the Party and Soviet power was created on the part of all anti-Soviet forces inside Georgia and Transcaucasia.

... On the instructions of Ph.D. Trotskyist B. Mdivani and with the knowledge and consent of the Georgian center of right-wing spy and traitor Karp Modebadze in 1935, while traveling abroad, contacted the Gestapo, German government circles represented by Rosenberg, Goering and Hess, agreeing on mutual support in the fight against Soviet power.

... All this bastard was a monstrous interweaving of spies, traitors, wreckers, saboteurs, persons with the most diverse counter-revolutionary views and convictions, but united by bestial hatred for the leadership of the CPSU (b) and a vile desire to overthrow Soviet power. Characteristic are the testimonies of Maria Orakhelashvili and Lukashin that Sergo Ordzhonikidze voluntarily or involuntarily provided great moral and material support to the former. Georgian and Transcaucasian workers expelled from Georgia and Transcaucasia and thereby actually helped them in their counter-revolutionary work against the party.

II. .. As I already informed you * German Mgaloblishvili turned out to be an English spy * ... Through espionage work, Mgaloblishvili, among other people, was connected with Tukhachevsky, whom he personally informed in 1937 about the state of counter-revolutionary work in the Georgian units of the Red Army ...

III. * Eliava Shalva confessed that he was an agent of the French, British and German intelligence services and one of the senior officials of the K.R. terrorist-sabotage organization of the right in Georgia.

In Moscow he kept in touch with Bukharin, who gave him a directive to organize terrorist acts against Comrade Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich*.

Eliava Sh. also maintained a close relationship with Gamarnik and Tukhachevsky, knew about the composition of the Ph.D. center of military organization, its work.

At the suggestion of Tukhachevsky, Sh. Eliava agreed to transfer to the German General Staff all information of a spy nature that was of interest to him about the state of the Georgian units of the Red Army, about the situation in Georgia, and other materials received by him for this purpose from G. Mgaloblishvili and Sh. Matikashvili.

...GV. Lavrentiev was silent at first, arguing that the arrest was his misunderstanding, then, after he was hired, he admitted that back in 1929 in Ukraine he was recruited into the K.-R. organization of the right by Yakir...

Lavrentiev confessed that, as secretary of the Zakkraykom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he deliberately distorted the party's policy on the peasant and national question. Deliberately carrying out grain procurements in Georgia under extremely harsh conditions, Lavrentiev and his accomplices caused, in his own words, sharp discontent among the peasants, which in a number of regions of Georgia resulted in armed peasant uprisings.

254

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Thus, the events that took place in Georgia in 1931 are not the result of the mistakes of the then leadership, but the result of the criminal K.-R. activities .

VII. 'For the time being, this scoundrel and traitor Orakhelashvili Mamiya is still silent. We are afraid to firmly take him into work, because. every time he is interrogated he faints* and he has to be injected with camphor.

There is no doubt that he will speak soon...

IX. G. Mgaloblishvili and Sh. Eliava* gave extensive testimonies about the espionage work of David Kandelaki.

These testimonies establish that D. Kandelaki, on the instructions of the All-Union Center of Ph.D. organization of the right got in touch with representatives of fascist Germany - Schacht, Goering and Goebbels.

According to the testimony of G. Mgaloblishvili, D. Kandelaki personally admitted to him that he managed to conclude an agreement on behalf of the rightists with the government of fascist Germany on providing mutual support at the time of the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR. D. Kandelaki was also associated with the German and British intelligence services.

X. *According to the testimony of G. Mgaloblishvili Ph.D. Trotskyist work is being carried out by the Commissar for Georgia, Stark, who is associated with the K.-R. work with deputy People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs - Krestinsky *.

XI. From the testimony of Mgaloblishvili G., Chalmaz M. and others, it is established that the c.r. The work of the center of the right was widely developed in Abkhazia under the direct supervision of N. Lakoba.

N. Lakoba told G. Mgaloblishvili that he was conducting active subversive sabotage and wrecking work in the agriculture of Abkhazia in order to overthrow the Soviet regime and create an "independent" Abkhazia under the protectorate of England or Turkey.

Lakoba hoped that if the organization failed, he would go to Turkey, where he had prepared a refuge among the Lazians and Abkhazians living there

XII. Also opened to. the organization is also in Adjara.

According to the preliminary investigation in 1933-1934. in Adjara, a leading PhD was created. center headed by the pre-CEC of Adjara 3. Lord Kipanidze, who was recruited for the c.-r. Serebryakov and Kurdadze V.

The main goal of this organization was the separation of Adzharia from the USSR and its annexation to Turkey through an armed uprising timed to coincide with the beginning of the declaration of war against the USSR by the capitalist states.

* In the plans of K.-R. The organizations included the restoration of capitalism and the receipt of wide autonomy for Adzharia from the Turkish government with the inclusion of the regions of Artvin and Ardagan in Adzharia. Negotiations were held about this with Turkish government circles through Adjarian emigrants and the Turkish consulate in Batumi*...

XGV. In connection with the above, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia adopted a number of measures:

- a) a purge of the NKVD is being carried out, in which a group of workers who were recruited at one time by the now arrested b. pre-ZakGPU Lordkipanidze T.;
- b) seized a number of persons as in the mountains. Tbilisi, and in the regions in respect of which their participation in the c.-r. work;
- c) in relation to other persons passing through the materials of the investigation, we are conducting an inspection, depending on the results of which appropriate measures will be taken.

DOCUMENTATION

255

Anti-Soviet and k.-r. elements on Georgia will be thoroughly withdrawn. About 200 people have already been shot. Recently, through the NKVD of Georgia, comrade. Yezhov was sent materials for another 350 people to be shot for approval.

I think that at least 1000 people will have to be shot, from among the k.-r. rightists, Trotskyists, spies, saboteurs, wreckers, and so on*. This number does not include former kulaks and criminals who returned from exile and are subject to administrative execution through a troika created under the NKVD of Georgia in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

XV. For further reversal of the investigation, I consider it necessary to arrest Mikhail Kakhiani, Yervand Asribekov, Gaioz Dendariani, Luka Lomidze, David Kandelaki and Stark.

I also consider it necessary to arrest and, after the investigation, send out of the Transcaucasus the wife and mother of N. Lakoba, who were closely connected with a group of now arrested members of the K.-R. groups of N. Lakoba and behave very suspiciously.

I ask for your instructions.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia L. BERIA

R. 5. Lavrentyev testified that, according to the words of the former People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Balitsky, he knew about the right-wing sentiments before the CEC of the Ukrainian SSR, Petrovsky, and the former before the Council of People's Commissars, Chubar*. According to Lavrentiev, at the end of 1933, Comrade Petrovsky and Chubar spoke to him about the right-wing moods. Kosior. During the same period of time, Yakir also told Lavrentiev that Petrovsky

and Chubar share the attitudes of the right in the peasant question...

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 315 L. 24-42. Script. Typescript.

•Published in part.

— Underlined in pencil.

No. 143

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION OF THE INO GUGB NKVD OF THE
USSR ON THE FIGHT AGAINST THE TROTSKISTS

IN THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST PARTY

July 21, 1937

Top secret

The apparatus of the 7th Department of the GUGB of the NKVD obtained in New York the following intelligence information about the struggle against Trotskyism in the American Socialist Party:*

The New York organization of the Socialist Party persistently raised the question of the expulsion of the Trotskyists from the Socialist Party and the withdrawal of its members from the Trotsky Defense Committee. In addition to a number of meetings of anti-Trotskyist groups, cells, and private meetings of individual leaders of the Socialist Party who take anti-Trotskyist positions, a mass general political meeting of members of the Socialist Party was to be convened in New York on June 15, at which the question of struggle was raised in its entirety. with Trotskyism.

In a large appeal signed by 16 local and national leaders of the Socialist Party, there is this passage:

"... You did not join the socialist party, as some did long ago, because you want to have a Trotskyist party; no such social

256

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

an alist in New York who does not blush with shame when he hears reports of speeches made from a public platform by people who are loyal to Trotskyism, not socialism. They (the Trotskyists) undermine the authority of the party among the working masses, and the latter, because we associate with these elements, begin to regard us, among other things, as enemies of the Soviet Union, the Spanish loyalist government, which, despite some defects, is waging a heroic struggle against fascism. If this impression spreads all over the world, we will be doomed. The Socialist Party does not want to live in isolation, but wants to help build a workers' party, defend the gains of the Soviet Union and help destroy the triumvirate of Franco, Hitler and Mussolini in Spain..."

The New York leaders of the American Socialist Party agreed on unity of action with the Wisconsin organization, and on June 18 an interstate conference of the leaders of the Socialist Party was convened in New York to discuss the expulsion of Trotskyists. In the address issued in connection with this conference, signed by Clarence SENIOR, Alfred Becker Lemis, Jack Altman, Harry Laidler, Murray BARON, BRENDON SEXTON, it is written:

"... Within the socialist party, fermentation is taking place, in California there has been a great disagreement on organizational and theoretical issues. Organization meetings in New York end in hand-to-hand fighting, complete anarchy reigns, party members are disappointed and leave the ranks. Because of the elements that undermine the Party from within, undermine its authority in the outside world, we are quickly gaining a reputation for being negative, destructive, even saboteurs. Because of irresponsible elements, the people consider us a Trotskyist party, enemies of the Spanish working class, enemies of the Soviet Union and the Farmers' and Workers' Party. On all these questions we have our own, neither Stalinist nor Trotskyist..."

Massachusetts Central Committee member Coolidge resigned in protest of a Trotskyist resolution passed at a meeting of the Philadelphia Central Committee.

A number of data confirm that Thomas is inclined to support the anti-Trotskyist group of Altman. This was helped by the following circumstances: representatives of the Altman group intercepted Trotskyist correspondence, in which Thomas was shown in the caricature form of a person whom the Trotskyists themselves are going to get rid of in the near future. This correspondence was shown to Thomas Altman immediately upon his arrival in New York.

The Trotskyists, taking into account their position in the Socialist Party, are now carrying out organizational work to create their own staff centers and a national association of centers, raising funds for this. Weber said that on June 18 there would be a meeting of Trotskyists only, at which the well-known French Trotskyist Alfred Rosmer would make a report on this issue. Weber stated that Rosmer would present the new guidelines he had received from Trotsky.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 316. L. 3-7. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "T. Stalin. M. Frinovsky. 21.VII.-37", Stalin's "Learn about Rosmer". A handwritten note is attached separately: "T. Ulmer. Taken under control. 23/VII. gave the task to Comrade Slutsky to collect

data on Rosmer and its contents

speeches. M. Frinovsky. 23/7." (Ibid., I. 3).

DOCUMENTATION

257

No. 144

M.P.'s NOTE Frinovsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
STATEMENT OF V.A. BALITSKY

July 21, 1937

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending you the statement of the arrested Balitsky V. dated July 17 of this year.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

(Frinovsky)

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

General Commissioner of State Security N.I. Ezhov from the arrested Balitsky V.A.

STATEMENT

On July 14, 1937, I filed an application in your name. Now I must completely renounce this statement, not, of course, because I took a lot of the blame on myself, but because in this statement I vilely deceived you. In this note, I meanly double-dealingly tried to present myself to you as a person who is only objectively guilty of having unwittingly contributed to the anti-Soviet activities of the enemies of the people.

After a long deliberation, I came to the conclusion that all the same, I would inevitably be exposed by the investigation, and therefore, I decided to tell how I deceived the party and the government in the most vile way, which entrusted me with a major state post.

My crimes against the country are enormous; after many years of honest work, I found myself in the camp of the worst enemies of the Party and the people.

About what specific hostile work was carried out by me, I will describe in detail to the investigation.

In this note, I will try to outline the main points of my criminal activities.

1. *First of all, I bluntly declare that I am a participant in the anti-Soviet Trotskyist-fascist military conspiracy*. I was involved in this conspiracy by YAKIR after a well-known indoctrination at the end of 1935.

2. *The Ukrainian Center for a Military Conspiracy consisted of the following persons: *YAKIR, N.N. POPOV, SHELEKhes, VEGER, DEMCHENKO and me BALITSKY*.

On the ascending line, our Ukrainian conspiracy was part of the all-Union anti-Soviet military conspiracy, which was led by GAMARNIK and TUKHACHEVSKY, *moreover, the leading role in the all-Union military fascist conspiracy belonged not to TUKHACHEVSKY, but to GAMARNIK*.

Gamarnik, in turn, was associated with the leading centers of the Trotskyists and the right.

Down the line in all regions of the Ukraine, among the leading party and Soviet workers, there were participants in the conspiracy, mainly people from among the former Trotskyists and rightists.

3. Turning to the political qualification of the conspiracy, based on the tasks that we put forward, I must declare that our conspiracy is in its own way

258

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

political direction and its organizational ties was right trotskyist-fascist. Our conspiracy was military in the sense that the leadership in the center and in the Ukraine followed a military line (GAMARNIK-YAKIR). In essence, he was associated with a number of civilian Trotskyist and right-wing lines.

** Parallel to our conspiracy and in close connection with it, the 4th anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist organization, headed by the KhVV

LEI, TRILIS and fox **.

The Ukrainian nationalist organization was associated with Ukrainian anti-Soviet centers in Germany and Poland.

5. The main goals of the conspiracy were: ^the overthrow of the central leadership of the party and the country by force of arms*. If this had not been achieved before the start of the war, then the tasks of the conspiracy would have been to create all the necessary conditions for the defeat of the Soviet Union in the war with Germany, Japan and Poland.

* For this purpose, extensive wrecking work was carried out along the line of the army to weaken the power of the Red Army in the main strategic directions (Novograd - Volynsk - Zhitomir), the Korosten direction, and the Letichevsky fortified region.

The work of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR under my leadership in its main operational directions was also placed at the service of these tasks of the conspiracy.

6. Participants in the conspiracy:

a) military: early. headquarters of the KVO division commander * BUTYRSKY *, deputy. commander of the HVO commander * TUROVSKY *, early. Politupr. QUO - * AMELIN, * his deputy * ORLOV *, corps commander division commander * GRIGORIEV *, corps commander division commander * DEMICHEV *, corps commander commander * GERMONIUS *, brigade commander * ZYUKA *, commander * SABLIN *;

b) Chekists: b. my deputy **IVANOV Vasily**, ex. my deputy police officer **BACHINSKY**, former head. Special Department ** ALEKSANDROVSKY **, head of the transport department ** WRITTEN **, beginning. Kharkov region management **MAZO**, early. Odessa Regional Administration **ROZANOV**.

On my instructions, BACHINSKY was to indoctrinate and recruit into the conspiracy the head of the Kyiv regional administration, **SHAROV**. I did not have time to ask Bachinsky about whether BACHINSKY SHAROV was recruited.

In this statement, I have only touched briefly on the main points of criminal activity and conspiracy.

I certainly did not remember, and therefore did not name all the participants in the conspiracy known to me.

During the investigation, I will make every effort to expose as completely as possible all our criminal activities and all the conspirators.

July 17, 1937

V. BALITSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 316. L. 8-12. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Discuss with Yezhov."
— underlined in pencil.

— Surnames are circled in pencil.

DOCUMENTATION

259

No. 145

CODE TELEGRAM L.P. Berii I.V. TO STALIN ON OBTAINING
THE AUTHORIZATION FOR THE ARREST
OF THE AUTHORIZED NKID

July 22, 1937

No. 1342/sh - From Tbilisi

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

The materials of the investigation of the NKVD of Georgia, the commissioner of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for Georgia, L. Stark, are exposed in counter-revolutionary work and counter-revolutionary relations with the deputy. NKID Krestinsky.

Request authorization for Stark's arrest.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party (b) of Georgia BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 316. L. 20. Original. Typescript.

There are handwritten notes on the cipher telegram: "For. Stalin", "Molotov, Chubar, Mikoyan", "Comrade Frinovsky reported. Poskrebyshv.

No. 146

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION
PROTOCOL I.D. FLOROVSKOY (44)

July 23, 1937

No. 58658

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the protocol of the interrogation of the arrested participant in the anti-Soviet military-Trotskyist conspiracy ID FLOROVSKII. - the former chief of the air force of the Primorsky Group of Forces OKDVA - dated June 19, 1937.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL I.D. FLOROVSKOY
of June 19, 1937

Chief of the Air Force of the Primorsky Group of Forces, division commander, member. VKP(b) since 1917.

Question: At previous interrogations you testified that you were tasked by a member of the military-Trotskyist conspiracy, LAPIN, to disrupt the military readiness of the air units of the Primorsky Group by wrecking measures. You have completed this task.

Answer: Yes, I did. As a result of the acts of sabotage carried out by me personally, as well as by the participants in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy *JUNG MEISTER*, 'GLAZUNOV*', 'MIRONOV*' and others, the aviation units of the Primgruppa in 1935-36. were brought into a non-combat-ready state and these units could not cope with the tasks of repelling the actions of Japanese aviation.

260

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Question: The investigation states that you, as a participant in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy, on the instructions of your organization, carried out wrecking and subversive work in order to disintegrate the Red Army in the event of its armed clash with the Japanese army.

Answer: Yes. I received a directive from them to create all the necessary conditions for the defeat of the Red Army in the war with Japan, and LAPINA was guided by this instruction in my subversive work.

Question: By what sabotage methods did you bring air units

Primgroups in a non-combatable state.

Answer: First of all, the destruction of the material part of the aircraft.

For this purpose, on the basis of the wrecking directive of LAPIN, I forbade unit commanders to store aircraft in tents.

In this way, ** in 1935, a fighter squadron of 48 I-15 and M-25 aircraft, in three months - May **, June and July, 30 aircraft were rendered unusable. These aircraft fell into disrepair from rain and sun, as the entire * percale cover * and wooden 'spars * and ribs of the planes and stabilizers were destroyed. In the flight crew and in the technical panic began. In response to my request by telegraph to LAPIN what to do next with the 31-IE aircraft, I received a telegraphic order from SANGURSKY: "... to stop flights, and to subject the remaining good aircraft to inspection and 'repair*.'" I ordered to open the canvas on the planes and stabilizers. Thus, by mid-August 1935, out of 48 I-15 aircraft received at the beginning of 1935, not a single airworthy one remained. The pilots did not fly, part was sent on vacation and the squadron, as a combat unit, was removed from the combat strength of the aviation of the Primorsky group.

Squadrons could not start repairing aircraft, as there was no repair material. I do not remember what date, the report about the failure of the 31-IE aircraft was sent to the People's Commissar of Defense signed by the commander of the FEDKO group. This report very quickly received an indication from the People's Commissar of Defense that a special team of workers was leaving Moscow with repair material for the restoration of aircraft. Such a brigade arrived very quickly and also quickly restored 25-28 aircraft.

However, by the end of the summer period of 1935, our organization did the following by wrecking work to destroy aircraft:

- 1) In the 3rd aerial photographic detachment, out of ten full-time R-5 aircraft, three remained fit for flight, and the rest rotted and required major repairs.
- 2) In the 28th light-bombs. esq. out of 28 aircraft, *10 aircraft* remained.
- 3) In the 29th, easy-bom. esq. out of 31 aircraft, 13-14 aircraft remained.
- 4) In the 30th assault squad. out of 31 aircraft, 12-13 aircraft remained *.
- 5) In the 12th reconnaissance. squadron of 19 aircraft left * 7 aircraft *.
- 6) In the 8th squadron, out of 29 aircraft, 11 aircraft remained.
- 7) In the 29th aviation detachment, out of 10 aircraft, 4 aircraft remained.
- 8) In the 8th cavalry aviation detachment, out of 10 aircraft, 4 aircraft remained.
- 9) In the 165th aviation detachment, out of 20 aircraft, 2 aircraft remained.
- 10) In the 187th detachment, out of 10 aircraft, 3 aircraft remained.

"Thus, about 75% of combat aircraft were disabled. In fact, aviation by the end of September 1935 was not combat-ready. The planes were completely preserved only in the 7th and 20th fighter squadrons. * In these units, aircraft * were stored in hangars **.

"Aircraft services in parts were completely destroyed **. Firstly, because LAPIN year after year, i.e. in 1934, 1945 and partly in 1936

DOCUMENTATION

261

removed from the title lists the construction of freestanding workshops parts.

Secondly, the organization of the repair was completely upset by the failure to supply repair materials from the army aviation depot No. 6, located in Khabarovsk. The former chiefs of supply of the air forces OKDVA VEZLOMTSEV and BUKHOVTSEV, in the interests of our military-Trotskyist organization, organized the supply in such a way that dope varnishes, aviation plywood, pistons, screws, galvanized nails, threads, percale, never arrived on time. paint brushes, aviation wood, non-ferrous and ferrous metal, so that the planes, due to any screws or plywood, stood for 4-5 months in the workshops of the 5th aviation brigade and could not go to the airfields for testing and enter the unit for filling the loss.

* VEZLOMTSEV * and * BUKOVTSSEV *, being the chiefs of supply of the OKDVA Air Force and being good experts in supply and aviation, successfully and successfully completely destroyed the special aviation rear. If a war broke out between the USSR and Japan, then the complete failure and failure of the aviation of the Primorsky group would be prepared *.

Question: Tell us about the subversive sabotage activities carried out by the participants in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy in the field of combat training of air units.

Answer: The sabotage activities of our organization in the field of combat training dealt one of the most severe blows to the air units. First of all, we tried to slow down the course of combat training, and for this purpose, we began the winter or summer periods with a delay in terms, and also ended earlier than the dates indicated by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense.

LAPIN, I - FLOROVSKII, JUNGMEISTER, MIRONOV and GLAZUNOV sabotage in this direction was carried out under the pretext of lack of aviation gasoline or the unsuitability of the airfield. The terms of preparation of the material part were also delayed, which also reduced the periods of combat training in time.

One of the elements of our wrecking activity was a special method of combat training, both for single pilots and for entire units. This caused periods of an outbreak of not only accidents, but also the death of the flight crew.

along with the planes.

Newly arrived pilots and observers were released into the air without preliminary and thorough individual combat training on the ground.

Forced combat training also found a lively response among the flight crew, who, by the way, did not like to engage in theoretical questions.

dew on the ground, evaded work in classes (which were poorly equipped) for the study of the material part. The ardent zeal of the aircrew in the air and their dismissive attitude to study on the ground made it possible for us to skillfully disguise our sabotage activities. The orders of the People's Commissar of Defense in matters of the elimination of "smartness" were not carried out by us. It was strictly forbidden to conduct live firing at ground and air targets in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the airfield. As a result of such a violation in 1934, on December 23, two R-5 aircraft collided over the airfield in the 8th assault squadron in Zharikovo, as a result two aircraft crashed and four people died. Very often planes and pilots perished due to the fact that in our practice of shooting at ground targets, under the pretext, in pursuit of a large percentage of hits, we allowed

262

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

flight personnel to withdraw aircraft from a dive below the heights indicated by the instructions for fire training.

During 1935 and 1936, there were about 75 aircraft accidents, up to 45 engine accidents, about 160 forced landings and 13 accidents with the death of 14 people in the air units of the Primorsky Group. A huge number of minor breakdowns, about 200 in total, not going to the start and returning aircraft from the start, which for 1935 and 1936 there were up to 300 cases - indicates that in the preparation of the material part we dealt a big blow and, mainly, to the 51 air brigade, as the main aviation unit in the aviation of the Primorsky group. "Sabotage work in the field of operation and preparation of the materiel was carried out by a member of the organization, an engineer of the brigade GRUTSEV **.

In addition, LAPIN compiled the so-called "complex of flight work", this complex had in mind to chain the flight units in their combat training to the airfield. "" The orders of the People's Commissar of Defense to teach and train units outside their main airfields, to involve flight crews in long flights day and night, were not carried out **. All commanders were connected with a "flight work complex." This complex was called in units "LAPINA complex", LAPIN managed to carry out this complex with the support of SANGURSKY. An extremely limited number of flight personnel was always involved in tactical flight exercises, this was done in order not to train the entire mass of personnel. Preparations for all exercises were carried out under the leadership of LAPIN, and in the training itself there was no purposefulness in the spirit of the orders of the NGOs.

The superficial nature of the exercises did not give the participants in the exercises a proper training load.

In questions of the operational training of aviation, LAPIN very often referred to TUKHACHEVSKY, calling him one of the operationally literate of all military workers. Most of the military games held were aimed at instilling in the commanding staff the idea that aircraft should be used to attack Japanese aircraft or other targets one by one, and not massively, as required by the NPO order and instructions for independent aviation operations. I remember my first participation in a military aviation game in March.

those of 1935. At this game, I carried out in my decisions the idea that was laid down in the orders of the NGOs, i.e. to destroy the enemy, it is necessary to strike with the entire mass of aircraft. During the analysis of the game, SANGURSKY and LAPIN persistently argued the fallacy and incorrectness of the use of aviation in a massive form.

They demanded the first flights and the last flights in small groups of 5-10 aircraft. At the time, I was surprised by this setup. LAPIN explained to me at the time his position that the conditions of the Manchurian theater require precisely the echelon use of aviation. Later it became clear to me why Lapin and Sangursky defended the echelon point of view. In the context of these requirements, at the direction of LAPIN, an operational plan was drawn up for 1935 for the use of OKDVA aviation, for 1936 this echelon tactics was also reflected in the operational plan.

At the military game in February 1937, LAPIN did not participate, the red side was commanded by SANGURSKY, I commanded the aviation of the red side of the Primorsky direction. One move was made by me in the context of echelon use of aviation, and two subsequent massive use. I was summoned to SANGURSKY's office, where BOGOMYAGKOV was also at that time. SANGURSKY asked me a question: "How did LAPIN teach you

DOCUMENTATION

263

use aircraft?", I replied that by echelon method, but further explanations were discontinued, since SANGURSKY was immediately urgently called to the chief leader of the game. From this incident, I realized that I did not exactly follow the instructions that were once given by LAPIN on the echelon use of aviation. Balakirev also stood for this point of view.

** Thus, in the operational use of the aviation of the Red Army, its defeat was being prepared in the war between the USSR and Japan **.

In the interests of the military-Trotskyist organization in 1934, 1935 and 1936. there were no joint exercises between the aviation of the OKDVA and the Pacific Fleet to work out the elements of operational interaction in case of war. There was only one such joint exercise in August 1935, but this exercise, according to its operational plan, was to inculcate even more strongly in commanders the idea of the expediency and necessity of using aviation by echelon. BALAKIREV also took part in this exercise, and SANGURSKY was the head

leader.

Question: What do you know about the sabotage of the participants in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy in heavy aviation.

Answer: LAPIN actively carried out the installation on the impossibility of the operational use of heavy aircraft in the Far Eastern theater of military operations. His main motives were: an extremely rainy summer in the DVK, an abundance of fogs and a limited number of land plots suitable for airfields. As for the winter period, LAPIN believed that it was very difficult to prepare heavy aircraft of the TB-3 type for flights in winter, and besides that, a lot of time was required. I think that on this basis

there is not a single unit of heavy aviation in the composition of the *** Primorsky group, as you can see, LAPIN managed to carry out his point of view. In fact, in Primorye, in the area enclosed between the points of Ussuri, K-Rybolov, Konstantinovka, Voroshilov, Tarasovka, Sysoevka, Bolshoy Klyuch and Ussuri, there are excellent conditions for the location of heavy aircraft, especially since the climatic conditions of Primorye ensure the successful operations of heavy aviation***.

LAPIN's attitude to the impossibility of using heavy aircraft at the DVK led to the fact that the 5th Airborne Regiment, located in Muchnaya, did not have the required heavy aircraft.

The regiment includes the 26th heavy squadron, which is currently not manned. Instead of 12 TB-3 aircraft received according to the report card, there are only four TB-3 aircraft.

Thus, the paratroopers of the 5th Air Regiment cannot be used as part of their entire mass during the war. An airborne regiment cannot be raised on 4 TB-3 aircraft. For 1935 and 1936 there was not a single case of lifting the entire air regiment into the air at once.

In 1935 and 1936 The 5th Air Regiment had only 200 instead of 1000 parachutes.

The airborne regiment has been formed since May 1, 1936 and has not been organized to the present. There are no warehouses for parachutes, armaments, ammunition, no training base, no apartments for officers, barracks, garages, and other special buildings.

Question: Which of the participants in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy carried out sabotage in aircraft construction?

Answer: Hangar construction in Primorye was started on the direct orders of NGOs in 1936, and before that time, DZYZA and LAPIN, as well as SANGURSKY, skillfully removed money from titles, or rather, requests from unit commanders for the construction of hangars.

264

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Concerning the technical side of the construction of the hangars, I must point out that KASHCHEEV, DZYZA and BEKKER, under the pretext of allegedly inexperience of the technical personnel at the sites, with great effect for the cause of the Trotskyist military organization, disrupted the construction of the hangars.

At ten airfields: Ussuri, Lyalichi, Kremovo, Voroshilovsky airfield, Baranovsky airfield, Golenka, Voznesenskoye, Khorolskoye and K-Rybolov, hangars were built in 1936 by the end of November, but these hangars were used partially in the winter of 1936/37 .g., and mainly in the spring of 1937, it was impossible.

Those hangars that were covered with roofing felt, this roof was torn off by the wind. The hangars were leaking and the planes were wet. The strong winds of Primorye blew off the roof of Finnish shavings on many hangars; in K-Rybolov one hangar was blocked by the wind. The area near the hangars was not planned in autumn, the canals remained

you and the pits. In the spring of 1937, water after snowmelt, and later rainwater, was collected near the hangars. The withdrawal of aircraft from the hangars became impossible with an ordinary team of 19 people, the time spent on rolling out one aircraft was up to one hour. Thus, the hangars turned into a trap for aircraft.

** On alert, not a single squadron in the spring could be ready for launch in one hour and ten minutes **. Under these new conditions, it took 5-7 hours to prepare the squadron for departure.

In addition, hangars until the last day, i.e. before my arrest, they had no gates.

In winter, snow, driven by strong winds, formed large snowdrifts in the hangars, which also drastically reduced the combat training of aviation in winter.

The gates in the hangars were not built because there were no metal rollers.

On this issue, DZYA corresponded with the beginning. SKU RKKA LEVINZO NOM, but the last commercials have not been released so far.

When GAMARNIK was in Primorye in the autumn of 1936, unit commanders approached him with a question about when the rollers would be available, to which the answer was that the rollers would soon be shipped.

There were similar appeals to GAMARNIK in Spassk, Khvalinka, and Daubikha, i.e. at all those airfields where GAMARNIK was.

During the winter of 1936 and 1937 the rolls didn't work. The order of the NPO, which strongly demanded the construction of hangars in 1936, was very skillfully bypassed by members of our military Trotskyist organization. In fact, not hangars were built, but sheds for an unknown purpose. DZYA and BECKER, to the demand of the unit commanders to give them full-fledged hangars as soon as possible, often did not give any answers or limited themselves to sending a commission to inspect the progress of the construction of the hangars. At the Spassky airfield, the hangars were built in such a sabotage manner that at the present time they are being completely rebuilt.

In parallel with the progress of work on the destruction of aircraft, work was actively carried out to render the existing airfields unusable.

At present, almost all airfields have many springboards, grooves, furrows, bumps in sedimentary places over almost their entire area, where pits were once filled up during the initial planning of airfields. In 1934-1935 and in 1936, LAPIN excluded funds for the maintenance of airfields from applications for construction. Airfields for night flights are especially dangerous. All these irregularities, which are indicated above, exacerbate the error of the pilot.

DOCUMENTS _265

during takeoff and landing. There were frequent cases of breakdowns, accidents of aircraft for these reasons.

Almost at all airfields there are no water collection and drainage channels.

navy. In autumn and spring, after rainfall, water rushes to the airfields from the area adjacent to the borders of the airfield. Water flows in one place turn a small groove into a ravine, and in another place puddles accumulate, as a result of which airfields failed even for light aircraft for a long time. This creates an extended non-flying period for aviation.

Thus, in this, as it were, a slight oversight, the deep meaning of the military-Trotskyist organization was laid: to bring the aviation of the Red Army to inactivity during an armed clash.

At the debriefing of aviation exercises in August 1935 at the DVK in Vozdvizhenka, in his concluding speech, SANGURSKY pointed out that it was necessary to teach aviation to work on bad airfields. Lapin also emphasized this in his speech.

In addition, many airfields are built on low ground where the soil dries out slowly. During a war, if aviation reaches such an aerodrome and finds it in seaside rainfall, then it will take up to five days with sun and wind to dry up such an aerodrome; without this, aviation will remain inactive during the crucial and decisive period of a combat operation.

The low airfields are Staraya Bilmanovka, Voznesenskoye, Abramovka, Voroshilovsky airfield, Voskresenka, Varpakhovka, Berezovka and Ussuri.

These airfields require drainage work, while the airfields at Varpakhovka and Berezovka are built on terrain with a clear sign of a swamp. In the summer these airfields dry out for no more than two months, and in rainy summers they are completely unusable. The airfields at Ussuri, Lipivtsy, Zharikovo, Kremovo, the Voroshilovsky airfield, and Staraya Sysoevka were chosen in limited areas of the area. Ravines and swamps approach the boundaries of these airfields. It is impossible to expand them, and if it is feasible, then up to 3-5 million rubles are required for earthworks.

Such airfields were chosen in order to prevent high-speed aircraft from working in these fields, and which, as you know, have an increased landing speed, and hence the increased mileage of the aircraft.

****To the main operational**** *airfields* Ilyinskoye, K-Rybolov, Klyuchi, Zharikovo, Popovka, Khorolskoye, Lipovtsy, Gapenka, Pokrovka, Novozhastovo, Bilmanovka, Old and New Voznesenskoye, Abramovka, Kremovo, Osipovka, Shiryaev, Lyalichi, Manzovka, Muchnaya, Spassky airfield hub, Antonovka, Shmakovka and Ussuri *no access roads*. In spring and autumn, as well as during rainy seasons, the roads to these airfields soften and become completely impassable for traffic. And in this case, members of our organization bypassed the issue of titles in road construction. We managed to convince many people that aviation does not fly by road, but by air, and that huge funds should not be invested in land, while this money can be used for other needs.

By persistently drawing the line that **** not to build access roads****, we and our organization have solved an extremely important task. In the event of a war and in the course of individual operations, the aviation of Primorye and part of the Amur Region (that is, that which should arrive in Primorye on the first day and subsequent days of the war) would suffer a huge defeat during its redeployment.

266

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Flight echelons could fly from their main airfields to operational ones, but the rear of each squadron in spring and autumn and in rainy summers can in no way get out of their main airfield. If you break out from the main airfield, then you can't drive up to the operational airfield to this rear.

Thus, each squadron would be torn in half. In this case, the rear cannot provide any assistance to the flight echelon located at the operational airfield.

The lack of built access roads prepared the complete destruction of the aviation of Primorye and the arriving aviation from the Amur region.

Question: Tell me, under what conditions are the mobile stockpiles of bombs of the air units of the Primrgruppe kept?

Answer: Under the pretext that air bombs should always be ready to hang under the aircraft, LAPIN pointed out that the bombs should not be stored in warehouses, but should be kept at airfields in the open. 'Chief of Artillery ROGOV* skillfully used this to cover up his wrecking actions. ROGOV stored bombs in the open air at artillery depots in Chalcedon, Galenka and the Partizan junction. At the operational airfields in Ilyinsk, K-Ry bolov, Zharikov, Staraya and Novaya Bilmanovka, Pokrovka and Muchnaya, it has been stored since 1934 and 1935. about one hundred and twenty wagonloads of bombs. About 50 carloads of bombs are stored in the open air in the warehouses of Chalcedon and Galenka.

SANGURSKY and BALAKIREV were well aware of the procedure for such storage of aerial bombs. ROGOV and I personally informed BALAKIREV about our actions with bombs, the latter suggested that bombs be delivered to other airfields as well. Members of the military-Trotskyist conspiracy DZYZA, BEKKER and LAPIN crossed out the declared amount of money from the applications for 1935 for the construction of bomb storage facilities at airfields. In 1936, again, unit commanders made a request for the construction of bomb storage facilities. This money was approved in 1936, and in the middle of 1936, by personal order of Gamarnik, more than 20 million rubles were withdrawn from aviation construction, this amount included all the money planned for the construction of bomb storages. The storage of bombs in the open air, a significant part of the latter, led to disrepair, rust began to appear on the hulls. Bombs began to lose normal flight when dropped from an aircraft due to the swelling of the hulls, which violated the accuracy of hitting the target. It must be assumed that the bomb will not produce the explosive effect it is supposed to have.

"The existing air depot No. 252 also does not provide normal storage of air bombs**. This warehouse began to take shape at the beginning of 1934, and construction began only in the second half of 1935. The storage facilities for the warehouse are not of good quality. Underground water protrudes from under the floor of the vault, which causes dampness. There is no ventilation in the vaults. All this requires very frequent drying of the property in order to protect it from damage. The fire-fighting reservoirs are built so wretchedly that the water does not hold in them and sinks into the soil. The electric lighting line, laid down from the power plant of the cement plant, collapsed in the spring of 1937, and at this time there is no light in the warehouse. Electrical cable, prolo-

zhenny under the railway bridge in the ground, technically, when laying, it was made wreckingly. The spring overflow of the stream (which has no name) destroyed the cable under the bridge with the flow of its water. The power supply has stopped. There were no human casualties. In April 1937, one of the Red Army soldiers of the warehouse, standing at the post near the bridge guarding the electric cable, was killed by stepping on a piece of wire sticking out of the ground. In his sabotage

DOCUMENTATION _ 267

At work, members of our military Trotskyist organization KASHCHEEV, DZYA and BECKER kept this warehouse under their special attention.

In 1935 and 1936 of the allocated amounts for the construction of the warehouse, they, i.e. KASHCHEEV, DZYA and BECKER withdrew about one million rubles.

This was done under the pretext of a lack of manpower, and the latter was transferred from one construction site to another, also under the pretext of strengthening the site with manpower.

Question: What is the state of the meteorological service in the air units of the Primgroup?

Answer: I, LAPIN, MIRONOV, GLAZUNOV and JUNGMEISTER took into account in my sabotage work the need to destroy this service. Although I do not have exact data, I believe that there are also people recruited by the military-Trotskyist organization in the civilian network of the weather service in the Far East. For weather stations in 1934, 1935 and 1936 not a single special building was built. There is no such building either at the headquarters of the Air Force of the group, there are no such buildings in the units either. The headquarters of the OKDVA Air Force for the equipment of the weather station did not release funds in the necessary need for the units. The supply of hydrogen and pilot balloons went on with great interruptions. The commanders of the units, making night or day flights, knew about the state of the weather only over their airfield, and what was happening within a radius of 10-15 km was not known. This led to the death of the material part and to the fatal casualties of the flight crew.

On August 23, 1934, under the leadership of the JUNGMEISTER at the airfield in Muchnaya, 11 aircraft with experienced pilots and observers were launched into the air in the 28th squadron. Around 24:00 on August 23, a strong typhoon broke out with heavy rainfall. Aircraft scattered in different places in Primorye. One crew was thrown to the ground, the pilot and observer were killed. The second plane landed near the Olga Bay and after some time the plane was blown into the sea by the flood of a mountain river, the crew remained alive. The third crew was forced to land near the Amur Bay, two planes landed in the valley of the Daubikhe River, the sixth crew almost flew into Manchuria, but, having restored the orientation of the villages north of Spassk, the rest of the planes had forced landings at the airfields of the Spassky hub. At that time, I was not yet a member of the Trotskyist-fascist military organization, and when investigating the causes of this incident, the former ** Kom appeared to be a very clear culprit. 51st Air Brigade JUNGMEISTER. At that time, before LAPIN and the former military prosecutor** of the Primorsky Group, MALKIN, I demanded that JUNGMEISTER be brought to trial.

LAPIN was dissatisfied with these demands of mine. The head of the meteorological station of the 51st ab. and pom. early headquarters of the 51st ab. KOCHANOVSKII. After my entry into the military Trotskyist conspiracy, I immediately

it became clear why JUNGMEISTER was not supported by LAPIN in my petition to bring him to trial.
LAPIN somehow reminded me of this case too.

**

The destruction of the meteorological service prepared the way for an active defeat of the OKDVA aircraft in the upcoming war with Japan**. At present, telephone, telegraph and radio communications are extremely poor in providing parts with data on the state of the weather. For 1935 and 1936 there were many cases when, due to untimely and inaccurate weather information, not only individual aircraft, but entire formations were at risk. Only the experience of the navigators, the high flight technique of old pilots will save

268

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

saved them from death. Young pilots and observers, who found themselves in unexpectedly difficult weather conditions, broke planes, and sometimes they themselves died.

In 1937, on May 24, 21 planes flew from the Kremovo region to Khabarovsk. The weather report of the Khabarovsk station gave good weather conditions throughout. In fact, the weather was good only up to the parallel of the Vyazemskaya station, to the north and up to Khabarovsk it was raining plentifully and there was continuous fog. 18 aircraft returned, and 3 aircraft landed on an extremely poor airfield, a primitively equipped landing site near the Vyazemskaya station. On this day, Khabarovsk assumed the right to lead the flight. During the war, OKDVA aviation, flying out with its entire mass to destroy Japanese aviation or other targets, may itself not reach these targets and die due to poorly prepared meteorological service. An unexpected squall, typhoon, snowstorm, blizzard, fog, or heavy rain can lead a large mass of aircraft in the air to the same outcome as those small groups of aircraft that were discussed here.

I read the protocol, it was written down from my words correctly - FLOROVSKII.

Interrogated:

Beginning 00 GUGB NKVD of the 19th Rifle Corps - Art. lieutenant of state security KOTYUK

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 316. L. 50-61. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Very important. This means that our aviation in the Far East is in a difficult condition."

— circled:-

**—*• underlined in pencil.

— underlined with a wavy line and underlined in the margins with three lines.

****—**** highlighted with two lines.

No. 147

CODE TELEGRAM ANNA-MUKHAMEDOVA I.V. TO STALIN
ON THE LIQUIDATION OF THE "SPY" ORGANIZATION
"MELLY-FIRKA"

July 23, 1937

In. No. 1367/sh - From Ashgabat

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

The organs of the NKVD of Turkmenistan* uncovered and liquidated the widely branched spy-nationalist insurrectionary organization "Melli-Firka", inspired by British intelligence. The center of the organization is located in Herat (Afghanistan) * among prominent representatives of Eastern espionage. *The organization set itself the task of separating the national republics from the USSR and creating a single Turkic-Tatar state*. The practical activity of the organization was reduced to the preparation of an armed uprising in Turkmenistan at the time of the intervention, for which:

1) In a number of regions of Turkmenistan, in particular Kerki, Iltani, Tashauz, Tedzhene, Merv, Bairam-Ali and others, widely branched espionage-nationalist rebel groups have been created.

2) In the cordon zone in Afghanistan, gangs are formed, consolidated, rebel cadres from the former Basmachi, counter-revolutionary

DOCUMENTATION

269

bais emigrants settled in large numbers along the border of Afghanistan with the USSR.

3) * In the Turkmen division in Merv, a military rebel group was created, formed, headed by Colonel Agali-Ismaïlov *, in whose activities the chief of the political department of the division Bainazarov was involved (arrested with the sanction of the People's Commissariat of Defense). This group is connected with the center of Herat, and should ensure the transition of the division to the side of the rebels at the time of the intervention.

4) "A major role in this organization is played by the Afghan consulate in Merv, which planted in a number of cities in Central Asia a widely ramified mass network of espionage and sabotage agents*, which transmitted military and political information to the Afghan consulate, the Herat rebel center, preparing an explosion Chardzhui bridge, which is of great strategic importance. The organs of the NKVD of Turkmenistan arrested up to 70 agents of the Afghan consulate who were caught in active counter-revolutionary espionage activities.

**5) The investigation reveals a detailed plan of active hostilities on the part of foreign gangs and formations at the time of the uprising in Turkmenia

nii, a plan to seize power**.

6) So far, up to 170 people have been arrested in the case of the insurgent espionage-nationalist organization, of which 43 people confessed, 60 are scheduled for additional arrest, including 23 Afghan nationals caught in espionage activities. The bodies of the NKVD of Turkmenistan are providing effective measures for the complete and decisive defeat of the organization, rooting out, liquidating the entire network of espionage and sabotage agents.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Turkmenistan considers it necessary:

1) To make a strong protest to the Afghan government against the obviously hostile actions of the Afghan consulate in Merv, which organizes active counter-revolutionary insurgent work on our territory.

2) For active counter-revolutionary work, arrest the Afghan consul in Merv, Abdul-Vadutkhvan, and his secretary, Atam-Medkhan, or expel both of them as unwanted foreigners within the USSR.

3) In view of the need to resolutely uproot the massive dangerous network of espionage and sabotage agents planted by the Afghan consulate in all the most important points in Central Asia, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Turkmenistan asks for permission to arrest with subsequent registration of all Afghan nationals convicted of active espionage-nationalist insurgent activity.

4) In order to suppress, localize the hostile activities of the Afghans, the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Turkmenistan considers it necessary to transfer the Merv Afghan Consulate to Ashgabat, from where it will be difficult to conduct active counter-revolutionary work among the Afghan population and tribes settled mainly in Merv oasis.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Turkmenistan ANNA-MUKHAMEDOV

RGANI. F. 89. Op. 48. D. 8. L. 1-2. Copy. Typescript.

On the second sheet there is a handwritten resolution: "Ashgabat. Secretary of the Central Committee of Turkmenistan Anna-Mukhamedov. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks allows the arrest of all convicted Afghan subjects. The issue of the Afghan consul will be resolved through diplomacy. Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin. 25.VII.37.

__ underlined in pencil.

__ underlined in the margins.

270

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 148

MESSAGE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY AND V.V. ULRIHA I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOV ON THE PUBLICATION

IN THE PRESS REPORT ON THE SENTENCE OF THE JAPANESE-GERMAN
"TROTSKYIST SPIES AND DIVERSANTS"

July 23, 1937

No. 270 I / ss

Sov. secret

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade I.V. STALIN

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

According to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Exit Session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR was sent to the Far East to consider the cases of Japanese-German Trotskyist spies and saboteurs* operating on the Amur and Far Eastern railways.

gah.

According to the same decision of the Politburo, the verdicts of the Field Session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court on the execution of exposed saboteurs and spies were to be published in the local press.

To date, the local press has already published the verdicts of the Field Session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on the execution of 212 spies and saboteurs.

Tov. Vareikis considers that further publication of the verdicts of the Assizes of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR is inappropriate.

July 20 this year the case against 20 more former railroad workers, active Trotskyist spies and saboteurs, agents of Japanese intelligence, who were sentenced to death, was considered, however, the publication of the message on the verdict was delayed until instructions were received from Moscow*.

Informing about the foregoing, We will irrigate your instructions *.

A. VYSHINSKY V.
ULRICH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 253. L. 142. Original. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Inform Vyshinsky. M."

— underlined in pencil.

** — ** the paragraph is crossed out in the margins with two lines and in the margins is a handwritten resolution: "It is possible not to publish.

I. St., Kaganovich, Molotov.

No. 149

NOTE N.I. Ezhova I.V. STALIN

WITH A COPY OF THE ORDER OF ARREST

ALL GERMANS WORKING IN DEFENSE FACTORIES

July 27, 1937

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

Pursuant to the decision of 20 July this year. I present herewith a copy of my order No. 00439, given to the NKVD organs, on the arrest of all Germans working in defense factories.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (I. Ezhov)

DOCUMENTATION

271

Copy

Top secret

OPERATIONAL ORDER

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE
UNION OF THE SSR July 25, 1937 No. 00439 Moscow

Recent secret and investigative materials have proved that the German General Staff and the Gestapo are organizing espionage and sabotage work on a large scale at the most important and, first of all, defense industry enterprises, using for this purpose the cadres of German subjects who have settled there.

Agents from among German subjects, while already carrying out acts of sabotage and sabotage, devote their main attention to the organization of sabotage operations for the period of the war and for this purpose train cadres of saboteurs.

For the complete suppression of this activity of German intelligence, I ORDER:

1. Within three days from the date of receipt of this order, establish exactly and convey to me the lists of German subjects;

a) working at all military factories and at factories with defense workshops, according to the attached list of factories;

b) a separate list of German citizens who at various times worked and were dismissed from these enterprises and workshops, but remained on the territory of the USSR, regardless of where they currently work;

c) a separate list of German nationals working in railway transport.

In the lists indicate: the surname, name and patronymic of the German citizen, the position he holds and the name of the enterprise in which he works.

2. Starting from July 29 of this year. to proceed with arrests of all German nationals identified by you who work in military plants and factories, have defense workshops, railway transport, as well as those dismissed from these factories, in the event that they live in the territory of your republic, territory or region.

Complete the entire arrest operation within five days.

3. German political emigrants working in military factories and factories with defense workshops should be arrested only if they retained German citizenship.

For each of the German political emigrants who have taken Soviet citizenship, submit to me no later than August 5, 1937, a detailed memorandum outlining compromising materials, to resolve the issue of arrest.

4. The investigation of the cases of those arrested should be carried out with particular care. To achieve an exhaustive opening of the hitherto unexposed German intelligence agents and the final defeat of the sabotage lowliness, which it planted at industrial enterprises.

At the end of the investigation, the cases of those arrested should be sent to the NKVD of the USSR, for subsequent consideration by the Military Collegium or the Special Conference of the NKVD.

272

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

5. German spy agents, saboteurs and terrorists newly identified in the course of the investigation, both from among Soviet citizens and citizens of other states, should be immediately arrested, regardless of their place of work.

6. Simultaneously with the operation, begin to conduct a thorough accounting of all German citizens working in all other industrial enterprises, in agriculture and Soviet institutions, as well as former German citizens who took Soviet citizenship and previously worked in military factories and defense workshops of other industrial enterprises.

By September 1 (DVK and USO by September 15) this year. provide me with a detailed memorandum for each of the indicated persons, setting out in it the installation data and detailed compromising materials for resolving the issue of arrest.

7. Every day by 12 o'clock for the past day, report to me by telegraph the progress and results of the operation and all the materials obtained by the investigation.

8. The order to put into effect by telegraph.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security N. Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 253. L. 143-146. Script. Typescript.

No. 150

CODE TELEGRAM L.I. MIRZOYANA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
NEED TO ARREST THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CEC OF KAZAKHSTAN

July 27, 1937

No. 1405/ sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

Of those arrested for participating in counter-revolutionary work in right-wing and Trotskyist organizations, about 10 people point to the former chairman of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee, Kulumbetov, as one of the leaders of the local national-fascist organization. In particular, such people as those arrested point to him: the former People's Commissariat of Internal Trade Diveev, the former deputy of the People's Commissariat of Food Industry Sarymuldaev, the former chairman of the Aktobe City Council Zhaman Murunov, the former chairman of the Karkaralinsky district executive committee Asylbekov, the former deputy. Chairman of the Arts Committee Topzhanov and a number of others. At the same time, investigative materials show that Kulumbetov was the main link maintaining communication between the center of this national-fascist organization consisting of Nurmakov, Ryskulov, Khodzhanov and local people.

Considering that there is more than enough material to arrest Kulumbetov, I ask for your permission to hold this event.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan MIRZOYAN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 8. Original. Typescript.

There are handwritten notes on the cipher telegram: "For the arrest of Kulumbetov. Art. *, "Answer. No objections. Stalin." 28.VII.37.

DOCUMENTATION

273

No. 151

M.I. FRINOVSKII TO THE POLITBURO
OF THE CC AUCP(b) WITH THE APPENDIX OF
OPERATIVE ORDER OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR No. 00447

July 30, 1937

Tov. Poskrebyshev

I am sending operational order No. 00447 on the repression of former kulaks, criminals and anti-Soviet elements and a resolution.

I ask you to send the resolution to the members of the Politburo for voting and send the extract to Comrade Yezhov.

OPERATIONAL ORDER

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

No. 00447 on the operation to repress former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements

July 30, 1937 mountains. Moscow

- The materials of the investigation into the cases of anti-Soviet formations establish that a significant number of former kulaks settled in the village, who were previously repressed, who fled from repressions, who fled from camps, exile and work settlements. Many clergymen and sectarians who were repressed in the past, former active participants in anti-Soviet armed uprisings, settled down. Significant cadres of anti-Soviet political parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Gruzmeks, Dashnaks, Musavatists, Ittihadists, etc.), as well as cadres of former active participants in bandit uprisings, Whites, punishers, repatriates, etc., remained almost untouched in the countryside.

Some of the elements listed above, leaving the countryside for the cities, penetrated industrial enterprises, transport and construction.

In addition, significant cadres of criminals still nest in the countryside and the city - horse-stealers, recidivist thieves, robbers, and others who were serving their sentences, fled from places of detention and hiding from repressions. The inadequacy of the fight against these criminal contingents has created for them conditions of impunity that contribute to their criminal activities.

As has been established, all these anti-Soviet elements are the main instigators of all kinds of anti-Soviet and sabotage crimes, both on collective farms and state farms, and in transport and in some areas of industry.

The organs of state security are faced with the task of crushing this whole gang of anti-Soviet elements in the most merciless way, protecting the working Soviet people from their counter-revolutionary intrigues, and finally, once and for all, putting an end to their vile subversive work against the foundations of the Soviet state.

In accordance with this, I ORDER - FROM AUGUST 5, 1937, IN ALL REPUBLICS, TERRITORIES AND REGIONS, TO START THE OPERATION TO REPRESS FORMER KULAKS, ACTIVE ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS, AND CRIMINALS.

IN THE UZBEK, TURKMEN, TAJIK AND KYRGYZ SSR THE OPERATION TO START FROM 10 AUGUST this year, AND IN THE FAR EASTERN AND KRASNOYARSK TERRITORIES AND EAST SIBERIAN REGION - FROM 15 AUGUST this year.

When organizing and conducting the operation, be guided by the following:

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

I. CONTINGENTS SUBJECT TO REPRESSION

1. Former kulaks who returned after serving their sentences and continue to conduct active anti-Soviet subversive activities.
2. Former kulaks who fled from camps or labor settlements, as well as kulaks who hid from dispossession and who carry out anti-Soviet activities.
3. Former kulaks and socially dangerous elements who were in rebel, fascist, terrorist and bandit formations, who served their sentences, hid from repressions or fled from places of detention and resumed their criminal activities.
4. Members of anti-Soviet parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Gruzmeks, Mussavatists, Itgiha Dists and Dashnaks), former whites, gendarmes, officials, punishers, bandits, bandit accomplices, ferrymen, re-emigrants who fled from repressions, escaped from places of detention and continue to lead active anti-Soviet activity.
5. The most hostile and active participants of the now liquidated Cossack-White Guard insurgent organizations, fascist, terrorist and espionage and sabotage counter-revolutionary formations, exposed by investigative and verified intelligence materials.

Elements of this category who are currently in custody, the investigation of whose cases has been completed, but the cases have not yet been considered by the judicial authorities, are also subject to repression.

6. The most active anti-Soviet elements from former kulaks, punishers, bandits, whites, sectarian activists, churchmen and others who are now kept in prisons, camps, labor settlements and colonies and continue to conduct active anti-Soviet subversive work there.

7. Criminals (bandits, robbers, recidivist thieves, professional smugglers, recidivist swindlers, cattle-stealers) engaged in criminal activities and associated with the criminal environment.

Elements of this category who are currently in custody, the investigation of whose cases has been completed, but the cases have not yet been considered by the judicial authorities, are also subject to repression.

8. Criminal elements located in camps and labor settlements and conducting criminal activities in them.

9. All the contingents listed above that are currently in the countryside - in collective farms, state farms, agricultural enterprises and in the city - in industrial and commercial enterprises, transport, in Soviet institutions and in construction are subject to repression.

I. ABOUT THE MEASURES OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE REPRESSED

AND THE NUMBER OF SUBJECT TO REPRESSION

1. All repressed kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements are divided into two categories:

a) the first category includes all the most hostile of the elements listed above. They are subject to immediate arrest and, upon consideration of their cases in troikas, to SHOOTING.

b) the second category includes all other less active, but still hostile elements. They are subject to arrest and imprisonment in camps for a term of 8 to 10 years, and the most vicious and socially dangerous of them, imprisonment for the same terms in prisons as determined by the troika.

2. According to the credentials provided by the People's Commissars of the republican NKVD and the heads of the regional and regional departments of the NKVD, the following number of persons subject to repression is approved:

DOCUMENTATION

275

1. Azerbaijan SSR

2. Armenian SSR

3. Byelorussian SSR

4. Georgian SSR

5. Kirghiz SSR

6. Tajik SSR

7. Turkmen SSR

8. Uzbek SSR

9. Bashkir ASSR

10. Buryat-Mongolian

11. Dagestan ASSR

12. Karelian ASSR

13. Kabardino-Balkarian

14. Crimean ASSR

15. Komi ASSR

16. Kalmyk ASSR

17. Mari ASSR

18. Mordovian ASSR

19. Germans Povozya

20. North Ossetian

21. Tatar ASSR

22. Udmurt ASSR

23. Chechen-Ingush

24. Chuvash ASSR

25. Azov-Chernomorsky

26. Far East

27. West Siberian

28. Krasnoyarsk Territory

29. Ordzhonikidzevsky

30. East Siberian

31. Voronezh region

32. Gorky region

33. Western region

34. Ivanovo region

35. Kalininskaya

36. Kursk region

First

category

Second

category

Total

1500

3750

5250

500

1000

1500

2000

10000

12000

2000

3000

5000

250

500

750

500

1300

1800

500

1500

2000

750

4000

4750

500

1500

2000

350

1500

1850

500

2500

3000

300

700

1000

300

700

' 1000

300

1200

1500

100

300

400

100

300

400

300

1500

1800

300

1500

1800

200

700

900

200

500

700

500

1500

2000

200

500

700

500

1500

2000

300

1500

1800

5000

8000

13000

2000
4000
6000
5000
12000
17000
750
2500
3250
1000
4000
5000
1000
4000
5000
1000
3500
4500
1000
3500
4500
1000
5000
6000
750
2000
2750
1000
3000

4000

1000

3000

4000

276

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

37. Kuibyshevskaya

38. Kirov region

39. Leningradskaya

40. Moscow

41. Omsk region

42. Orenburg

43. Saratov

44. Stalingrad region

45. Sverdlovsk

46. Northern region

47. Chelyabinsk

48. Yaroslavskaia

UKRAINIAN SSR

1. Kharkiv region

2. Kyiv region

3. Vinnitsa region

4. Donetsk region

5. Odessa region

6. Dnepropetrovsk

7. Chernihiv

8. Moldavian ASSR

KAZAKH SSR

First

category

Second

category

1000

4000

500

1500

4000

10000
5000
30000
1000
2500
1500
3000
1000
2000
1000
3000
4000
6000
750
2000
1500
4500
7500
1250

Table continuation

Total

1. North Kazakhstan

650

2. South Kazakhstan

350

3. West Kazakhstan region

100

4. Kustanai

150

5. East Kazakhstan region

300

6. Aysgyubinskaya

350

7. Karaganda

400

8. Alma-Ata

200

NKVD camps

10000

3. The approved figures are indicative. However, the people's commissars of the republican NKVD and the heads of the regional and regional departments of the NKVD do not have the right to independently exceed them. Any independent increase in numbers is not allowed.

DOCUMENTATION

277

In cases where the situation requires an increase in the approved figures, the people's commissars of the republican NKVD and the heads of the regional and regional departments of the NKVD are obliged to submit to me the appropriate reasoned petitions.

The reduction of numbers, as well as the transfer of persons scheduled for repression in the first category, to the second category, and vice versa, is permitted.

4. The families of those sentenced in the first and second categories, as a rule, are not repressed.

The exception is:

a) Families whose members are capable of active anti-Soviet actions. Members of such a family, with a special decision of the troika, are subject to placement in camps or work settlements.

b) Families of persons repressed in the first category, living in the border zone, are subject to resettlement outside the border zone.

los within the republics, territories and regions.

c) Families of the repressed in the first category, living in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Baku, Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog and in the regions of Sochi, Gagra and Sukhumi, are subject to eviction from these points to other regions according to their choice, with the exception of border areas.

5. All families of persons repressed in the first and second categories should be registered and systematically monitored (45).

III. OPERATION PROCEDURE

1. The operation should begin on August 5, 1937 and be completed within four months.

In the Turkmen, Tajik, Uzbek and Kirghiz SSRs, the operation will begin on August 10 of this year, and in the East Siberian Region, Krasnoyarsk and Far Eastern Territories - from August 15 of this year.

2. First of all, the contingents assigned to the first category are subjected to repression.

The contingents assigned to the second category are not subjected to repression until further notice.

In the event that the People's Commissar of the Republican NKVD, the head of the department or the regional department of the NKVD, having completed the operation on the contingents of the first category, considers it possible to start the operation on the contingents assigned to the second category, he is obliged, before actually starting this operation - to request my sanction and only after receiving it, start the operation.

With regard to all those arrested who will be sentenced to imprisonment in camps or prisons for various terms, as the sentences are passed, report to me how many people, for what terms of prison or camp were sentenced. Upon receipt of this information, I will give instructions on how to send the convicts and to which camps.

3. In accordance with the situation and local conditions, the territory of the republic, territory and region is divided into operational sectors.

To organize and conduct an operation in each sector, an operational group is formed, headed by a senior official of the NKVD of the republic, the regional or regional NKVD department, who can successfully cope with the serious operational tasks assigned to him.

In some cases, the most experienced and capable heads of district and city departments may be appointed heads of operational groups.

4. To staff operational groups with the necessary number of operational workers and give them means of transport and communication.

In accordance with the requirements of the operational situation, the groups should be given military or police units.

5. The chiefs of the operational groups are to be entrusted with the management of accounting and identification of those subject to repression, the management of the investigation, the approval of the indictments and the enforcement of the sentences of the troikas.

The head of the operational group is responsible for organizing and conducting the operation on the territory of his sector.

6. Detailed identification data and compromising materials are collected for each repressed person. On the basis of the latter, lists for arrest are compiled, which are signed by the head of the task force and sent in 2 copies for consideration and approval by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, the head of the department or the regional department of the NKVD.

The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, the head of the department or the regional department of the NKVD examines the list and authorizes the arrest of the persons listed in it.

7. Based on the approved list, the head of the operational group makes an arrest. Every arrest is issued with a warrant. Upon arrest, a thorough search is carried out. The following must be confiscated without fail: weapons, ammunition, military equipment, explosives, poisonous and poisonous substances, counter-revolutionary literature, precious metals in coins, ingots and products, foreign currency, multiplying devices and correspondence.

Everything seized is recorded in the search protocol.

8. The arrested are concentrated in points on the instructions of the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs, heads of departments or regional departments of the NKVD. Places where detainees are concentrated must have premises suitable for accommodating detainees.

9. Those arrested are strictly guarded. All events are organized to guarantee against escapes or any excesses.

IV. INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE

1. An investigation file is opened for each arrested person or a group of arrested persons. The investigation is carried out quickly and in a simplified manner.

In the course of the investigation, all criminal connections of arrests should be revealed.
forged.

2. At the end of the investigation, the case is sent to the troika for consideration.

The following shall be attached to the file: an arrest warrant, a search protocol, materials seized during the search, personal documents, a profile of the arrested person, intelligence and accounting material, an interrogation protocol and a brief indictment.

V. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF TRIOS

1. I approve the following personal composition of the republican, regional and regional troikas:

Azerbaijan SSR - Chairman - Sumbatov, members of the Teimurkulievs, Jangir Akhund Zade.

Armenian SSR chairman - Mugdusi, members Mikvelyan, Ternakalov

Byelorussian SSR chairman - Berman, members Seliverstov, Potapeyko

Georgian SSR chairman - Rapava, members Talakhadze, Tsereteli

Kirghiz SSR chairman - Chetvertakov, members Dzhenbaev, Gutsev

Tajik SSR chairman - Tarasyuk, members of Ashurov, Baikov

DOCUMENTATION _ 279

Turkmen SSR chairman - Nodev, members Anna-Mukhamedov, Tashli Anna-Muradov

Uzbek SSR chairman - Zagvozdin, members Ikramov, Baltabaev Bashkir ASSR chairman - Bak, members Isanchurin, Tsypnyatov Buryat-Mongolian ASSR chairman - Babkevich, members Dorzhiev, Gross

Dagestan ASSR Chairman - Lomonosov, members Samursky, Shiperov Karelian ASSR Chairman - Tenisson, members Mikhailovich, Nikolsky

Kabardino-Balkar ASSR chairman - Antonov, members Kalmyks, Khagurov

Crimean ASSR Chairman - Pavlov, members Trupchu, Monakov Komi ASSR Chairman - Kovalev, members Semichev, Litin Kalmyk ASSR Chairman - Ozerkin, members Khonkhoshev, Kilganov Mari ASSR Chairman - Karacharov, members Vrublevsky, Bystrakov

Mordovian ASSR chairman — Veyzager, members Mikhailov, Polyakov Nemtsev of the Volga ASSR chairman — Dalinger, members Luft, Anisimov North Ossetian ASSR chairman — Ivanov, members Togoev, Kokov Tatar ASSR chairman — Alemasov, members Lepa, Mukhamedzyanov Udmurt ASSR chairman — Shlenov, members Baryshnikov, Shevelkov Chechen-Ingush ASSR Chairman - Dementiev, members Egorov, Vakhaev Chuvash ASSR Chairman - Rozanov, members Petrov, Elifanov Azov-Black Sea Territory Chairman - Kagan, members Evdokimov, Ivanov Dalnevostochn. the chairman of the region is Lyushkov, members of Ptukh, Fedin West-Siberian. Territory Chairman - Mironov, members of Eikhe, Barkov Krasnoyarsk Territory Chairman - Leonyuk, members Gorchaev, Rabinovich Ordzhonikidzevsky Territory Chairman - Bulakh, members Sergeev, Rozit East Siberian Region Chairman - Lupekin, members Yusup Khasimov, Gryaznov

Voronezh Region Chairman — Korkin, members Anfimov, Yarygin Gorky Region Chairman — Lavrushin, members Ogurtsov, Ustyuzha Ninov

Western region Chairman - Karutsky, members Bilinsky, Korotchenko Ivanovo region Chairman - Radzivilovskiy, members Nosov, Karasik Kalinin region Chairman - Dombrovsky, members Rabov, Bobkov Kursk region Chairman - Simanovsky, members Piskarev, Nikitin Kuibyshev region Chairman - Popashenko, members Nelke, Klyuev Kirov Region Chairman — Gazov, members Mukhin, Naumov Leningrad Region Chairman — Zakovsky, members Smorodin, Pozern Moscow Region Chairman — Redens, members Maslov, Volkov Omsk Region Chairman — Gorbach, members Bulatov, Evstigneev Orenburg Region Chairman — Uspensky, members Narbut, Mitro — fans

Saratov Region Chairman - Stromin, members Andreev, Kalachev Stalingrad Region Chairman - Raev, members Semyonov, Rummyantsev Sverdlovsk Region Chairman - Dmitriev, members Abalyaev, Grachev Northern Region Chairman - Bak, members Korzhin, Ryabov Chelyabinsk Region Chairman - Chistov, members Ryndin, Malyshev Yaroslavl region chairman - Ershov, members of the Polumordvins, Yurchuk

280

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

U.S.S.R.

Kharkiv region Chairman - Shumsky, members Gikalo, Leonov Kiev region Chairman - Sharov, members Kudryavtsev, Ginzburg Vinnitsa region Chairman - Grishin, members Chernyavsky, Yaroshevsky

Donetsk region Chairman - Sokolinsky, members Pramnek, Rudenko Odessa region Chairman - Fedorov, members Yevtushenko, Dnepropetrovsk region Chairman - Kryvets, members Margolin, Tsvik Chernihiv region Chairman - Kornev, members Markitan, Sklyarsky Moldavian ASSR Chairman - Rogol, members Todres, Kolodiy KAZAKHSKAYA SSR

North Kazakhstan. region Chairman - Panov, members Stepanov, Segizbaev Yuzhno-Kazakhst. region chairman - Pital, members of Dosov, Sluchak West Kazakhstan. region Chairman - Romeiko, members Satarbekov, Spirov

Kustanai region chairman - Pavlov, members Kuznetsov, Baidakov

East Kazakhstan. region chairman - Chirkov, members Sverdlov, Yusupov Aktobe region. Chairman - Demidov, members Musin, Stetsura Karaganda region Chairman - Adamovich, members Duhovich, Pin Hasik

Alma-Ata region Chairman - Shabanbekov, members of Sadvakas, Kuzhanov

2. The meetings of the troikas may be attended (where he is not a member of the troika) by the republican regional or regional prosecutor.

3. The troika conducts its work either by being located at the location of the respective NKVD, UNKVD or regional departments of the NKVD, or by traveling to the locations of the operational sectors.

4. Troikas consider the materials presented to them for each arrested person or group of arrested persons, as well as for each family to be evicted separately.

Troikas, depending on the nature of the materials and the degree of social danger of the arrested person, can classify persons scheduled for repression in category 2 - to the first category, and persons scheduled for repression in the first category - to the second.

5. The troikas keep minutes of their meetings, in which they record the sentences they passed against each convict.

The minutes of the meeting of the troika are sent to the head of the operational group for the execution of sentences. Excerpts from the protocols in respect of each convict are attached to the investigative cases.

VI. PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF SENTENCES

1. Sentences are carried out by persons on the instructions of the chairmen of the troikas, i.e. people's commissars of the republican NKVD, heads of departments or regional departments of the NKVD.

The basis for the execution of the sentence is a certified extract from the minutes of the meeting of the troika outlining the sentence in respect of each convicted person and a special order signed by the chairman of the troika, handed over to the person carrying out the sentence.

2. Sentences in the first category are carried out in places and in the manner at the direction of the people's commissars of internal affairs, heads of departments and regional departments of the NKVD, with the obligatory complete secrecy of the time and place of the execution of the sentence.

DOCUMENTATION

281

Documents on the execution of the sentence shall be attached in a separate envelope to the investigation file of each convicted person.

3. The direction to the camps of persons convicted under category 2 is carried out on the basis of orders reported by the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR.

VII. ORGANIZATION OF MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND REPORTING

1. I entrust the general management of the conduct of operations to my deputy, the Head of the Main Directorate of State Security, Komkorat comrade. FRINOVSKY.

To carry out work related to the management of operations, form a special group under him.

2. The protocols of the triplets on the execution of sentences should immediately be sent to the head of the 8th Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR with the application of registration cards in form No. 1.

For convicts in the 1st category, simultaneously with the protocol and registration cards, investigative files should also be sent.

3. Report the progress and results of the operation in five-day reports by the 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th and 25th of each month by telegraph and in detail by mail.

4. All counter-revolutionary formations newly discovered during the operation, the occurrence of excesses, escapes across the cordon, the formation of gangster and robber groups and other emergency incidents should be reported by telegraph immediately.

When organizing and conducting the operation, take comprehensive measures to prevent: the transition of the repressed to an illegal position; flight from their places of residence, and especially for the cordon; the formation of bandit and predatory groups, the occurrence of any excesses.

Timely detect and quickly suppress attempts to commit any active counter-revolutionary actions.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security N. Ezhov

RIGHT:

M. FRINOVSKII

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 55, 59-78. Script. Typescript.

Partially published: Trud, 1992, N° 88.

No. 152

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "QUESTION OF THE NKVD"

July 31, 1937

442 - Question of the NKVD.

1. Approve the draft operational order submitted by the NKVD on the repression of former kulaks, criminals and anti-Soviet elements.

2. Start the operation in all regions of the Union on August 5, 1937. In the Far East, the East Siberian Region and the Krasnoyarsk Territory from August 15, 1937 and in the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik and Kirghiz Republics - from August 10, 1937. Complete the entire operation within 4 months.

3. The operation is carried out in two stages. First of all, criminals and kulaks classified in the first category are repressed. Secondly, kulaks and criminals, classified in the second category.

4. To approve the people's commissars of internal affairs and the heads of the regional and regional departments of the NKVD as chairmen of the troikas.

282

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

5. To release the NKVD from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars for operating expenses related to the operation, 75 million rubles, of which 25 million - to pay the railway tariff.

6. To oblige the NKPS to provide the NKVD, at its request, with rolling stock for transporting convicts within the regions and to the camps.

7. All kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements sentenced under the second category to imprisonment in camps for terms, use:

- a) on the ongoing construction of the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR;
- b) on the construction of new camps in the deep areas of Kazakhstan;
- c) for the construction of new camps, specially organized for logging work by the convicts.

8. In order to organize camps for forest development, to suggest that the People's Commissariat for the Forest immediately transfer the following forest areas to the GULAG of the NKVD:

- a) Tomsk-Asino - in the West Siberian Territory,
- b) Taishet-Bratskaya in the East Siberian region,
- c) Kuloy - in the Northern region,
- d) Chibyu-Ust-Vym - "-
- e) Ivdelsky - in the Sverdlovsk region,
- f) Kargopolsky in the Northern region,
- g) Lokchinsky, Storozhevsky and Ust-Kulomsky in the Vychegda river basin.

9. To propose to the People's Commissariat of Forests and the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR, within a ten-day period, to determine which additional forest areas, in addition to those listed above, should be transferred to the GULAG for the organization of new camps.

10. Instruct the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the Gulag of the NKVD and the People's Commissariat of Forests to develop and submit for approval to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR within 20 days:

- a) plans for the organization of logging operations, the labor force required for this purpose, the necessary material resources, funds and personnel of specialists;
- b) determine the logging program for these camps for 1938.

11. To release the GULAG of the NKVD from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in advance of 10 million rubles for the organization of camps and for preparatory work. Take into account that in the 3rd and 4th quarters of 1937, the convicts will be used to carry out preparatory work for mastering the 1938 program.

12. Propose to the regional committees and regional committees of the AUCP(b) and VLKSM of those regions where camps are being organized, to allocate at the disposal of the NKVD the necessary number of communists and Komsomol members to staff the administrative apparatus and guard the camps (at the request of the NKVD).

13. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Defense to call up 210 commanders and political workers from the reserve of the Red Army to staff the personnel of the paramilitary guards of the newly formed camps.

14. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Health to allocate 150 doctors and 400 paramedics to the GULAG of the NKVD for the newly organized camps.

15. Oblige the People's Commissariat of Forests to allocate 10 major specialists in forestry to the GULAG and transfer 50 graduates of the Leningrad Forestry Engineering Academy to the GULAG.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 52-54. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 51.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov - everything; t.t. Kaganovich L. - 6; Ivanov - 8, 9, 10, 15; Smirnov G. - 10; Arbuzov - 5, 10, 11; Voroshilov - 13; Propper-Grashenkov - 14.

DOCUMENTATION

283

No. 153

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND PERSONS,
DISMISSED FROM THE RKKA

July 31, 1937

457 - Question of NGOs (PB dated 29.III.37, pr. No. 47, p. 102).

In accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 29.3.37, to oblige the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties to ensure the placement of command personnel dismissed from the Red Army, including those dismissed as expelled from the party for political reasons.

For this purpose, to organize special commissions under the regional executive committees, regional executive committees and Councils of People's Commissars of the republics with the participation of a representative of the Military Council of the corresponding military district.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 316. L. 231. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 51.

No. 154

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE REMOVAL OF THE NAME OF
BALYTSKY FROM THE DYNAMO STADIUM (Kyiv)

July 31, 1937

462 - On the removal of the name of Balitsky from the stadium "Dynamo" (Kyiv) and the assignment to the stadium of the name of Comrade Yezhov N.I. (OB dated 29.VII.37, pr. No. 71, p. 859gs).

Satisfy the request of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine to remove the name of Balitsky from the stadium "Dynamo" (Kyiv) and assign the stadium the name of Comrade Yezhov N.I.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 990. L. 6. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

No. 155

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL S.Kh. KHODZHANOVA (46)

July 31, 1937

KHODZHANOV S.Kh. - born in 1894, comes from the Turkmen region, South Kazakhstan region, Kazakh SSR. In 1917 he graduated from the Tashkent Teachers' Seminary, a member of the CPSU (b) since March 1920, occupied a number of leading areas in the former Turkestan Republic and Kazakhstan, was the secretary of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) in 1925.

Prior to his arrest, he served as deputy commissioner of the Soviet Control Commission for the Uzbek SSR.

Question: You are being charged with being one of the leaders of an anti-Soviet pan-Turkist organization that acted against the Soviet government in a bloc with Trotskyist and right-wing centers.

We suggest that you give frank testimony about all the illegal anti-Soviet activities that you carried out and extradite your accomplices.

284

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Answer: Yes, I will give frank, exhaustive testimony about all my anti-Soviet work, which I carried out against the Soviet government together with other enemies of the people for almost 20 years.

I will talk about the vile, treacherous role that I and my accomplices played during this entire period.

I do not intend to hide from the investigation about the political bloc that our anti-Soviet organization has concluded with the Trotskyist and Rightist centers, about the terrorist, sabotage and insurrectionary activities of our organization, which we conducted jointly with the right-wing Trotskyist centers, about our counterrevolutionary ties with foreign intelligence services. and emigrant nationalist centers in the person of CHOKAYEV, VALIDOV and others, whose agents we were.

As a result of a thorough, united analysis of the criminal path I have traveled in the active struggle against the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government, realizing the gravity of the crimes I have committed, I come to the need for both my own disarmament and the disarmament of our entire anti-Soviet nationalist organization.

Question: Tell us in detail when and under what circumstances did you join the pan-Turkist movement?

Answer: My activity as a bourgeois nationalist began in 1917 in a teacher's circle organized by me called "Kenes".

After the February revolution, I, along with my other political associates, organized in Tashkent a branch of the Bai nationalist party "Alan".

The branch I created had its own newspaper, Berlik-Tun. The committee in the editorial office of this newspaper included: I am KHODZHANOV Sultanbek, CHOKAEV Mustafa, TOKHTABAYEV Isa, BORIEV Kumush Ali (Turkmen), ASFENDIA ROV Sanzhar, AKAEV Serizhbai, KURUMCHIN Almukhamed, Utegenov Sadyk, Kenesarin Azimkhan, KASYMOV Ibrai, RYSKULOV Turar, JA NUZAKOV Seidalin, more than 50 people in total. Subsequently, most of them entered the pan-Turkic organization.

During the period of preparation for the October Revolution, the Berlik-Tun, an organ of our organization, systematically persecuted the Bolsheviks and called on the population to fight against them.

I and other bourgeois nationalists, including Chokaev Mustafa, Akaev Serizhbai, KHODZHIKOV KONGIR Khoja, Urazaev Abdrakhman, Boriev Kumush-Ali, Tynyshpaev Mukhamedzhan met with hostility and under the flag of the All-Turkistan Extraordinary Congress we united the most reactionary bourgeois-nationalist elements cops of the Turkestan region under the slogan of non-recognition of Soviet power and the formation of an independent bourgeois "Kokand autonomy".

At this congress, a government was created headed by Prime Minister TYNYSHPAEV, who was later replaced by Mustafa Chokaev. "Kokand autonomy" was the founder of the Basmachi movement in Central Asia and was dispersed at the beginning of 1918.

The Kokand adventure is one of the stages in my struggle against the Soviet power shortly after the October Revolution.

At the end of 1919, Alash-Orda, which acted against the Soviet regime in Central Kazakhstan, was also defeated.

The small "Apash Orda" in Western Kazakhstan was also defeated.

The successful development of the military operations of the Red Army on the fronts of Siberia, in Orenburg and Aktyubinsk led to the final defeat of Apash

DOCUMENTATION _ 285

Horde, the establishment of Soviet power in all regions of Kazakhstan and the organization of the Kazakh Autonomous Republic.

In connection with this, it became necessary to change our tactics in the fight against the Soviet regime and to switch from open struggle to methods of underground activity. To this end, we put forward the task of infiltrating the ranks of the CPSU(b) and taking leading positions in the Party and Soviet bodies. Proceeding from this attitude, many of us joined the CPSU(b) and occupied leading positions. In particular, in 1920 I got a Soviet job and in March of the same year joined the ranks of the CPSU (b), taking the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Turkestan Republic and at the same time being Deputy Chairman of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee.

From this moment, my counter-revolutionary double-dealing activity in the ranks of the CPSU (b) begins, aimed at creating the Alash-Orda underground and continuing the struggle against the Soviet regime.

Now let me move on to the second stage of my counter-revolutionary activities, which began in 1920, after I infiltrated the ranks of the CPSU(b) with a deceitful double-dealing goal.

Question: Under what circumstances and when did you establish a bloc with pantyur as a Kist organization?

Answer: In December 1919, while in Aktyubinsk at the Congress of Soviets. I met there with one of the leaders of the Alash Horde *BAITURSUNOV*, who informed me about the state of the Alash Horde underground after the defeat. BAITURSUNOV reported that the main Alash-Orda cadres had been retained and that he, DULATOV and BUKEIKHANOV considered it necessary to enter into a bloc with the Pan-Turkists in order to further fight the Soviet regime.

In a further conversation, Baitursunov spoke in favor of the need to concentrate the Alash Horde in Tashkent, since Central Asia is one of the most favorable springboards for the fight against the Soviet regime, in connection with the situation in Eastern Bukhara and the presence of the Basmachi movement there.

On all issues put forward by Baitursunov, we reached an agreement solutions.

To carry out this task, an underground meeting was held in Moscow in 1920 between the Alash-Orda leader Baitursunov, the leader of the Bashkir nationalists ZAKI VALIDOV, and the Turkestan Pan-Turkist RYSKULOV.

At this meeting, it was decided to jointly fight against

Soviet power of all bourgeois-nationalist organizations in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Bashkiria on the platform of pan-Turkism.

Question: What do you know about the anti-Soviet activities of the Pan-Turkist organization?

Answer: In 1918, the Pan-Turkists launched a great anti-Soviet work in the former Turkestan region, especially in Tashkent, and with the participation of Turkish officers who were on the territory of the Turkestan region, they created the pan-Turkist organization Ittihad-Va-Tarakki (Unity and progress"). This organization included a number of prominent nationalists of the Turkestan region and Bukhara, including * RYSKULOV, KHODZHAEV Faizula, RA KHIMBAYEV, KHOJIBAEV, KARIMOV, MUNAVARKORY, NIZAMETDIN KHODZHAEV, Tursun KHODZHAEV, IRMUKHAMEDOV, SERGAZIEV and others*.

"Ittihad-Va-Tarakki" had its own central committee and branches in all regions of the Turkestan Republic.

286

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Considering the possible victory of Bolshevism as an offensive of colonial bondage over the Turko-Tatar peoples, Ittihad-Va-Tarakki sought to unite the Turko-Tatar peoples and establish a bourgeois republic independent of the Soviet Union.

Question: Who personally carried out the connection between the Alash-Orda and Pan-Turkist organizations?

Answer: Basically, the connection between the Pan-Turkist and Alash-Orda organizations was carried out by BAYTURSUNOV, BOLGAN-BAYEV Khairidin, ADILEV Din-Mukhamed, BRIMZHANOV Gazimbek.

Question: Tell us about your anti-Soviet activities in the subsequent period?

Answer: The reorganized Alash-Orda organization after 1923 outlined the following program of action:

- 1) penetrate into the Soviet apparatus, bringing it under the influence of Bai-nationalist elements. The rate was taken in particular on the people's commissariats of finance, justice, agriculture, public education, police, i.e. such institutions, which are primarily the conductors of the class policy of the CPSU(b) and Soviet power;
- 2) infiltrate cultural institutions, recruit nationalist cadres among young people, popularize the leaders of the Alash Orda and propagate the ideas of bourgeois nationalism;
- 3) to fight for the preservation of the authority of the ancestor in the Kazakh village, giving the opportunity to bays and semi-feudal lords to influence re-election campaigns;
- 4) raise the authority of the Muslim clergy and promote it

religious activities;

5) to promote the penetration of class-alien elements into the CPSU (b) and the Komsomol.

We tried to staff the militia with socially hostile elements. The Alash-Orda organization took all measures to ensure that the militia units of the Turkestan Republic and Kazakhstan were staffed with their own people, who could be a reliable support for the nationalists in the armed struggle against the Soviet regime. In the People's Commissariat of Education, we were mainly engaged in the education of nationalist cadres. This work was carried out through Baitursunov, Kenzhin, Tokhtabaev, S. Sadvakasov, Dzhandosov*, and others.

In the People's Commissariat of Justice and Finance, there were also members of our organization in leading positions who pursued a policy in the interests of the Alash-Orda underground organization.

In the aul, we pursued a policy aimed at clogging up the Soviet apparatus with beys and mullahs. In a significant part of the aul councils, the chairmen were enemies of the Soviet regime. Volost institutions were completed according to the same principle. Thus, often we had the grassroots entirely on our side.

One of the methods of our counter-revolutionary activity in the period 1921-1925. was the use of the Soviet press to propagate nationalism. The newspaper called "Ak-Zhol", of which I was the editor, was entirely used by our organization. On the pages of "Ak-Zhol" the Alash Horde DULATOV, DZHUMABAEV, BAYTURSUNOV, DOSMUKHAMEDOV ** and others spoke, who openly criticized the national policy of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government from counter-revolutionary positions.

The press and cultural institutions were at the disposal of the Alash-Or-Dyns.

DOCUMENTATION

287

By this time, I had published in the editorial office of Ak-Zhol a number of anti-Soviet articles aimed at inciting national enmity between the Kazakhs and other peoples of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan.

The land reform carried out under my leadership in 1920-1921. It was also directed, in accordance with the organization's guidelines, at distorting the class policy of the Soviet government and inciting national enmity between Russians, Kirghiz and Kazakhs in the Semirechye regions.

One of the accomplices in the so-called land reform of 1921 was SAFAROV, who later joined the Zinovievists and politically contacted me after 1930.

Basically, I showed about the counter-revolutionary activities carried out by the Alash-Ordyn organization before the national delimitation, i.e.

until December 1924, when the southern regions of the Turkestan Republic were ceded to Kazakhstan, when the Kirghiz Autonomous Region (now a Union Republic) was separated.

In 1924-1925. after the national disengagement, I moved to work in Orenburg, as one of the secretaries of the Kazakh regional committee of the CPSU (b).

Question: What was the anti-Soviet activity during your tenure as secretary of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the CPSU(b)?

Answer: In 1925, during the 10 months of my tenure as secretary of the Kazakh regional committee of the CPSU(b), I did a great deal of work to litter the party and Soviet apparatus with socially alien and hostile elements. In the regional committee of the party, in the Kazakh Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, I put a significant number of members of the organization to work, they, in turn, carried out work on the placement of nationalist cadres in the periphery.

I must admit that the entire period of work in responsible positions until I was recalled to the disposal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the end of 1925 was a complete perversion of Soviet principles, an unceremonious revelry of the Alash Horde and a struggle against Soviet power with the help of Soviet authorities.

During 1925-1928, while in Moscow studying Marxism under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I led the anti-Soviet organization through "DZHANDOSOV, ESKARAYEV, ARALBAYEV **", who often met with me directly or through signalmen and received from me decree

niya.

Question: Who else, besides the persons you mentioned, led the nationalist organization?

Answer: The leadership of the nationalist organization was also carried out by RYSKULOV Turar, Smagul SATSVAKASOV, NURMAKOV, "SULTANBEKOV, MUSTAMBAEV, DIVEEV, SARYMULDAEV, KULUMBETOV and ZHAMAN MURUNOV **.

Question: When was the united center created by your Pan-Turkist organization?

Answer: The United Center of the Anti-Soviet Pan-Turkist Organization was established in late 1929-early 1930.

The center included: I - KHODZHANOV, RYSKULOV, NURMAKOV, FAIZULA KHODZHAEV, "ABDRAKHMANOV **", KHALILOV," KORKMASOV and GABID LIN **.

Question: What circumstances preceded the creation of the center?

Answer: For a long period, I, RISKULOV, FAIZULA KHODZHAEV and other leaders of nationalist organizations prepared

raised the question of the need for authoritative concentrated leadership of all anti-Soviet activities of existing nationalist organizations.

I consider it necessary to dwell on this important organizational question in some detail.

Although in 1920 the "Alash-Orda" organization established a tactical bloc by the Pan-Turkists, we nevertheless retained our independence even after the liquidation of the Basmachi movement. We were oriented about the activities of the Pan-Turkists in the republics of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tataria, Bashkiria, the Crimea, the Caucasus, but there was no close contact between us.

The organizational block of "Alash-Orda" with the Pan-Turkists begins to form
lyat since 1924

By that time, it had already become completely clear to me that the scattered struggle of individual nationalist organizations against the Soviet regime could not be successful until we united.

To this end, in 1924, I began negotiations with DIVEEV, whom I needed as an intermediary between me and RYSKULOV. The fact is that RYSKULOV at that time was either in Moscow or abroad on the lines of the Comintern, and I personally had no opportunity to contact him.

Some time later, DIVEEV informed me that RYSKULOV agreed with the position I had put forward and also considered it necessary to consolidate the anti-Soviet activities of nationalist organizations, placing at the head a united center for directing practical anti-Soviet work.

All this RYSKULOV repeated to me during a personal meeting with him in Moscow in 1926.

In 1927, RYSKULOV convened a meeting of a number of members of the pan-Turkist organization under the guise of preparing the fifth meeting of the workers of the national republics. This meeting was attended by: RYSKULOV, GABID LIN, KASHAEV, KORKMASOV, myself - KHODZHANOV and others. Behind the scenes of this meeting, RYSKULOV negotiated a bloc and the unification of all anti-Soviet nationalist organizations under the single flag of pan-Turkism.

Question: Was an agreement reached at this meeting on a united bloc of all nationalist formations under the flag of Pan-Turkism?

Answer: Actually, an agreement was reached, but the issue was not finally resolved. Only at the beginning of 1930, when I was at work in Tashkent in the Sredazburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, on behalf of RYSKULOV, at various times I was informed by DIVEEV, TURSUNKHODZHAEV and others that an agreement had been reached between the leaders of nationalist organizations, the issue had been resolved about the creation of a united center of the pan-Turkist organization, which is planned to include RYSKULOV, NURMAKOV, FAIZULA KHODZHAEV, ABDRAKHMANOV from Kyrgyzstan, KORKMASOV and I - KHODZHANOV. I instructed DIVEEV to inform RYSKULOV that I agreed with the creation of the united center and its composition, giving my consent to my participation in this center.

Question: On what political basis did the unification of all nationalist formations into a single pan-Turkist organization take place?

Answer: The unification of all nationalist forces into a single anti-Soviet pan-Turkist organization took place on the basis of our hostility to the Soviet system, the preparation of an armed rejection from the USSR for

DOCUMENTATION _ 289

national republics and the creation of a single bourgeois state from them under the protectorate of German and Japanese fascism.

I consider it absolutely inevitable to establish organizational and political ties with circles hostile to Soviet power in Japan, Germany, England and Turkey, we had to start negotiations with agents of these countries to provide us with material assistance, to supply us with means and weapons to fight the Soviet power. We had in mind to compensate foreign powers for the services that will be rendered to us by establishing economic relations with them that are beneficial to them, by giving them a concession of a number of industrial enterprises and by organizing an insurrection within the USSR during the war.

Question: How were you to establish contact with foreign powers?

Answer: The Alash-Orda organization was connected with the nationalist emigration in Western China with the group of MARSEKOV Raimzhan. The members of our organization were associated with the nationalists of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tataria, Bashkiria, the Crimea and the Caucasus, the latter were closely connected with Japanese agents, with British and German circles through Iranian, Afghan, Turkish and Polish sky borders. Through these channels there should have been regular communication between the united pan-Turkic center and foreign powers. This connection was subsequently made.

Question: What anti-Soviet formations has your pan-Turkist organization contacted within the country?

Answer: At the beginning of 1930, after the formation of a single pan-Turkist center, we also decided to conclude a bloc with the counter-revolutionary organizations of the Trotskyists and the Rights. RYSKULOV and NURMAKOV were supposed to get in touch with RYKOV, BUKHARIN and TOMSKY. By agreement with the members of the center, I was to contact the Trotskyists Safarov and SOKOLNIKOV.

Question: The investigators have evidence that a bloc between the Pan-Turkist organization and the Trotskyists was carried out in 1927. Do you confirm this fact?

Answer: Yes, I do. Back in 1927, before the final unification with the Pan-Turkists, when the Alash-Orda organization in Kazakhstan existed independently, we began negotiations with the Trotskyists through SADVAKASOV Smagul, SULTANBEKOV Zhakfar and MUSTAMBAEV Idris. Back in 1926, SULTANBEKOV became close to the Zinovievist TOIVO, who connected him with the Zinovievist ROZNER. In 1927, this proximity was decided to use

call in the political interests of our organization.

In 1927, SADVAKASOV, SULTANBEKOV and MUSTAMBAEV got in touch with TROTSKY in Moscow, at the same time they had a secret meeting with Zinoviev through TOIVO and ROZNER. In the same year, 1927, they also contacted Safarov. Since that time, a bloc was established between the Trotskyists and the Pan-Turkist organization, later this bloc expanded significantly due to ties with the centers of the Trotskyists and the Rights.

I am KHODZHANOV, I was personally connected with SAFAROV, KENZHIN was connected with TOIVO until recently.

With the center of the Rights (RYKOV, BUKHARIN, TOMSKY) a direct link was established through RYSKULOV and NURMAKOV.

290

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

In addition, in 1932, through a member of our organization, ASFENDIAROV, a connection was established in Kazakhstan with the Trotskyists REINGOLD, FAIVILOVICH, and **VOSKANOV**.

Contact was established with members of the right-wing organization in Kazakhstan **PODNEK and RADIN** through DIVEEV and SARYMULDAEV.

Similar work to establish contact with the Trotskyists in the field was carried out in Kyrgyzstan by a member of our organization ABDRAKHMANOV, heads of branches of the nationalist organization in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Tataria, Bashkiria, the Crimea and the Caucasus.

Question: Let us return to your connection with Safarov, when and under what circumstances did you contact him?

Answer: I have known SAFAROV since 1920 through joint work in Turkoko by the Mission of the State Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

In 1926 I visited him in Leningrad and met him at his apartment.

Safarov had openly anti-Soviet conversations with me and did not hide his hostility towards the leadership of the party. He introduced me to the drafts of illegal documents of the counter-revolutionary-Zinoviev organization. I was in full solidarity with Safarov in all his anti-Soviet, slanderous conversations about the leadership of the party.

In 1932 our connection was renewed.

In August 1932 I visited him in Moscow at 5 Granovsky Street in the House of Soviets. Safarov, convinced of the invariance of my anti-Soviet convictions, informed me that the Zinovievites had their own conspiratorial center and, in alliance with the Trotskyists, were continuing the struggle against the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). Seeing that in the person of Safarov I could find a possible ally of our anti-Soviet organization, I, in turn, told him that I was entering an illegal group.

a nationalist anti-Soviet organization fighting against the CPSU(b) and Soviet power. SAFAROV brought before me the question of a bloc between the Trots-Kist-Zinoviev center and our organization for the joint struggle against the CPSU(b). He also informed me that they had regular contact with TROTSKY and considered it necessary to act in alliance with the aggressive countries.

Question: How did you feel about Safarov's proposal for a bloc?

Answer: I considered the Trotskyist-Zinoviev organization as a real force and a reliable ally of our organization for the joint struggle against the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government, therefore I accepted Safarov's proposal for a bloc.

Question: Therefore, your connection with Safarov should be regarded as the emergence of a bloc of Trotskyist and nationalist centers?

Answer: Of course it is.

Question: Continue your testimony about the pan-Turkist organization. Who was in the organization?

Answer: Personally, I know the following members of the organization in Kazakhstan: RYSKULOV Turar, former deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, ** DIVEEV Shakir, former People's Commissariat of Trade of Kazakhstan, ASFENDIAROV Sanzhar - head of the Academy of Sciences in Kazakhstan, SULTANBEKOV Zhagfar - in leading Soviet work in Kazakhstan, TOKHTABAYEV Isa , - works in Leningrad in one of the institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, ARALBAYEV Bekaidar - is in the camp, convicted in the case of nationalists in 1934, BAIGASKINA Esim - the former director of the Alma-Ata Veterinary Institute, BAGIZBAYEV - deputy chairman of the Chimkent City Council, KUBENOV - works somewhere in Kazakhstan, KADYRBAYEVA -

DOCUMENTATION

291

director of the Alma-Ata Kazakh theater, ZHURGENEV - People's Commissariat of Education of Kazakhstan, BEKZHANOV - director of the Pedagogical Institute in Alma Ata, KABULOVA - head of the department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, KULE TOVA - works in the South Kazakhstan region, KULSARTOVA - works through public education, TAGZHIGITOVA - an employee of the Committee of Science in Kazakhstan, TOKZHANOVA - Chairman of the Committee on Arts under the Council of People's Commissars of Kazakhstan, ZHANDOSOVA Uraza - former. chairman of the Alma-Ata Regional Executive Committee, ZHANDOSOV Urazali - engineer-geologist, TUGANBAYEV Karkhodzha - engineer for mechanization of agriculture, TOLEBAYEV - former head of the forestry department of the Kazakh People's Commissariat of Agriculture, YEGIMBETOV - Alma-Ata city prosecutor, TOLEBAEVA M. - works in the CEC of Kaz. SSR, KENBAYEV - chairman of the Chimkent City Council, writers of Kazakhstan MAULINA Beimbet and SAIFULIN Saken, ZHANDARBEOVA - artist of the order bearer, KULUM BETOVA - chairman of the Kaz. CEC, ZHANGILDINA** - Deputy Chairman of the CEC of Kazakhstan, TUNGACHINA - representative of Kaztorg; living in Tashkent: Kazakhs - KHOJAMKULOVA, RUSTEMOVA

ZULFI KARA, ZHANTUGANOV, ALIFBAYEV - engineer of Kazpolitmetal, **DOSOVA - secretary of the South Kazakhstan Regional Party Committee; SA FARBEKOV - secretary of the West Kazakh Regional Committee, BATYRBKOV - former director of a meat processing plant in Kazakhstan, KUZEMBAYEV - works in the Administration of the Kazakh SSR Executive Committee, ESKARAYEV ** - deputy chairman of the SEC of Kazakhstan, BARMAKOV, ZHILISBAYEV and ORUNTAEV - whose place of work is unknown to me, MOLDAZHANOV - Narkomfin in Kazakhstan, KHODZHNIKOV - an employee of a public library in Kazakhstan, ** SHANIN ** - a former director of the Kazakh Theater, LEKEROVA - a former employee of the State Planning Committee, TOREGOGIN - a former employee of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, ** MENDESHEVA ** - Chairman of the Committee science az. Central Executive Committee, CASA BULATOV, BEKBATYROV, TATTIBAYEV, who are in Kazakhstan, NURMAKOV, former deputy secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, ** TULEPOVA ** Mi Rasbek, works in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, SARYMULDAEV - deputy of the People's Commissariat for Food Industry in Kazakhstan, SARYIKULOV - works on cotton in Tashkent, the writer AUEZOV, Deputy Narkompros in Kazakhstan, BAYMAKH NOV, MUSTAMBAEV serving his sentence, working in various institutions in Kazakhstan CHINALI MUSAYEV, KUDERINA, SULEYEV Vilyay. The organization also includes former members of the Alash Horde: Bukeikhanov, Baytursunov, Dosmukhamedovs, Umarov Yeldes and others.

I have named members of the organization who are personally well known to me, with whom I have met periodically since 1924.

In 1935, while in Kazakhstan (Alma-Ata), I personally contacted the members of the organization ERIMBETOV, KABULOV, ZHURGENEV, ZHANDOSO VYM, TOGAMBAYEV, DIVEEV, ZHANGELDIN, TULEBAY VYM K., BEKZHANOV, ASFENDIAROV, MAILIN, SULTAN BEKOV, Zhantleuov, Kalin, Kadyrbaev, Begaliy Vym, Adinaev, Kenbaev, Bagizbaev, Kucherbaev, Tulebaev, Baygaskin, Zhumbaev, Mendeshev, and others whose names I don't remember now.

With each of these members of the organization, I had conversations about the tasks of the counter-revolutionary organization, inquired about practical activities, and for my part gave them instructions on anti-Soviet work.

The members of the organization I have named are the active part of its composition, which is well known to me, both personally and in its specific

292

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

activities over a number of years. Some of them are heads of branches of the organization in the regions of Kazakhstan.

According to KULUMBETOV, I know that in the Aktobe region, a branch of the organization was led by a former Alash Orda resident, a member of the punitive expeditions of the Alash Orda in the Irgiz district, ** ZHAMANMURUNOV Tel **.

I also know from the information of KULUMBETOV that in the Karaganda region the branch of the organization was headed by ASYLBEKOV.

Question: We suggest you tell about the insurrectionary activity of your organization in the subsequent period, after the creation of the united party of the Kist center?

Answer: By the end of 1927, under the influence of the strengthening of the positions of Soviet power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan and the consequent narrowing of the mass base for insurgent activity, we, the leaders of the Alash-Orda organization, in particular I, KHODZHANOV, considered it necessary take the path of organizing an open speech as soon as possible. Without raising the question of insurrection in a clear form, we, nevertheless, were already probing the ground, probing the moods and conducting preparatory work of an ideological nature. By this time, rebel groups had already been created in Central Kazakhstan, focusing on ties with Western China.

In 1928, on the eve of the confiscation of the property of semi-feudal lords, DULATOV, an Alash Orda, was instructed, as one of the military leaders of the Alash Orda, to carry out preparatory work for raising an uprising. DULATOV established a number of connections with semi-feudal lords and tribal authorities in many regions of Kazakhstan. An active search for weapons began; a connection was established with the Alash Horde MARSEKOV Raimzhan, who was in exile. However, to raise an uprising in 1928-1929, we did not succeed, since the GPU authorities arrested the gangster group of ADILEV Din Mukhamed, BAYTURSUNOV, DULATOV and other Alash Horde people who were entrusted with the work of preparing the uprising were taken into custody.

The complete collectivization carried out in 1929 in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and the excesses that took place everywhere created a favorable situation for the resumption of preparations for the uprising. At this time, I personally joined the organization of the insurgent movement.

As a result of my negotiations with ZhURGENCEV Temirbek, the issue of organizing an uprising was resolved. DIVEEV and SARYMUDAEV were instructed to negotiate with RYSKULOV about his participation in organizing the uprising. RYSKULOV also had to agree with the leaders of the organization in other republics on a general uprising.

The work of raising an uprising in central Kazakhstan was entrusted to SULTANBEKOV, Smagul SADVAKASOV, MUSTAMBAEV and others.

The question of the uprising was finally resolved at the end of 1929.

At the beginning of 1930, we launched insurrectionary activities in almost all regions of Kazakhstan. Uprisings were raised in Central Asia, in Karakalpakstan and Kyrgyzstan. By the same time, there were open armed uprisings in other national republics.

We believed that the uprisings organized by us would be supported by anti-Soviet elements inside the country, that the Trotskyists and the rightists would use the insurrection to overthrow the Soviet regime. I must admit that we had high hopes for the interventionists.

All our calculations turned out to be deeply erroneous. After these uprisings, we were finally convinced that the peasantry would no longer follow us, that the Bai elite that followed us was crushed, and in our further struggle we should mainly focus on the interventionists.

DOCUMENTATION

293

Question: Tell us about the technique of organizing the uprising in 1930?

Answer: I have already testified about the agreement between the leaders of our organization on the question of the uprising. In practice, preparations for the uprising were carried out as follows: each of us, members of the organization, had great connections in the districts, auls, kishlaks. Among these connections was a significant part of tribal authorities. We used them to raise an uprising. For example, in the Yanykurgan district, South Kazakhstan region, there lived a famous semi-feudal lord, the father of a member of our organization, ARAL BAYEV. ARALBAYEV's father enjoyed great influence in a number of areas adjacent to Yanykurgan. ESKARAYEV and I were closely connected with the semi-feudal lords Kutybarovs, who spread their influence in the Kyzyl-Kum and Kara-Kum. Each of us had a lot of similar connections with the enemies of Soviet power in the localities. Through these people and through the Muslim clergy, we organized uprisings.

I also know that RYSKULOV had an agreement with the center of the right and received their consent to the deployment of the insurrection.

At the end of 1930, the insurrectionary movement began to decline against our will. The masses did not follow the insurgents, and the bandit groups were routed.

Question: What was the activity of the anti-Soviet pan-Turkist organization in preparing the insurrectionary movement after 1931?

Answer: Faced with the fact of the defeat of the uprising and insurgent groups, we are still from the insurgency as a method of fighting Soviet power, did not refuse.

Seeing the pointlessness of further armed struggle by internal forces, we decided that the insurgency could only be successful if it was combined with outside help. We should have received such assistance from the aggressive countries preparing war against the Soviet Union.

In 1933, in connection with the intensification of Japan's aggressive intentions and the coming to power of the Nazis in Germany, we staked on intervention by these powers.

In accordance with this, we resumed the training of insurgent personnel. To this end, through the leaders of anti-Soviet groups in the localities, we recruited persons from the hostile camp who were capable of creating groups and becoming the head of the insurrectionary movement at the moment of intervention. The leaders of the insurgent groups in the regions had around them certain contingents of hostile sections of the population, beys and mullahs. The latter were to be the core of the insurgent groups.

Similar work was carried out through KULUMBETOV, DIVEEV, SARYMUL DAYEV and other members of the organization in Kazakhstan. These same people established contact with the nationalist emigration in Western China, Afghanistan and Iran, having a certain agreement with them regarding active assistance to the emerging insurrectionary movement.

Personally, I am also connected with émigré circles.

Question: Can you tell us about the connections of your anti-Soviet organization with the zakordon?

Answer: Even during the civil war, the Alash Horde people contacted representatives of foreign states as reliable allies in the fight against Soviet power. Such a connection existed between BUKEI KHANOVSH and the Japanese agent, Baron Ungern, between BUKEIKHANOV, BAYTURSUNOV TYNYSHPAEV and the White Guards in China. Such a connection was among the Central Asian pan-Turkists who had relations with agents of England, Japan and Turkey.

294

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

These connections, in one form or another, were preserved in subsequent years and were used by our anti-Soviet nationalist organization. After the formation of the pan-Turkist center, Chokaev, Validov and other emigrants organized links in the republics of Central Asia with this center.

To establish such a connection, the Kazakh organization used the trips abroad of RYSKULOV, KOSHEMBAEV and also members of the organization sent to study in Germany - Gazimbek BRIMZHANOV, Sabir TA NAIPEV, BATYRBAYEVADamulu, MUNAYTPASO V A Abdurakhman.

I am aware of the conduct of the same work with representatives of Germany, directly with the pan-Turkic center in the person of RYSKULOV.

In the spring of 1935, the teacher Ibrai KASYMOV, at the office of the authorized commission of Soviet control in Tashkent, informed me that in Kyzyl-Orda he received a message from Chokaev that Chokaev was negotiating with Japan about organizing an uprising and intervention in the USSR. The teacher TAGIROV (Tatar) informed me in 1936 that he had an established connection with Istanbul and corresponded with the journal of CHOKAYEV and VALI DOV. In the fall of 1936, the instructor of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan, KOZHAI DAROV Daribai, in the city of Tashkent in my apartment reported that in Alma-Ata ERMEKO VYM Alimkhan had received a proposal from CHOKAEV to start, through Kazakh emigrants, negotiations with the representation of Japan in Western China and the course of negotiations keep the Pan-Turkist center informed. On the instructions of the Pan-Turkist center, through TURSUNKHADZHAEV Sagduly, in 1936, I instructed ASFENDIAROV, ZHANDOSOV, MASANCHI and ROZYBAKI VU to negotiate with a Japanese agent in Western China on establishing close ties with the Japanese government in preparing a war against the USSR and using our organization in the interests of Japan.

Our nationalist organization has been connected with British agents since 1922, through Sanzhar Asfendiarov, a member of our organization, who is fluent in English. And when the question of the need to establish political ties with England surfaced in the organization, I personally settled on ASFENDIAROV, as the most suitable person for this person.

In 1922, ASFENDIAROV contacted the Iranian citizen Kamalov Aliaskar and through him got acquainted with the Iranian diplomat in Tashkent, MUKHAMED Ali Khan, who was a resident of British intelligence in Central Asia.

From 1923 to 1927, MUKHAMED Ali Khan was in Tashkent, and later in Moscow, and throughout this period did not break off contact with AS FENDIAROV.

Question: Through this you were personally connected with zakordon?

Answer: At various times, the following persons came to me with instructions and information from CHOKAEV, who was in exile: S. KAZBEKOV, Myan Buzruk SALIKHOV, Beki VERDIEV, Abdulkhay MADRAIMOV - all after their arrival from abroad.

In addition, the following people gave me information from CHOKAYEV: Gazi Galim YUNUSOV, Shegebey DAIRABAYEV, Sadyk Utegenov, Ibrai ZHIMANOV, Ibrai Kasymov, Darybai TAGIROV and KOMADAROV, all persons were communicators between me and CHOKAYEV.

Ties with Chokaev I did not break until recently.

I was connected with CHOKAYEV through the exiled Socialist-Revolutionary Vadim CHAYKIN.

On the connections of our organization with the zakordon, I will give more detailed testimony at the next interrogation.

DOCUMENTATION

295

Question: Tell us about the terrorist activities of your organization?

Answer: The center of our organization and I personally recognized individual terror against the leaders of the CPSU(b) and Soviet power as one of the methods of struggle.

Back in 1923, a member of our nationalist organization RYSKULOV carried out practical activities in training terrorist personnel among young people.

Among the graduates of the Kazakh Institute of Education in Tashkent, he trained a group of terrorists consisting of students BEKZHANOV Sheikhaslam, BAYMAKHANOV Sadvakas, MUSAYEV Chinali, ALIEV Ospankul and Danizrov Bazarkul - to commit individual terrorist attacks against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and Soviet power.

These "five" terrorists, in turn, recruited young people into the nationalist organization and trained terrorist personnel - each of them carried out this work of training terrorist personnel at their location.

Question: Where are these people now?

Answer: I don't know.

In 1929, members of our organization ALIEV, SEIFULLIN, DULATOV and ISPULOV prepared a terrorist act against the secretary of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) GOLOSHCHEKIN, and only the exposure of ALIEV and his arrest prevented the terror against GOLOSHCHEKIN.

Question: That's not all. Are you aware of other facts of the terrorist activities of your anti-Soviet organization?

Answer: Yes, I must admit that I am also aware of other facts of the terrorist activities of our organization.

In the spring of 1936, in Tashkent, I had a meeting with a member of our organization, KULUMBETOV, who informed me that the center of the Rights was preparing terrorist acts against STALIN, MOLOTOV, and KAGANOVICH, that NUR MAKOV, a member of the center of our organization, had informed him about this.

KULUMBETOV warned me that our organization was entrusted with the task of preparing terrorist cadres for carrying out central terror together with the rightists.

Question: How did you react to KULUMBETOV's report about your organization's preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government?

Answer: I personally approved terror as one of the methods of combating the Soviet power and agreed with the directive regarding the use of individual terror against the leaders of the party and government, primarily against STALIN, MOLOTOV and KAGANOVICH.

Question: We will return to the inquiry about the terrorist activities of your organization. Tell us about the sabotage activities of your organization?

Answer: I must admit that our anti-Soviet pan-Turkist organization, along with terror and rebellion, recognized sabotage as one of the real methods of struggle against the CPSU(b) and Soviet power.

To this end, our organization has created a number of sabotage cells in industry and agriculture.

Question: Where exactly were the sabotage cells created?

Answer: Diversion cells were created at the industrial enterprises of Karsakpai, Ridtser, Achisai, at the Chimkent lead smelter, and in the coal industry of Karaganda.

296

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Question: Who led the sabotage activities of your organization?

Answer: The United Center of the Pan-Turkist Organization gave instructions to the places about the deployment of sabotage activities at the beginning of 1933.

TURSUNKHODZHAEV, who connected me with the united center, informed me that members of the organization KULUMBETOV, DIVEEV Shakir, SARYMULDAEV Kabulbek, ESKARAEV Suleyman, ZHANDOSOV Uraz, SULTANBEKOV Zhagfar, TABA SHEV, ASFENDIAROV are leading the sabotage activities in Kazakhstan.

On Achisla, sabotage work was carried out by members of our organization, engineers MAMYROV (MAMYRBAYEV) and TONIN (SARSE NEVI).

The testimonies were written down from my words, right, they were read by me, I confirm the correctness of what was stated with my signature -

KHOJANOV

The interrogation is interrupted.

Pom . head of the 7th department of the 4th department of the GUGB
senior lieutenant of state security GENDIN

Interrogated:

Detective officer of the 7th department of the GUGB, junior
lieutenant of state security NEIMAN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 316. L. 195-224. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "In Kazakhstan". The protocol contains Stalin's handwritten notes:

— Surnames are circled.

*
in the margins it is written: "Take Dzhandosov."

**
in the margins the sign "YV".

— Surnames are circled and in the margins there is a handwritten note: "Ar".

No. 156

CODE TELEGRAM R.I. EIKHE I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
WORK OF THE TRIOKS IN THE WESTERN SIBERIAN REGION

August 1, 1937

No. 1456/sh — Novosibirsk

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

By order of Vyshinsky, the regional prosecutor Barkov is summoned to Moscow. Now, two troikas, approved by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in which Barkov works, are extremely hard work. I urge Barkov's summons to Moscow to be cancelled.

EICHE

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 58. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the telegram: "To postpone the call of Barkov to Moscow. St.", as well as a handwritten note: "T.

Vyshinsky said that he was summoned for two days to negotiate his appointment as republican prosecutor. Deputies remain in place, who can replace him for a few days."

DOCUMENTATION

297

No. 157

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN A.A. ANDREEV ON ARRESTS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE VOLGA GERMANS

August 2, 1937

No. 1164/sh

Saratov, comrade ANDREEV, copy to comrade Ezhov The
Central Committee decided:

First. Sanction the removal of the leaders of the sectarian German group Beth Brudorites.

Second. The current composition of the Chekists in the ASSR of the Germans of the Volga region should be replaced
by non-Germans.

You can leave for Moscow on August 3rd.

STALIN

RGANI. F. 89. Op. 48. D. 11. L. I. Copy. Typescript.

No. 158

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN IN THE
CC CP(b) OF UZBEKISTAN ON REPLACEMENTS
IN THE LEADING STAFF

August 2, 1937

No. 1167/sh

Tashkent. Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan

Karimov does not fit as before. SNK. You have already been informed about this. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks demands that Karimov be replaced by another candidate. Baltabaev cannot be nominated before the Council of People's Commissars, since the arrested Ryskulov, Khodzhanov, Atabaev, Fayzulla Khodzhaev also slander him. Try to nominate Tyuryabekov as the head of the Council of People's Commissars. It seems to us that in Uzbekistan there is no struggle against anti-Soviet elements, and Ikramov is surrounded by such elements that he does not see, does not notice.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks STALIN RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 19. Original. Typescript.

No. 159

M.M.'s NOTE Litvinova I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT
JAPANESE UNDER THIS SATO JIRO

August 3, 1937

No. 333/I
Secret

To the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. STALIN

*I recently reported on the very vigorous presentations made to us by the Japanese Ambassador in connection with the conviction of several Japanese in the Sakhalin concessions. This topic was also touched upon by Hirota in his recent speech on foreign policy in the Japanese Parliament. All signs

298

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

they say that Japan intends in the near future to make the question of Japanese concessions on Sakhalin the central point of our disputes with her*.

The NKVD is now agreeing with me on the arrest of a Japanese SATO JIRO living on a Japanese concession on suspicion of espionage and directing espionage and sabotage work of others.

As you know, I take a very hard line with Japan when it comes to border and other disputes. At the same time, it seems to me necessary to be especially careful in matters relating to the island of Sakhalin. Therefore, I cannot assume responsibility for sanctioning the arrest of SATO JIRO, also proceeding from the fact that one can rightfully suspect all Japanese in the USSR without exception of espionage.

I put the question at your discretion.

LITVINOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

* the paragraph is underlined in the margins with a single line.
__
underlined in pencil.

No. 160

CODE TELEGRAM OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE ORGANIZATION OF OPEN PROCESSES
ABOUT "PREDICTION" IN AGRICULTURE

August 3, 1937

No. 1178/sh

TO THE SECRETARIES OF OBCOMMS AND TERRITORIAL COMMISSIONS OF THE AUCP(b)

And the Central Committee of the National Committee of the Parties

Recently, the wrecking work of the enemies of the people in the field of agriculture, aimed at undermining the economy of the collective farms and at provoking the collective farmers to discontent against the Soviet regime, through a whole system of mockery and mockery of them, has been exposed in the territories, regions and republics.

The Central Committee considers that the fact that the liquidation of pests is carried out only in a secret order through the NKVD bodies, and the collective farmers are not mobilized to combat sabotage and its carriers, is a significant shortcoming in the leadership of the cause of defeating pests in agriculture.

Considering it absolutely necessary to politically mobilize the collective farmers around the work carried out to defeat the enemies of the people in agriculture, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks obliges the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties to organize in each region 2-3 open show trials over the enemies of the people - pests agriculture, who made their way into the district party, soviet and land bodies (employees of the MTS and district zoning districts, pre-RIKs, secretaries of the Republic of Kazakhstan, etc.), widely covering the progress of the trials in the local press.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Stalin

RGANI. F. 89. Op. 48. D. 12. L. 1. Copy. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

299

No. 161

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "THE QUESTION OF THE NKID"

August 5, 1937

519 - The question of the NKID.

Do not apply repressions against the Japanese Sato Jiro, but take other measures to prevent his espionage activities.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. I. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Litvinov, Yezhov.

No. 162

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "QUESTION OF THE NKVD"

August 9, 1937

564 - Question of the NKVD.

Approve the order of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR on the elimination of Polish sabotage and espionage groups and organizations of the POV.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 85. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov.

No. 163

CODE TELEGRAM L.P. Berii I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
ARREST OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE NARKOMLEGPROM

August 9, 1937

No. 1526/sh - Tbilisi.

Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The materials of the investigation of the NKVD of Georgia exposed the following persons as wreckers and Japanese spies in the silk industry of the Union:

1) Muratov M. - head of the supply department of the Main Silk Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Light Industry of the USSR.

2) Tumarkin D.A. - Assistant to the head of the planning department of the People's Commissariat of Light Industry of the USSR.

3) Galkin - engineer, head. production department of the Uzbek silk industry.

I ask you to instruct them to arrest them and send them to the NKVD.

Georgia.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party (b) of Georgia BERIA RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 61. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the telegram: "T. Yezhov. I am for arrest. I. St. *.

300

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 164

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN
IN THE CC CP(b) OF TAJIKISTAN ON
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CEC OF THE REPUBLIC

August 11, 1937

No. 1230/sh

Stalinabad. Central Committee of Tajikistan ASHUROV

We cannot yet approve either the first or the second candidate for the presidency. CEC. Verification is needed, verification takes time. The election of the chairman of the CEC can be postponed to the next session.

STALIN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 38. Original. Typescript.

No. 165

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF G.S. LYUSHKOVA ON THE
ARRESTS OF NKVD EMPLOYEES (47)

August 11, 1937

No. 59014
Owls. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the telegram from the head of the UNKVD for the Far Eastern Territory, comrade. LYUSHKOVA.

WIESEL, DAVYDOV and BUBENNY ordered to be arrested.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade. Ezhov

After a day of interrogation today, 10 BARMINSKY filed a statement in your name about his belonging to the Right-Trotskyist organization in the UNKVD. Names as participants of DERIBASA, WESTERN, early. personnel department POLOZOV, former head of the AHO BUBENNY, early. Primorsky Regional NKVD VIESEL, beg. Amur Regional Administration DAVYDOV. Spy activity is denied.

I reported to you about POLOZOV as a Trotskyite, and with your sanction I arrested him. WIESEL was removed by your order as a Trotskyist, but so far your order has not been carried out. DERIBAS could not give any answer to my question.

DAVYDOV - a former White Guard, despite the expression of political distrust of the regional party conference and his inactivity, DERIBAS did not remove him. All behavior of DERIBASA is suspicious. Upon my arrival, in spite of the arrangement by telephone for a personal meeting, he had previously sent Western to the station to reconnoiter, did not appear at the office for a long time and, as established, looked out for what was being done in the office of Western, where I performed the operation. In a conversation with me, he showed confusion and irritation about his withdrawal, the edge

DOCUMENTATION

301

her curiosity about the nature of the testimony against Western, Barminsky. DERIBAS showed me the Harbin newspaper, which says about his arrest. Knowing that WESTERN was being interrogated in his office, DERIBAS appeared there, explaining to me, because he was looking for me. We suspect that he decided to show the WESTERN that he was not arrested. Noteworthy is Deribas' delay in leaving for DVK, despite your instructions that he should go to Vladivostok to fetch his family.

I ask you to telegraph the sanction for the arrest of VIESEL, DAVYDOV, BUBENNY.

Iyushkov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 317. L. 112-114. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten resolution: "To Molotov. Voroshilov. Deribas will have to be arrested by St."; "Behind. V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov.

No. 166

OPERATIONAL ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION SSR No. 00485 (48)

August 11, 1937 Moscow

The closed letter sent along with this order about the fascist-insurgent, espionage, sabotage, defeatist and terrorist activities of Polish intelligence in the USSR, as well as the materials of the investigation into the POV case, reveal a picture of long-term and relatively unpunished sabotage and espionage work Polish intelligence on the territory of the Union.

From these materials it is clear that the subversive activities of the Polish intelligence service were carried out and continue to be carried out so openly that the impunity of this activity can only be explained by the poor work of the GUGB organs and the carelessness of the Chekists.

Even now, work on the local elimination of Polish sabotage and espionage groups and the organization of the POV has not been fully deployed. The pace and scale of the investigation is extremely low. The main contingents of Polish intelligence eluded even operational records (of the total mass of defectors from Poland, numbering approximately 15,000 people, only 9,000 people were registered in the Union). In Western Siberia, out of about 5,000 defectors located on its territory, no more than 1,000 are counted. The situation is the same with regard to political emigrants from Poland.

The insufficiently resolute liquidation of the Polish intelligence cadres is all the more dangerous now, when the Moscow POV center has been destroyed and many of its most active members have been arrested. Polish intelligence, foreseeing the inevitability of its further failure, is trying to set in motion, and in some cases is already setting in motion, its sabotage network in the national economy of the USSR and, first of all, at its defense facilities.

In accordance with this, the main task of the organs of the GUGB at the present time is the defeat of the anti-Soviet work of Polish intelligence and the complete liquidation of the still unaffected wide sabotage and insurgent ranks of the POV and the main human contingents of Polish intelligence in the USSR.

302

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGBNKVD. 1937-1938

I ORDER:

1. On August 20, 1937, start a broad operation aimed at the complete liquidation of local POV organizations and, above all, their sabotage, espionage and insurgent personnel in industry, transport, state farms and collective farms.

The entire operation must be completed within 3 months, i.e. by November 20, 1937.

2. Subject to arrest:

a) identified in the course of the investigation and still not found

the most active members of the POV according to the attached list;

b) all prisoners of war of the Polish army remaining in the USSR;

c) defectors from Poland, regardless of the time of their transition to the USSR;

d) political emigrants and political exchanges from Poland;

e) former members of the PPS and other Polish anti-Soviet political parties;

f) the most active part of the local anti-Soviet and nationalist elements of the Polish regions.

3. The arrest operation should be carried out in two stages:

a) in the first place, the contingents listed above, working in the NKVD, in the Red Army, in military factories, in the defense shops of all other factories, in railway, water and air transport, in the electric power economy of all industrial enterprises, are subject to arrest; ty, at gas and oil refineries;

b) in the second place, all the rest who work in industrial enterprises of non-defense significance, in state farms, collective farms and institutions are subject to arrest.

4. Simultaneously with the deployment of the arrest operation, start investigative work. The main focus of the investigation should be on the complete exposure of the organizers and leaders of sabotage groups, with the aim of exhaustively identifying the sabotage network.

All spies, saboteurs and saboteurs passing on the testimony of arrested persons -
IMMEDIATELY ARRESTE.

To conduct the investigation, allocate a special group of operational work
nicknames.

5. All those arrested, as their guilt is revealed in the course of the investigation, are to be divided into two categories:

a) the first category, subject to execution, which includes all espionage, sabotage, wrecking and insurgent personnel of Polish intelligence;

b) the second category, the less active of them, subject to imprisonment in prisons and camps, for a period of 5 to 10 years.

6. For those classified in the process of investigation to the first and second categories, every 10 days lists are compiled with a summary of the investigative and intelligence materials characterizing the degree of guilt of the arrested person, which are sent for final approval to the NKVD of the USSR.

Assignment to the first or second category on the basis of undercover and investigative materials is made by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the republic, the head of the UNKVD of the region or territory, together with the corresponding prosecutor of the republic, region, territory.

The lists are sent to the NKVD of the USSR signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the republic, the heads of the UNKVD and the Prosecutor respectively.

operating republics, territories and regions.

DOCUMENTATION

303

After the approval of the lists by the NKVD of the USSR and the Prosecutor of the Union, the sentence is immediately carried out, i.e. those convicted in the first category are shot and in the second category they are sent to prisons and camps, according to the orders of the NKVD of the USSR.

7. To stop the release from prisons and camps of those who are finishing their term of imprisonment on the grounds of Polish espionage. On each of them, submit material for consideration at the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR.

8. Skillfully and deliberately use all the work to defeat the POV and all other contingents of Polish intelligence to acquire new agents along the Polish line.

When selecting agents, pay special attention to measures that ensure that the NKVD organs do not penetrate into the network of doppelgänger agents of Polish intelligence.

Lists of all agents scheduled for recruitment, with an exhaustive description of them, should be sent for approval to the head of the GUGB NKVD comrade. FRINOVSKY.

9. Report the progress of the operation by telegraph every 5 days, i.e. 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th and 30th of every month.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Published: Butovo test site 1937-1938. Book of memory of victims of political repressions. M., 1997. S. 353-354.

No. 167

CLOSED LETTER ON THE FASCIST-REBELLION, SPY,
SUBVERSION, DEFEATIVE AND TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE
IN THE USSR

August 11, 1937

No. 59098

Strictly secret Keep
on a par with the cipher Moscow

People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union Republics, Heads of the
NKVD Departments of the Autonomous Republics, Regions and
Territories

The NKVD of the Union has uncovered and is liquidating the largest and, judging by all the data, the main sabotage and espionage network of Polish intelligence in the USSR, which existed in the form of the so-called "Polish military organization".

On the eve of the October Revolution and immediately after it, the PIL SUDSKII created on Soviet territory its largest political agency, which headed the organization now being liquidated, and then from year to year systematically transferred to the USSR, under the guise of political emigrants, exchanged political prisoners, defectors, numerous cadres of spies and saboteurs who were included in the general system of organization that operated in the USSR and replenished here by recruiting the local Polish population.

304

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

The organization was led by a center located in Moscow, consisting of UNSHLICHT, MUKLEVICH, OLSKII and others, and had powerful branches in Belarus and the Ukraine, mainly in the border areas, in a number of other areas of the USSR.

By the present time, when only the head and the active of the organization have been liquidated, it has already been determined that the anti-Soviet work of the organization was covered - the NKVD system, the Red Army, the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, the apparatus of the Comintern - primarily the Polish section of the ECCI, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the defense industry, transport - mainly strategic roads of the western theater of war, agriculture.

Active anti-Soviet work of the organization was carried out in the following main areas:

1. Preparation, together with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bukharinites, to overthrow the Soviet government, disrupt the Brest peace, provoke a war between the RSFSR and Germany and put together armed intervention units (1916).
2. Extensive comprehensive subversive work on the Western and Southwestern fronts during the Soviet-Polish war, with the direct goal of defeating the Red Army and separating the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR.
3. Mass fascist-nationalist work among the Polish population of the USSR in order to prepare a base and local personnel for sabotage, espionage and insurgent actions.
4. Qualified espionage work in the field of the military, economic and political life of the USSR, in the presence of the largest strategic agents and a wide medium and grassroots spy network.
5. Subversive and wrecking work in the main branches of the defense industry, in current and mobilization planning, in transport, in agriculture; the creation of a powerful sabotage network for wartime, both from among the Poles, and, to a large extent, due to various

personal non-Polish elements.

6. Contacting and unification of sabotage-espionage and other active anti-Soviet actions with the Trotskyist center and its periphery, with the organization of right-wing traitors, with Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalists on the basis of joint preparations for the overthrow of Soviet power and the dismemberment of the USSR.

7. Direct contact and agreement with the leader of the military-fascist conspiracy, the traitor TUKHACHEVSKY, in order to disrupt the preparations of the Red Army for war and to open our front to the Poles during the war.

8. Deep penetration of the members of the organization into the Communist Party of Poland, complete seizure of the leading bodies of the party and the Polish section of the ECCI, provocative work to disintegrate and demoralize the party, disruption of the united and popular front in Poland, use of party channels to introduce spies and saboteurs into USSR, work aimed at turning the Communist Party into an appendage of the Pilsud region in order to use its influence for anti-Soviet actions during the Polish military attack on the USSR.

9. Complete seizure and paralysis of all our intelligence work against Poland and the systematic use of the penetration of members of the organization into the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army for active anti-Soviet work.

The main reason for the unpunished anti-Soviet activities of the organization for almost 20 years is the fact that almost from the very

DOCUMENTATION

305

from the moment of the appearance on the most important areas of anti-Polish work, large Polish spies who had penetrated the Cheka - UNSCHLIKHT, MESSING, PILLYAR, MEDVED, OLSKII, SOSNOVSKY, MAKOVSKY, LOGANOVSKIY, BARANSKY and a number of others, who completely seized the entire anti-Polish intelligence and counterintelligence in their hands → The work of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD.

The emergence of the organization and methods of introducing Polish agents in the USSR

The "Polish Army Organization" arose in 1914 on the initiative and under the personal leadership of PILSUDSKY as a nationalist organization of active supporters of the struggle for the independence of bourgeois Poland, trained in the combat organizations of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), on which PILSUDSKY mainly relied, and

in special military schools that he created to train the backbone of the future Polish army.

These schools were created by PILSUDSKY in 1910-1914. in Galicia, where they were semi-secret in nature and enjoyed subsidies and practical assistance from the intelligence department of the Austro-Hungarian

of the General Staff. Even before the imperialist war, Piłsudski had at his disposal a number of officers of the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service, who taught Piłsudski military affairs, as well as reconnaissance and sabotage techniques, since the cadres who formed the POV a little later were intended to act in alliance with the Austro-German army on the rear of the Russian troops and for the acquisition of the Polish legions in anticipation of a war with tsarist Russia.

Therefore, already then, in addition to the territory of tsarist Poland, members of the POV were sent to Russia, recruited here on the spot, based on the principle of creating their own organizations, wherever possible, mainly in large cities, to account for and mobilize their people for the purposes of communications and intelligence.

At the same time, the POV was a tool for the political mobilization of Piłsudski's forces participating under his leadership in the struggle for the independence of Poland. In this regard, the POV secretly infiltrated all Polish political parties, from the extreme left to the extreme right, recruiting active leaders of these parties into their ranks everywhere on the basis of recognition of the indisputable authority and personal will of Piłsudski and the idea of fighting for great-power Poland within the borders of 1772.

Along this line, since the pre-war years, the POV accumulated a rich practice of intra-party and inter-party provocation, which was the main method of the Pilsudschyna in its struggle against the revolutionary movement.

At that time, the POV was headed by the central headquarters, which was called "Comenda Naczelna" (abbreviated as "KN"), which led the activities of local Pilsudchik organizations that bore the same name with the addition of a serial number, for example, in Belarus - "KN-1", in Ukraine "KN-3", etc. Each of these local "commands" was a regional territorial district of the POV, divided into local commandant's offices of the POV, the number of which in each territory was determined depending on the local conditions and tasks pursued by the Pilsudschyna in the area.

At the end of 1918, in connection with the formation of Poland, headed by PIŁ SUDSKII as the sole dictator with the title of "head of state", the main command of the POV in its entirety merged into the general headquarters of Poland and formed the intelligence department of the headquarters.

306

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

During the period of temporary removal of PIŁSUDSKY from power in Poland (1922-1926), the main command of the POV, which was then generally eliminated by the endeks from the government bodies of Poland and then partially retained its influence in the intelligence department of the general staff, continued its sabotage and reconnaissance work on the territory of the USSR, regardless → mo from official bodies and prepared a new coming to power of PIŁ → SUDSKII.

After the so-called May Revolution of 1926, which again brought Piłsudski to power, the leadership and activists of the POV filled the entire state elite and the fascist government apparatus of Poland; a significant part of the active POV remained underground to fight the revolutionary movement in Poland by means of provocation and political inspiration, and also, mainly, for illegal infiltration in the USSR in various ways.

The activities of Piłsudski's conspiratorial organization on our territory became significantly more active in 1917, when, in connection with the events of the imperialist war, significant qualified cadres of Piłsudski's close associates from among the prisoners of war legionnaires accumulated in various parts of our country (Piłsudski's legions, formed by the POV, included into the Austro-Hungarian army) and refugees from the territory of tsarist Poland, then occupied by the Germans.

Thus, already by the time of the October Revolution, Piłsudski had in Russia significant cadres of POV participants, both from among the local Polish population and, mainly, from among the Poles evacuated from Poland.

Since, however, the main cadres of the POV during the imperialist war consisted of people more or less known for their open Polish-patriotic convictions, and given the victorious growth of the influence of the Bolshevik Party, Piłsudski in the summer of 1917 undertook special recruitment measures to infiltrate the RSDLP (Bolsheviks). For these purposes, on the personal instructions of Piłsudski, his entourage launched extensive recruitment work among the Polish Social Democrats and the PPS-Levice, who later merged and formed the Communist Party of Poland.

During 1917, the members of the central leadership of the POV, who were then in Moscow and Petrograd - PRISTOR (later the Polish Prime Minister), PUZHAK (Secretary of the Central Committee of the PPS), MAKOVSKY (member of the Moscow Committee of the PPS, later assistant head of the KRO OPTU and resident of INO OPTU in Poland), GOLUVKO, YUZEFOVSKY (voivode of Volyn), MATUSHEVSKY (later head of the 2nd department of the Polish General Staff) - involved in the POV a number of Polish Social Democrats and members of the PPS-levitsa, who later penetrated prominent posts in the Soviet state apparatus: UNSHLIKHT (former deputy chairman of the OGPU and Revolutionary Military Council), LESHCHINSKY (Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland), DOLETSKY (head of TASS), BRONKOVSKY (deputy head of the Red Army Intelligence Department), MUKLEVICH (head of sea forces of the Red Army, deputy people's commissar of the defense industry), LONGVU (comrade commander, head of the communications department of the Red Army) and a number of others who formed the Moscow center of the POV in 1918 and led the management of all POV activities on the territory of the USSR.

At the same time, at the beginning of 1918, PILSUDSKY gave a directive to a number of personally selected members of the POV, who were members of the PPS and who were in the USSR, to infiltrate the Soviet state apparatus through

valuing their break with the teaching staff and the transition to Soviet positions. Among the Polish agents who infiltrated the Soviet system in this way are: M.A. LOGANOVSKY, former member of the Moscow Committee of the PPS (before the arrest of the deputy people's commissar of the food industry), MAKOVSKY, VOYTYGA (infiltrated the KRO VChK-OGPU-NKVD), BARANSKY (head of the department of the INO OGPU-NKVD) and a number of others.

In an effort to take over our intelligence and counterintelligence work against Poland, PILSUDSKY, along with the introduction of the above-mentioned members of the "POV" into the Cheka, undertook during 1919-1920. and subsequently a number of measures to introduce highly qualified career intelligence officers into the Cheka - officers of the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters, who, with the assistance of UNSHLIKHTA, MESSING, MEDVED and other major Polish agents, infiltrated senior positions in Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence. So, I.I. SOSNOVSKY (before his arrest, deputy head of the NKVD Directorate for the Saratov region), who in 1919 was an emissary of PILSUDSKY and residents of the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters on the territory of Soviet Russia, then received a directive from the head of the 2nd department, Major MATUSHEVSKY, to infiltrate the apparatus VChK. Using his arrest by the Special Department of the Cheka in the summer of 1920, SOSNOVSKY, with the assistance of PILLYAR, staged his break with the Polish intelligence and POV, of which he was the leading figure, gave out with the permission of the 2nd department of the PGSH an insignificant part of his network and infiltrated to work in The Central Office of the Cheka. Soon, SOSNOVSKY managed to introduce a whole group of large Polish intelligence officers into the Cheka: lieutenant colonel of the 2nd department of the Polgenstab VITKOVSKY (who served as head of the Polish branch of the Special Department of the Cheka, who then went to work in Narkomtiazhprom), KIYAKOVSKY (head of the Anglo-Roman branch of the KRO VChK), ROLLER (before arrest - head of the Special Department of the Stalingrad Territory), Brzezovsky (deputy head of the Special Department of Ukraine) and others.

A number of other members of the POV, starting with BRONKOVSKY, who, with the assistance of UNSHLIKHTA, got into the position of deputy. early The Intelligence Department of the Red Army, infiltrated the entire Intelligence Department system, took over and paralyzed all intelligence work against Poland (BUDKEVICH - the head of the department and a foreign resident), ZhBIKOVSKY, PERINSKY, FIRIN, IODLOVSKY, UZLANSKY, MAKSIMOV and others.).

One of the types of use of these major Polish spies in the work of the INO and the Intelligence Agency abroad was the wide set-up of doubles in our residencies abroad. In the future, through staging failures, doubles substituted by intelligence were transferred to the USSR for espionage and sabotage work.

At various times, Polish agents infiltrated and worked in responsible leadership positions in the Red Army: UNSHLIKHT - deputy chairman. RVS, MUK LEVICH - early. naval forces, LONGVA - beg. Communications Department RKIS \, KO KHANSKY - commander, KOZLOVSKY - commissar of a number of units and many other Polish agents who penetrated into the most diverse parts of the Red Army.

The main cadre of Polish agents who infiltrated the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was created by a man who worked there in the period 1925-1931. LOGANOVSKY, and here, too, the Polish agents concentrated on the area of work of the NKID, connected with Poland (the spies MORSHTIIN, KONITS were referents for Poland) and a number of other important areas (plenipotentiary BROLOVSKII, plenipotentiary GAYKIS, plenipotentiary KARSKY).

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Having seized the leading bodies of the Communist Party of Poland and the Polish section of the ECCI for a long time, the POV systematically transferred its participants - spies and saboteurs to the USSR under the guise of political emigrants and exchanged political prisoners, specially staging the arrests and convictions of members of the POV who had infiltrated the Communist Party.

Regardless of the POV, the method of transferring spies to the USSR under the guise of political emigrants was widely used by the Polish political police (defensive), which has in the communist parties of Poland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus a significant number of personnel of its provocateur agents from among Polish, Belarusian, Ukrainian nationalists who had infiltrated various revolutionary organizations.

At the same time, various organs of Polish intelligence (mainly local apparatuses of the 2nd Polglavshstab - Vilna and Lvov exosites, border reconnaissance points, reconnaissance centers, political police of the rear and border regions of Poland) systematically, on a massive scale, transfer spies and saboteurs under the guise of defectors.

These "defectors" covered up the criminal goals of their arrival in the USSR with various motives and pretexts (desertion from military service, flight from police persecution, from unemployment in search of work, to live together with relatives, etc.).

As it turns out now, Polish spies and saboteurs, transferred to the USSR under the guise of defectors, despite the fact that they had independent ways of communication with Poland, in a number of cases contacted POV participants on our territory, acted under their leadership, and the mass of defectors as a whole was a source of active personnel for the organization.

A number of qualified Polish spies, transferred to the USSR under the guise of defectors - soldiers who deserted from the Polish army, settled in the Saratov region, where Polish agents PILLAR and SOS operated

new.

Political emigrants and defectors form the backbone of a subversive network of Poles in industry and transport, recruiting subversive cadres from among local Polish nationalists and, most importantly, at the expense of a wide variety of non-Polish, deeply concealed anti-Soviet elements.

The POV organization in Ukraine was headed by LAZOVERT (state arbiter of the Ukrainian SSR), under whose leadership was the POV center partially liquidated in 1933 in Ukraine (SKARBK, POLITUR, VISHNEVSKY), and in Belarus - BENEK (People's Commissariat of the BSSR), which, like LAZOVERT, was a member of the Moscow POV Center since 1918.

Preparation of an anti-Soviet coup in the first period of the revolution

The first stage of the activity of the POV in Soviet Russia includes actions aimed at disrupting the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk at the beginning of 1918 and preparing, together with the Bukharinites and Left Social Revolutionaries, an anti-Soviet coup in order to draw Soviet Russia into the continuation of the war with Germany, since, in addition, Pilsudski had already reoriented himself towards the Entente and directed the activities of his organizations according to the directives of the French headquarters.

Members of the organization - UNSCHLICHT, LESHCHINSKY and DOLETSKY, together with BUKHARIN and the Left SRs, developed plans for the arrest of the Council of People's Commissars, headed by LENIN. For these purposes, PESTKOVSKY, on behalf of

DOCUMENTATION

309

UNSCHLIKHTA, established contact with the representative of French intelligence in Moscow, General LAVERN and the leadership of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries; BOBINSKY put together armed detachments to participate in the Left SR uprisings; in the Polish units that survived from the time of Kerensky, work was underway to prepare their provocative military action against the German troops on the demarcation line.

Having failed in the implementation of the plan of an anti-Soviet coup and the resumption of the war with Germany, the Moscow organization of the POV, acting on the directives of LAVERN and the adjutant Pilsudsky, a prominent member of the POV of VENIAVY-DLUGOSHEVS KHOGO, who illegally arrived on Soviet territory, switched to preparing an intervention against Soviet Russia, creating its own armed force under the guise of the formation of the Polish units of the Red Army.

The so-called Western Rifle Division, which was formed at the end of 1918, manned mainly by Poles, was completely captured in its command head by members of the POV (division commanders MAKOVSKY and LONGVA, commissars LAZOVERT and SLAVINSKY, brigade commanders MAEVSKII and LUSSKII, commissars of brigades SPIBOR, GRUZEL and CHERNITSKY, regimental commanders - all without exception were members of the POV), who created POV groups in various parts of the division.

Defeatist work during the Soviet-Polish war

Since the beginning of 1919, the main field of activity of the Moscow POV organization has become the Western Front, where the organization, using the presence of a number of its members in leading positions at the front headquarters (UN SHLICHT - a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front, MUKLEVICH - the commissar of the front headquarters, STASHEVSKIY - head of the intelligence department Headquarters of the Front, BUDKE HIV - Commissar of the Headquarters of the 16th Army), in the Special Department of the Front (BEAR, OLSKII, POLICHKEVICH, CHATSKIY), in the government bodies of Belarus (TSIKHOVSKY - Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Litbel Republic), - widely launched work aimed at defeat of the Red Army and facilitating the capture of Belarus by the Poles.

The first, largest act of the organization's activities on the fronts

was the surrender of Vilna to the Poles, committed by UNSHLICHT, who seized the leadership of the defense of the Litbelrepublic.

In various parts of the Western Front, the organization concentrated a significant number of its supporters, gathering them from various parts of the country, under the guise of mobilizing Poles-"communists" to the front, planted its people in various Soviet institutions of the front and headed the work of the local organization " POV" in Belarus ("KN-1"), created by the Poles independently of the Moscow center.

Subsequently, throughout the entire period of the Soviet-Polish war, the organization under the leadership of UNSHLICHT not only supplied the Polish command with all the most important information about the plans and actions of our army on the Western Front (UNSHLICHT handed over to the Poles a plan of attack on Warsaw), but carried out systematic work to influence on the operational plans of the front in the direction necessary for the Poles and launched extensive sabotage and insurrectionary work on the rear of the Western Front.

In the light of the facts now established by the investigation, there is absolutely no doubt that the POV organization, which is being liquidated, headed by UNSHLIKHT, played a major role in disrupting the Red Army's offensive against Warsaw.

310

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

During the Civil War, along with active sabotage and rebel activity, extensive nationalist work among the local Polish population was carried out by local POV organizations created independently of the Moscow center of the POV in Belarus ("KN-1"), in Ukraine ("KN-3"), in Siberia and other places.

After the end of the Soviet-Polish war, local POV organizations were reorganized in accordance with peacetime conditions, and the leadership of all their anti-Soviet activities was concentrated in the Moscow POV center, which launched a wide-ranging fascist nationalist work that is still ongoing among the Polish population of the USSR.

Particularly active since the end of 1920, the widespread introduction of Polish agents to the leading positions of the entire system of party and Soviet institutions for work among the Polish population of the USSR and the use of this system to carry out the work of the "POV" began.

Members of the POV GELTMAN and NEYMAN infiltrate the posts of secretaries of the Politburo under the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), VNOROVSKY, VONSOVSKII, MAZE PUS - in the Poliburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus, SKARBEEK, LAZOVERT and others - in the Poliburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, LOMBAL' as editor of the Tribuna Radziecka newspaper in Moscow, PRINTS and ZHARSKY as editors of a Polish newspaper in Minsk, other members of the POV seize leadership in the editorial offices of Polish newspapers in Ukraine, in the Polish sections of the People's Commissariat of Education, Polish publishing houses, technical schools, schools and clubs in various localities THE USSR.

Taking advantage of their official position, the right to distribute personnel, GELTMAN and NEYMAN sent members of the POV from Moscow, covering

who were sent by party card for party, cultural, educational, pedagogical, economic work in the most diverse regions of the USSR, where there is only a Polish population, not only to Ukraine, Belarus and Leningrad, but also to the Urals, Siberia, the Far East, where the Polish intelligence is active, hitherto undiscovered work in contact with Japanese intelligence.

The organization actively used its introduction into this system of party-Soviet institutions to create local grass-roots POV groups and launch broad chauvinist and Polonist work, which continues to this day and aims primarily at training subversive and insurgent personnel and armed anti-Soviet speeches in case of war.

The same goals were pursued by the creation under the influence of the POV of Polish national village councils and areas in the border zone, often in areas with a minority of the Polish population, which also provided the POV with one of the opportunities for Polonization work among Ukrainians and Belarusian Catholics.

The POV made extensive use of its penetration into the system of Soviet party institutions for work among the Polish population to carry out all-round espionage work through its mass agents in various parts of the country.

In its practical sabotage, espionage, terrorist and defeatist work on the territory of the USSR, Polish intelligence makes extensive use of, above all, Trotskyite hirelings and right-wing traitors.

DOCUMENTATION

311

In 1931, UNSHLIKHT and MUKLEVICH, having contacted the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center, represented by PYATAKOV, and then with KAMENEV, agreed with them on the joint wrecking subversive work of the members of the Trotskyist POV of the Zinoviev POV in the national economy of the country and, in particular, in the military industry .

In September 1932, the UNSHLIKhT also came into contact with the center of right-wing traitors, having received BUKHARIN's consent to unite the sabotage and sabotage work of the rights and the POV.

Finally, in 1933, with the knowledge of PYATAKOV, the UNSCHLICHT contacted the traitor TUKHACHEVSKY, received from him information about his relations with the German fascists, and agreed with him on joint actions aimed at the elimination of Soviet power and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. . UNSHLICHT agreed with TUKHACHEVSKY on supplying the latter to Polish intelligence with the most important espionage information on the Red Army and on opening our Western Front to the Poles in case of war.

All local POV organizations carried out anti-Soviet work in the closest connection with the Trotskyists, rightists and various anti-Soviet nationalists.

tic organizations in the Ukraine, Belarus, and other places.

Spy work of Polish intelligence in the USSR

Regardless of the espionage work of its lower ranks, the Moscow POV center carried out, right up to liquidation, the systematic supply of Polish intelligence with all the most important information about the military, economic and political situation of the USSR, including the operational-mobilization materials of the Red Army headquarters, to which UNSHLIKHT, MUKLEVICH, BUDKEVICH, BRONKOVSKY, LONGVA and other members of the Moscow center had access according to their official position.

Parallel to this, the Moscow POV center and residents of the 2nd department of the PGSH conducted a large-scale recruitment of spies from among non-Polish elements. UNSHLIKHT, for example, in 1932 recruited the head of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army Efimov for Polish intelligence and received from him comprehensive information about the state of the artillery weapons of the Red Army. Another member of the Moscow POV center, PESTKOVSKY, carried out a number of recruiting activities in the Comintern, scientific institutes and other institutions, moreover, he recruited mostly non-Poles directly for Polish intelligence, as such, and only in some cases for the POV, since the Warsaw center authorized the organization to be included in In some cases, non-Polish elements (Russians, Ukrainians) also appear in the POV. A large spy network in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was created by LOGANOVSKY.

Particularly large recruiting work was carried out by the resident of the 2nd department of the PGSH I. SOSNOVSKY and his deputy for residency, lieutenant colonel of the 2nd department V. VITKOVSKY.

SOSNOVSKY recruited and used pom. early The intelligence unit of the Red Army KARINA (who turned out to be a German agent since 1916), pom. early Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army MEYER, Assistant Prosecutor of the USSR PRUSS, Deputy. early Dmitrovsky camp of the NKVD Puzitsky and a number of other persons who held senior positions in the Red Army, the OGPU-NKVD and central government agencies.

V. VITKOVSKII, introduced by SOSNOVSKII into the Cheka in 1920, was later transferred to espionage work in transport and the governing bodies of the national economy, where by the time of his arrest he had created a large sabotage and espionage network, consisting mainly of specialists.

312

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

A serious channel for the penetration of the Polish spy agents into the Red Army, which has survived to this day, was the so-called "Red Communards" school that existed in Moscow from 1920 to 1927 (before it was disbanded, it was called the Unshlikht United Military School).

This military school, especially in the first period of its existence, was completed at the expense of the Poles, who were sent to it mainly

Polish bureau at the central and local party bodies. Members of the POV who had infiltrated the Polish Bureau sent members of the organization to the school, as well as career agents of Polish intelligence who remained in the USSR under the guise of prisoners of war from the period of the Soviet-Polish war who did not want to return to Poland or who arrived under the guise of defectors; in the school itself there was a strong POV group that carried out independent recruitment work.

The school trained officers of the infantry, cavalry and artillery specialties, who were sent to the most diverse parts of the Red Army, where, naturally, Polish spies who graduated from school also ended up.

Communication with Warsaw was carried out by the organization on a regular basis using the most diverse and diverse methods.

Prominent representatives of the Warsaw POV center and the 2nd department of the Polglavshstab regularly came to the USSR, who contacted UN SHLICHT, PESTKOVSKY, SOSNOVSKY, VITKOVSKY, BORT NOVSKY and others.

These representatives came to the USSR under various official pretexts (as diplomatic couriers, to audit Polish diplomatic institutions, on commercial matters), under personal cover (as tourists, to visit relatives, in transit), and also illegally. Especially for constant contact with SOSNOVSKY and OLSKII, the Polish military attache in Moscow included officers of the 2nd department of the Main Staff KOVALSKI and KOBILYANSKY sent from Warsaw, who were close to PILSUDSKY, meetings with whom were legalized by fictitious recruitment by OLSKII and SOSNOVSKI for OGPU.

A number of members of the organization had secret connections with the Polish military attaché in Moscow and other members of the embassy residency (VISLYAK, BUDKEVICH, LOMBAL', NAUIOKAITIS, KONITS, and others).

Other participants in the POV, who had made their way to positions that gave them the opportunity of official meetings with the staff of foreign embassies, used these meetings for intelligence communications (LOGANOVSKY - at official receptions, MORSHTYN - for work in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, PESTKOVSKII - in various Polish-Soviet commissions, etc.).

Members of the organization who were on Soviet official or covert work abroad contacted representatives of the POV and the 2nd department of the Primary School of Civil Aviation (LOGANOVSKY, BARANSKY and others in Warsaw, BORZHOZOVSKY G. - in Finland, Czechoslovakia and Japan, LESHCHINSKY - in Copenhagen, BUDKEVICH in France, etc.).

Finally, a number of large residents (SOSNOVSKY, PESTKOVSKY) had complex ciphers and passwords for communication.

Through all these communication channels, all obtained espionage information and information about the activities of the organization were systematically transmitted to Warsaw, and from the main center of the POV and the 2nd department of the PGSH received funds and directives on the direction of the organization's active activities.

313

Wrecker and sabotage work of Polish intelligence

in the national economy of the USSR

Immediately after the end of the Civil War, Polish intelligence, through the Moscow center of the POV and along other parallel lines, began sabotage work, aimed in the first period at disrupting the restoration of the industry of the USSR.

In 1925, M. SOKOLNITSKY, a representative of the Warsaw POV center, who came to Moscow, handed over to UNSHLIKHTU a directive to intensify wrecking work, soon supplemented by an instruction to switch to sabotage operations.

In accordance with these directives, the Moscow center of the POV launched and carried out, until its liquidation, extensive sabotage and sabotage activities aimed at undermining the defense capability of the USSR.

A number of the most prominent members of the POV were introduced into the governing bodies of the Red Army and the Red Army Fleet, as well as into civilian institutions in charge of the country's defense (the headquarters of the Red Army, the Directorate of the Naval Forces, the defense, transport and metallurgy sectors of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, Glavmorprom, etc.).

In 1925, a military-economic department of the mobilization department was formed at the headquarters of the Red Army.

A member of the POV BOTNER S., who was at the same time a member of the Polish espionage and sabotage group GORBATYUK, was introduced into this department for leadership work.

Together with the last BOTNER S.O. launched serious wrecking work in Mobupre of the headquarters of the Red Army, designed to prepare for the defeat of the Soviet Union in the upcoming war.

Thus, when working out mobilization problems, the group, by shifting the focus of attention to the issues of providing rear services, sabotagely cut off the requests of the army itself for wartime as allegedly overstated. The terms of the mobilization deployment of industry were extended to a year or more, which, in essence, left a number of enterprises unprepared for defense. The resolution of the issues of providing the Red Army with military equipment and the improvement of the latter were systematically frustrated.

In 1927, the Defense Sector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR was created, which plays a major role in preparing the country's defense, mobilizing industry and transport.

In order to seize this most important area in their hands, the Moscow center of the POV introduced the above-mentioned BOTNER into the Defense Sector of the State Planning Commission, and then, with his and UNSCHLIKHTA's assistance, members of the POV KOLESINSKY V.A., MUKLEVICH Anna, SHI RINSKY Zaslav penetrated there and others, and in 1931 UNNILIKHT himself, who held the post of deputy. Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. These persons, in turn, have again involved in the organization a number of responsible employees of the Defense Sector.

In its practical activities, the organization sought primarily to undermine the development of the military industry.

Initially, the members of the organization openly opposed the construction of military factories under the pretext that it was expensive and unsustainable, wreckingly recommending that military production be established in civilian industry.

In this activity, UNSHLIKhT, KOLESYNSKY, BOTNER and others blocked themselves with the anti-Soviet Trotskyist group SMIL GI in the Supreme Economic Council.

314

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

In the future, from risky open speeches against military construction, the organization switched to more disguised methods of undermining the Soviet defense base.

When the Defense Sector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR was working out plans for the capital construction of the military industry, the members of the organization deliberately squandered funds on many construction projects and did not provide the decisive construction projects with the necessary funds. As a result, the construction of military plants was stretched out over long periods, incompetence was created in the capacity of individual workshops, and the practice of unplanned construction was encouraged.

In this regard, the disruption of the construction and reconstruction of ammunition factories, which, in combination with other wrecking actions, was aimed at creating a "shell shortage" for the duration of the war, is especially characteristic.

In a number of regions, for example, in the Urals, only shell factories were built, while there were no shell factories. This has led and continues to lead to the fact that the production of shell cases is located at a distance of several thousand kilometers from the places where they can receive equipment. In those cases when the construction of equipment factories was nevertheless carried out, its development was deliberately slowed down, and the facilities serving the equipment factories (water, steam, energy, sewerage) were disorganized.

Also, the construction and reconstruction of factories for the production of shell cases was deliberately disrupted. UNISHIIKhT, KOLESINSKY, BOTNER, in practical contact with the Trotskyist organization in industry (Pyatakov, Smilga, Yerman, Yarozhevsky), deliberately confused the capacity of these plants, delayed their construction and reconstruction.

A similar situation took place with the production of gunpowder. During the development of the plan for the construction of new gunpowder factories in the Defense Sector of the State Planning Commission, UNISHIIKhT, KOLESINSKY, BOTNER accepted and put into practice RATAICHAK's sabotage installations, in particular, calculations of capacities according to outdated standards. At the same time, sabotage went along the line of delaying the construction of new facilities (for example, Aleksinsky

gunpowder factory of the Moscow region), disorganization of the servicing economy of gunpowder factories and disruption of the reconstruction of old gunpowder factories (Kazan No.-40, named after Kosyakov, etc.).

In terms of planning, the organization deliberately underestimated the plans for consumption in metals for military orders, gave false, deliberately underestimated information about the production capacities of the military industry, proving that the plans for the orders of the Voenved for the military industry were unrealistic, and reduced mobilization orders to the maximum. Military Veterinary Affairs and the NKPS, as a result of which, from year to year, the underfulfillment of defense construction programs and the shortage of mobilization

stocks.

Plans for providing the mobilized industry with a labor force were not developed at all for a number of years.

Despite the shortage in providing military industries with non-ferrous metals in wartime, measures to replace non-ferrous metals were hampered in the same way as the development of the industry of rare metals.

Separate areas of mobilization training in the Defense Sector of the State Planning Commission were deliberately left abandoned, in particular, mobilization training in the field of health and agriculture.

DOCUMENTATION

315

Personally, UNSHLIKHT, with the help of the Trotskyite YEMSHANOV recruited by him for Polish intelligence, carried out significant wrecking work in the transport sector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR.

These sabotage actions were aimed at disrupting the delivery of raw materials to factories, disrupting the export of finished products and were carried out by setting deliberately low standards and indicators. The necessary repair of the transport system was systematically thwarted by cutting down on the demands of the NKPS for metal. The elimination of bottlenecks in transport was artificially hampered by the sabotage distribution of appropriations when approving the title lists of capital work in transport.

The plan for mobilization transportation in rail transport for a long period of time was drawn up in such a way that with the declaration of war, economic transportation should almost completely stop, which meant a disruption in the mobilization of industry and the normal life of the rear of the country.

The most serious wrecking and sabotage work was carried out in the system of the Navy and Glavmorprom by one of the leaders of the POV - MUK LEVICH R.A.

From the moment of his appointment as chief of the naval forces of the RKKF in 1925, MUKLEVICH began to energetically put together anti-Soviet cadres to use them in the work of the POV.

MUKLEVICH involved his deputy Zinov'ev P. I. Kurkov, who was a member of the anti-Soviet organization in the navy, to the wrecking work, and through him used this group in the interests of the POV.

MUKLEVICH's wrecking work in the Navy began with the slowdown in the construction of torpedo boats, patrol ships, and the first series of submarines. MUKLEVICH entrusted the design of these vessels to IGNAT'EVU, who headed the group of pests in the scientific and technical committee. The terms for the design and construction of these ships approved by the Revolutionary Military Council were violated and changed without permission. The ships laid on the stocks were riveted several times and shifted again. Orders for equipment were placed untimely and incomplete.

In 1934, having moved to the position of head of the Glavmorprom, MUKLEHIV, he formed a wrecking and sabotage organization there, without losing contact with the anti-Soviet organization in the RKKF.

MUKLEVICH involved more than 20 leading employees of the shipbuilding industry from among the Trotskyists, Zinovievists and anti-Soviet specialists into the wrecking organization in the system of naval shipbuilding. With their help, MUKLEVICH launched extensive wrecking and sabotage activities in the Glavmorprom and at the shipbuilding industry.

As a result of this activity, the construction and commissioning of a number of ships and submarines to the Military Veterinarian was delayed. In particular, the delivery of submarines for the Far East this year has been thwarted by delaying the production of diesel engines. In the submarine "Malyutka" the size has been sabotagely increased, making it impossible to transport it by rail. The construction of serial destroyers was thwarted. On destroyer leaders, the ship's hull is made too light, which hinders the use of stern artillery. On cruisers, anti-aircraft artillery is placed in such a way that it cannot be brought into battle at the same time. The preparation of stocks for laying down battleships at the Nikolaev plants was disrupted.

316

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

By agreement with the anti-Soviet organization in the RKKF, the testing of already finished ships was systematically hampered, and they were not put into operation.

Along with widespread sabotage, MUKLEVICH also prepared sabotage on acts.

Thus, in particular, at the direction of MUKLEVICH, members of the organization in the marine shipbuilding industry, STRELTSOV and BRODSKII, were to organize the decommissioning of the large stocks of the Baltic Shipbuilding Plant. This sabotage was planned to be carried out either by shorting the electrical wires, which are in large numbers on the scaffolding surrounding the stocks, or by organizing an explosion. However, MUKLEVICH failed to carry out this diversion.

The decommissioning of a number of large military factories in Les was also being prepared.

Ningrad, including part of the units of the Kirov Plant, whose assistant director, Leon Markovsky, was also a member of the POV.

Sabotage groups at the largest aviation (Plant No. 22, Perm Aviation Plant, etc.) and artillery plants (named after Molotov, "Barricades", Tula, Kiev Arsenal) in the chemical industry were created by LOGANOVSKII, BUDNYAK, ARTAMONOV, BARANSKY and others.

The largest base for a sabotage network in industry is made up of defectors and emigrants from Poland, who settled mainly in the Urals and Siberia. Since, however, these categories have been purged from the main defense enterprises in recent years, the Polish intelligence and POV recruited various non-Polish elements working in the defense industry and have not been exposed to this day in order to create a highly secret subversive network.

The sabotage work of Polish intelligence in transport was concentrated mainly on the railways of the Western Theater of War and the Siberian Railway, mainly in the Ural sector, with the aim of cutting off the Far East from the central part of the Union. However, the opening of Polish sabotage groups in transport has not yet been deployed at all.

In a number of cases, in order to check the readiness of the sabotage network created for wartime, the organization carried out acts of sabotage in a number of places.

Thus, a member of the POV organization in the Dnepropetrovsk region, VEIKHT, on the instructions of the Ukrainian POV center, carried out a sabotage act at the Kamenskaya power plant, during which the station was completely destroyed.

Terrorist work of Polish intelligence

On directives from Warsaw, UNSHLICHT, PESTKOVSKY, MAKOVSKY, DOMBAL', VISLYAK, MATUSHEVSKY and others, together with the Trotskyists, led preparation of central terrorist acts.

So, for example, MATUSHEVSKY created a POV group in the apparatus of the Moscow police, involved in it, together with SHIPROVSKY (former secretary of the party committee of the police), a large number of police officers (including non-Poles), who carried out their subversive activities in various areas militia service (external service, communications, metro security, militia komvuz).

According to the directives of DOMBAL, MATUSHEVSKY and SHIPROVSKY were preparing central terrorist acts, using the fact that the members of the group were guarding objects visited by members of the government.

The Polish agent Kaspersky (editor of the regional newspaper Kommunist), recruited by SOSNOVSKII in Saratov, was a member of a Trotskyist organization and was associated with the Saratov regional Trotskyist center

and, along with participation in his sabotage and wrecking work (a sabotage group at the plant of combines, lead batteries, plant-195, etc.), joined in the preparation of central terrorist acts.

SOSNOVSKY and PILLYAR were also in business contact with the regional Trotskyist center, who himself participated in the preparation of terrorist attacks.
ical acts.

The Saratov POV group, through the same KASPERSKY, was in touch with the anti-Soviet organization of the right in Saratov.

The now liquidated POV branch in the Dnepropetrovsk region was preparing central terrorist attacks together with the Trotskyist-Socialist-Revolutionary organization in Dneprodzerzhinsk, with which he also contacted all his sabotage and wrecking work.

Along with terrorist work at the present time, the Moscow POV center had a directive to prepare a number of combat groups for the commission of central terrorist acts at the time of a military attack on the USSR.

The work on the creation of such groups was carried out by a member of the Moscow center POV PESTKOVSKY.

Sabotage in Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence work

After the end of the Soviet-Polish war, the main cadre of the organization returned to Moscow and, using UNSCHLIKHTA's tenure as deputy chairman of the Cheka-OGPU, and then deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, began work to seize under his influence the decisive sectors of the activities of the Cheka-OGPU (PILLYAR - early 1940s). KRO VChK, SOSNOVSKII and his group in the KRO VChK, MEDVED - chairman of the Moscow Cheka, later replaced MESSING at the post of the OGPU PP in the LVO, LOGANOVSK, BARANSKY and a number of others in the system of INO VChK-OGPU-NKVD and the Intelligence Unit of the Red Army - BORTNOVSKY, etc.).

The work of the organization in the system of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army during all the years was directed mainly along the following lines:

1. Complete paralysis of our counterintelligence work against Poland, ensuring the successful work of Polish intelligence in the USSR with impunity, facilitating the penetration and legalization of Polish agents into the territory of the USSR and various sectors of the national economic life of the country.

PILLYAR, OLSKII, SOSNOVSKII and others in Moscow, Belorussia, MESSING, METSVTSD, YANISHEVSKY, SENDZIKOVSKII and others in Leningrad - systematically thwarted the activities of our bodies against Polish intelligence, saved local organizations of the POV from defeat, warning groups and individual members of the POV information about the activities of the POV that came from honest agents, filled the intelligence and information network with doubles who worked for the Poles, prevented arrests, and closed cases.

2. The capture and paralysis of all intelligence work of the NKVD and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army against Poland, the widespread and systematic misinformation of us and the use of our intelligence apparatus abroad to supply

Polish intelligence needed information about other countries and for anti-Soviet actions in the international arena.

Thus, a member of the POV STASHEVSKII, who was appointed by UNSCHLICHT to work behind the scenes, used his stay in Berlin in 1923 to

318

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

support of BRANDLER in order to disrupt and crush the proletarian uprising in Germany, while acting on the direct directives of UNSCHLICHT.

A member of the POV ZHBIKOVSKY, sent by BRONKOVSKY to work behind the scenes of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, carried out provocative work in order to complicate relations between the USSR and England.

According to the directives of UNSHLIKHTA, members of the organization LOGANOVSKY and BARANSKY used their stay on the line of the INO in Warsaw during the period of removal of Pilsudski from power under the cover of the OGPU of sabotage Pilsudczyk organizations that acted against the then government of the endeks in Poland, and prepared on behalf of the residency INO provocative attempt on the life of the French Marshal FOSCH during his visit to Poland in order to disrupt the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between France and the USSR.

3. Using the position of POV members in the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD for deep anti-Soviet work and recruiting spies.

I. SOSNOVSKY, an emissary of PILSUDSKY and a resident of the 2nd department of the PSG, widely used his position in the bodies to establish contact with various, mainly nationalist, anti-Soviet elements and led their subversive activities in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and other places.

However, perhaps the greatest harm was done to us by the theory and practice of passivity in counterintelligence work, persistently and systematically carried out by Polish spies who had penetrated the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD.

Taking advantage of the seizure of leading positions in our counterintelligence apparatus, the Polish spies reduced all his work to narrow defensive measures on our territory, did not allow work on the penetration of our counterintelligence agents into the centers of foreign intelligence and other active offensive counterintelligence activities. ~ stviy.

By frustrating and preventing the main method of counterintelligence work, which consists in transferring our struggle against foreign intelligence services to their own territory, the Polish spies in our organs have reached a position in which Soviet counterintelligence from the body entrusted by the proletarian state with the fight against foreign intelligence services and their activities in On the whole, for a number of the past years, it has been turned into a helpless apparatus chasing individual petty spies.

In the same cases when attempts of counterintelligence to go beyond the cordon

were made, they were used by Polish intelligence either to infiltrate their large agents in the USSR (the whole of SAVINKOVA), or to establish contact with the activities of anti-Soviet elements and activate them (the MOSKVICH-BOYAROV case, prof. ISYCHENKO and others).

Provocative work of Polish intelligence in the Communist Party of Poland

The penetration of large Polish agents into the Communist Party of Poland, the Polish section of the ECCI and the apparatus of the Comintern was predetermined by the fact that, when the Communist Party of Poland was formed at the end of 1918, a number of major members of the POV, who had previously been members of the PPS, were automatically included in its leadership. -Levice and the Polish Social Democracy, united in the formation of the Communist Party.

Regardless of this, the leading head of the POV, over the course of all subsequent years, systematically introduced its agents into the ranks of the Communist Party through various provocative measures, at the same time

DOCUMENTATION

319

used new agents from among the nationalist-minded intelligentsia who joined the communist movement, promoted these agents to the leading bodies of the party, in order to disintegrate them and use them in their own interests, and widely used political emigration and the exchange of political prisoners for the mass introduction of their agents in the USSR .

An example of the largest political provocation of the Pilsud region is the so-called "PPS opposition" created by the POV in 1919, the leadership of which, headed by ZHARSKY, LYANDE-VITKOVSKY, Witold STURM de SHIREM, consisted of the largest peowyak provocateurs. Having initially its task to prevent the retreat of the revolutionary elements from the PPS to the Communist Party, the "opposition", not being able to keep under its influence the working masses who had broken away from the PPS in 1920, merged with them into the Communist Party of Poland and took over a number of leaders

posts.

Another, the largest act of widespread political provocation already within the Polish Communist Party on the part of Pilsudchiki, who penetrated into its leadership, is the use of the influence of the Communist Party among the masses during Pilsudski's May coup in 1926, when these provocateurs put forward and implemented a policy of supporting Communist Party of Pilsudczyk's coup.

Anticipating that that part of the members of the POV who had penetrated the leadership of the Communist Party of Poland and were directly working to use the Communist Party to facilitate the Pilsudczyk coup (BARSKY, KOSTRZEVA, KRAJEVSKY, LYANDE-WITKOWSKI) would be compromised and removed from the leadership, the POV kept another group of members in reserve POV (headed by LESHCHINSKY), which outwardly stood aside from assisting the coup of 1926 and was intended to seize the leadership of the checkpoint after the failure of the BARSKY group.

After the May coup, in order to distract the working masses from opposing the establishment of a new fascist regime by PILSUDSKY and to weaken and disintegrate the Communist Party from within, the POV developed and carried out a plan for a broad factional struggle between the LESHCHINSKY group (the so-called "minority" in the CPT) and the VARSKY-KOSTRZHEVA group (the so-called "majority"). Both POV groups succeeded in drawing the masses of the Party into the factional struggle and paralyzed the work of the Party for a long time.

As a result, the POV group managed to seize the leadership of the party, headed by a member of the Moscow center of the POV LESHCHINSKY, who concentrated his work on further disintegrating the party and slowing down the revolutionary movement in Poland.

In recent years, all the efforts of the Warsaw and Moscow POV centers in relation to their work within the Communist Party of Poland have been aimed at disrupting the united and popular front in Poland and, mainly, at preparing to use the Communist Party for anti-Soviet actions during the Polish military attack on the USSR.

In this direction, UNSHLICHT and LESCHINSKY carried out special work on the use of party channels for the communication service of Polish intelligence during the war and developed a plan for a number of political provocative measures (presenting ultimatums to the Comintern and the CPSU (b) on behalf of the Communist Party of Poland on the inviolability of the "Polish independence", the issuance of anti-Soviet appeals to the working class of Poland, the split of the party, etc.).

320

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Beginning in 1920, and especially widely after the May coup, the POV used the channels of the Communist Party and the Polish section of the Comintern, which had been penetrated by such major members of the POV as SOKHATSKY-BRATKOVSKY, LESHCHINSKY, PRUKHNYAK, VERTINSKY, BRONKOVSKY and a number of others, for a systematic the transfer of sabotage and espionage agents of various scales to the USSR under the guise of political emigrants and political prisoners. So, under the guise of political prisoners, the Polish spies GTILLYAR, BUDZINSKY, NAUIOKAITIS, VYSOTSKY, DOMBAL, BELEVSKII were transferred to the USSR; as political emigrants - VIS LYAK, Heinrich LYAUER (headed the metallurgy sector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR), ZDZYARSKY, GENRIKHOVSKY, BRZHOZOVSKY and many tens and hundreds

nor other spies who penetrated the most diverse sections of the state apparatus, industry, transport and agriculture of the USSR.

Not only the Communist Party of Poland was used as a cover for spies and saboteurs. The agents of Polish intelligence were transferred to the USSR also under the cover of belonging to the communist parties of Western Belarus, Western Ukraine and other revolutionary organizations, in the very emergence of which Polish intelligence was actively involved for provocative purposes.

So, for example, the so-called. "Belorusskaya Gromada" - a mass peasant organization in Western Belarus - was actively

used by Polish intelligence and the fascist organization of Belarusian nationalists, existing in Vilna, to crush the peasant movement in Western Belarus and transfer their agents to the USSR.

The same mass organization as the "Independent Peasant Party" ("Independent Party of Khlopska") in native Poland was created by the largest provocateur - an officer of the 2nd department of the General Staff VOEVUDSKI specifically to intercept the movement of the revolutionary Polish peasantry and was also used to transfer agents to the USSR under the sight of "peasant" activists fleeing police persecution.

All materials of the investigation in the present case prove with exhaustive certainty that the overwhelming, absolute majority of the so-called. political emigrants from Poland are either members of the "POV" (natives of native Poland, including Polish Jews), or agents of the 2nd department of the Main Staff or the political police (Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc.).

Anti-Soviet work of Polish intelligence in Belarus and other areas of the USSR

The POV organization in Belorussia, headed recently by a member of the Moscow POV center BENEKOM, members of the Minsk POV center VONSOVSKII, KLISS, in addition, led by PILLAR, SOSNOVSKY, GELTMAN, DOMBAL through many channels, has established organic ties with the organization of Belarusian national fascists, the Trotskyist underground and the anti-Soviet organization of the right, as a result of which there was a single anti-Soviet conspiracy in Belarus, led by CHERVYAKOV, GOLODED, BENEK.

The united underground launched extensive wrecking and destructive work in Byelorussia, linked to the military plans of the Polish-German general staffs.

The subversive work of the united underground affected all sectors of the national economy of Belarus: transport, planning, fuel and energy

DOCUMENTATION _ 321

geographic economy, construction of new enterprises, all branches of light industry, agriculture, construction of state farms.

Over the past few years, the united underground, through the artificial spread of infectious diseases (meningitis, anemia, plague), has done a lot of work to destroy the livestock of pigs, horse livestock in Belarus, as a result of which over 30,000 horses were destroyed in the BSSR alone in 1936 .

In the course of its work to prepare for the capture of the Byelorussian SSR by the Poles, the united underground put forward and tried to carry out a sabotage project of draining the Polissya swamps, which are a natural obstacle against the offensive actions of the Polish army. At the same time, DOMBAL, who was developing the projects of the Great Dnieper in a sabotage spirit, included in the plan of work a deep-water canal project in Belarus, designed to open access for Polish military ships to Soviet territory.

Simultaneously with the wrecking work in the agriculture of the BSSR, the united underground was actively working to train insurgent cadets.

ditch and armed anti-Soviet uprising, widely practicing various methods of artificially inciting discontent among the population against the Soviet government (planned "excesses" during various economic campaigns in the countryside, taxation, illegal mass confiscations for non-payment of taxes, etc.) .

Communicating with Poland through many channels (through the Moscow center of the POV), the Minsk Polish Consulate, the Vilna center of the Belarusian national fascists and with the 2nd department of the Central Headquarters directly carried out espionage work, having a number of their connections in parts of the Belarusian military district and contact with the military fascist group of the traitor TUKHACHEVSKY, represented by UBOREVICH, a member of this group.

On the direct instructions of Zinoviev, the Trotskyite HESSEN organized a terrorist group from the members of the united underground, which was preparing an attempt against Comrade VOROSHILOV during his stay in Minsk in the autumn of 1936.

The NKVD of the BSSR launched its work on the liquidation of the leading head of the anti-Soviet united underground in Belarus on the basis of the minimum data obtained at the initial stage of the investigation in Moscow and the interrogation of previously arrested Belarusian national fascists, thus demonstrating the skillful operational use of small initial data. to defeat the organizing forces of the enemy.

Until now, work has been going on completely unsatisfactorily to eliminate the POV in the DVK, Siberia, the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions and in the Ukraine. Having in the period 1933-1935. exceptionally great opportunities for exposing the Peovyatsky underground (arrests of the SKARBEEK, STASYAK-KO NETSKIY group), the apparatus of the NKVD of Ukraine did not then deploy investigations to the necessary limit of fully exposing the activities of the POV in Ukraine, which was used by the spy SOS NOVSKY, who was then in the Special Department of the center, to failure localization in general.

While sending out collections of protocols of interrogation of UNSHLIKHTA and other arrested persons, I SUGGEST that all heads of operational departments of the GUGB and senior officials of 3 Departments familiarize themselves with this letter.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Published: Sudoplatov A.P. The secret life of General Sudoplatov: Truth and fiction about my father: In 2 books. Book. 1. - M.: Sovremennik: Olma-Press, 1998. S. 366-393.

322

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 168

CODE TELEGRAM G.F. GORBACH N.I. Ezhov
ON INCREASING THE LIMIT ON THE "KULAK" OPERATION
FOR THE OMSK REGION

August 15, 1937

No. 26212

As of August 13, 5,444 people were arrested in the Omsk region in the first category, and 1,000 weapons were seized.

I ask you to give instructions, in accordance with my letter No. 365, regarding an increase in the limit for the first category to 8,000 people.

GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 876. Copy. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "T. Yezhov. For increasing the limit to 8 thousand. I. Stalin".

No. 169

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ON THE ARREST OF "PESTS" IN THE CRIMEAN ASSR

August 16, 1937

No. 59204

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a memorandum from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Crimean ASSR Comrade. Pavlov dated July 24 of this year. and protocols of interrogations of members of the anti-Soviet organization of the right Tylman M.A. dated July 22 of this year. and Fomin FA. dated July 9 this year about the wrecking activities of the right in the agriculture of the Crimea.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security

In addition to No. 16854-16855 of July 22 p. At the same time, I am sending a copy of the protocol of interrogation of a member of the counter-revolutionary organization of rightists and Trotskyists, Deputy People's Commissariat of Crimea, Tylman MA.

Tylman shows that he arrived in the Crimea from Eastern Siberia, where he was a member of the k.r. organizations of the right, in 1935 in Simferopol he was recruited into the K.R. organization of right-wingers and Trotskyists by the head of the organization b. Secretary of the Crimean OK of the CPSU (b) Semenov B.A.

According to his testimony, the organization carried out extensive sabotage in agriculture, conducted sabotage and subversive activities, in particular, Tylman himself, in carrying out deliberately poor-quality repairs of combines, in disrupting the supply of fire-fighting equipment, prepared the conditions for the destruction of combines and crops. Tylman himself indicates 9 cases of fires of combines and crops. As a result of sabotage and wrecking work, more than 20 such facts have been registered in Crimea today.

DOCUMENTATION

323

Among the active participants in the c.r. organizations associated with him (Tylman) and Semenov, Tylman calls the beginning. political department of the state farm "Bolshevik" (Telmanovsky district of Crimea) Kozlov. According to your order, Kozlov has been arrested by us. They started interrogating him.

In connection with the fact that No. 16854 of July 22, we raised the question of the arrest of the leader of the Right-Trotskyite K.R. organization Semenov B.A., while enclosing a copy of the interrogation of a member of this organization b. Secretary of the Simferopol City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Fomin.

Fomin shows that the core of the organization was formed back in 1930 in Dnepropetrovsk, that in the Crimea the organization carried out active wrecking work in agriculture, the urban economy collapsed, and sabotage was carried out in industry. The leadership of the organization, as Fomin shows, belonged to Semenov and Olkhovy.

I ask you to authorize the arrest of Menkes, who is in Moscow, his address is probably known to the Kleiner secretariat, at whose disposal he left.

Appendix: copies of protocols of interrogations of Tylman and Fomin*.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Crimean ASSR major
of state security PAVLOV

July 24, 1937

No. 16877

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D 318. L. 78-80. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "Take Semenov. Olkhov take. Menkes (Kleiner secretariat) to take.

* Published without interrogation protocols.

No. 170

SPBTsSOOBShCHBNIB N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM D.M. DMITRIEV ON THE
"REBELLION" ORGANIZATION IN THE URALS

August 16, 1937

No. 59206

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the telegram to the beginning. UNKVD for the Sverdlovsk region comrade. DMITRIEV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the
USSR General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs Comrade Yezhov

According to the testimony of the arrested former Colonel of the General Staff EITNER, the former member of the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks YAN, the former head of the Kama state shipping company KANDALINTSEV, and the interrogation of the arrested kulaks, the existence of the Ural insurgent headquarters is established - the working body for preparing an armed uprising. The headquarters was created by the Ural block

324

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Trotskyists, rightists, socialist-revolutionaries, a white officer organization and a representative of a large insurrectionary organization, Metropolitan Peter KHOL MOGORTSEV. The idea of creating an insurgent headquarters belongs to KABAKOV, who, from the middle of 1935, negotiated through a number of persons with the Trotskyists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and other groups about the need to allocate a headquarters, after which the headquarters was created.

Colonel EITNER was connected with an agent of the ROVS, the headquarters captain of the SHKURO detachment - YEPIFANOV, who lives on illegal conditions. From the beginning of its inception (1929), the white officer organization was led by EPIFANOV. In the middle of 1925, Colonel EITNER contacted the former deputy commander of the URVO VASILENKO, who was associated with the said YEPIFANOV. VASILENKO invites EITNER to work in the Ural insurgent headquarters, connects him with WHEAT NJIM, who headed the work of the Ural insurgent headquarters.

The testimonies established that the insurgent headquarters included from the right: PSHENITSYN, a former Far Eastern partisan, KORMILOV, the former second secretary of the Sverdlovsk City Committee, from the Trotskyists: KORKIN and the famous partisan Nazar VASILEV, from the Socialist-Revolutionaries: AGAPOV, from the officer organization: VASILENKO and EITNER, from the clergy of the rebels: Metropolitan of Sverdlovsk KHOLMOGORTSEV. Subsequently, the headquarters was replenished with the partisan VETCHININ, the chairman of the Regional Consumer Union. By decision of the headquarters, the region was divided into 6 insurgent districts, at the head of which were the insurgent leaders. The following were created: the Komi-Permyatsky National District, Bereznikovskiy, which included the districts of Kivelovskiy and Sulinsky, Nadezhdenskiy, which included the districts of Verkho-Turskiy, Lyalinskiy, Gainskiy and Izdel. Perm district, which included 22 districts, Krasno-Ufimskiy, which included 18 districts. Sverdlovsk, which included 22 districts.

According to other indications, 7 rebel districts were created.

The primary insurgent formations were platoons, the organization of which was concentrated on collective farms. For every 4 platoons there was a representative from the head of the insurgent district. In order to purchase weapons, GOLOVIN recruited the Chairman of the regional Osoaviakhim, Vasiliev. Further, for this purpose, brigade commander BLUM, head of artillery of the URVO, was involved in the activities of the headquarters in order to obtain weapons on artillery

district warehouses.

Colonel EITNER names the composition of the white officer organization. The organization has poisons at its disposal in order to spread infectious diseases with anthrax, cholera, glanders, which, at the time of the appearance of insurgent detachments, infect drinking sources, train cars. Part of the poisons was used in the Ishim region to spread septic tonsillitis. <...>

August 13

No. 918

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 318. L. 97. Original. Typescript.

DMITRIEV

- The cipher telegram is partially published.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "To T. Yezhov. Dmitriev seems to act sluggishly. It is necessary to immediately arrest all (th small and large) participants
"rebel
groups" in the Urals. St.".

DOCUMENTATION

325

No. 171

NOTE I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOV ON
INCREASING THE LIMIT ON THE "KULAK" OPERATION
FOR THE KRASNOYARSK REGION

August 20, 1937

Give an additional 6,600 people to the Krasnoyarsk Territory. limit for the 1st category. "For" I. St., V. Molotov.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 88a. Script. Manuscript.

No. 172

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE ADDITION OF THE TROIKA IN THE KOMI ASSR (49)

August 21, 1937

732 - On anti-Soviet elements (PB dated 10.VII.37, pr. No. 51, p. 199).

Approve the decision of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Komi ASSR to increase the composition of the commission for checking anti-Soviet elements to 4 people and the approval of the fourth member of the commission, Comrade Fedchenko I.A.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 91. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov, Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Komi ASSR.

No. 173

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON KOREANS"

August 21, 1937

734 - On the Koreans (Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR).

In order to prevent the penetration of Japanese espionage into the FEC, take the following measures:

1. Propose to the Far Eastern Regional Committee, the Regional Executive Committee and the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory to evict the entire Korean population of the border regions of the Far East: Posyetsky, Molotovskiy, Grodekovskiy, Khankaysky, Khorolsky, Chernigovskiy, Spassky, Imakovskiy, Postyshevskiy, Bikinskiy, Vyazemskiy, Khabarovskiy, Suifunskiy, Kirovskiy, Kalininskiy, Lazo, Svobodnenskiy, Blagoveshchenskiy, Tambov, Mikhailovskiy, Arkharinskiy, Stalinskiy and Blucherovo and resettled in the South Kazakhstan region in the areas of the Aral Sea and Balkhash and the Uzbek SSR. The eviction should start from the Posyetsky district and the districts adjacent to Grodekovo.

2. To proceed with the eviction immediately and complete by January 1, 1938.

3. Allow Koreans to be resettled to take with them property, household equipment and livestock during the resettlement.

326

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

4. Compensate the resettlers for the cost of their movable and immovable property and crops left behind.

5. Do not create obstacles for the resettled Koreans to leave, if desired, abroad, allowing for a simplified procedure for crossing the border.

6. The NKVD to take measures against possible excesses and unrest on the part of the Koreans in connection with the eviction.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 139. L. 1-2. Script. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

No. 174

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM L.N. BELSKY

August 26, 1937

No. 59418

Top secret

Tov. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the telegram to Comrade. BELSKY.

I ask for sanctions for the arrest of MARKITAN

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

Top secret

GOLUBYATNIKOV, who was arrested by us, was a former People's Commissar of Public Utilities of the Ukrainian SSR, previously the chairman of the Chernigov Regional Executive Committee, testified that he was a member of an anti-Soviet nationalist organization that carried out active wrecking work in industry and agriculture, named a number of members of the organization, including MARKITAN - Secretary of the Chernigov Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) . It has been organizationally connected with the latter since 1932.

GOLUBYATNIKOV recruited KUZMENKO, the former People's Commissariat for Forestry of the Ukrainian SSR (arrested), KRIKHA, the former Narkomsovkhoz (arrested) and others. According to the testimony of GOLUBYATNIKOV, MARKITAN was organizationally connected with Khvylya and PORAIKO. MARKITAN is also being held, according to the testimony of KURYATNIKOV, the former head of the seed department of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, as a member of the right-wing organization since 1927.

I ask for sanctions for the arrest of MARKITAN.

BELSKY

August 23, 1937

No. 2442

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 319. L. 66-67. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "For the arrest of Markitan."

DOCUMENTATION

327

No. 175

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.S. LYUSHKOVA ABOUT
"DOCTORS-CONVERTERS"

August 27, 1937

No. 59442

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the telegram from the head of the UNKVD for the Far Eastern Territory,
comrade. LYUSHKOV No. 7230/7231 dated 25/8/8/2019

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

Based on your instructions No. 505, I took steps to identify the doctors of the conspirators. In this regard, the cases and additional testimony of the former head of the health service OKDVA KOROEDOV, who was a member of the military-Trotskyist organization, were of interest, was dedicated to ARON SHTAMM about the need to remove Blucher from the army.

SANGURSKY, LAPIN, and ARONSHTAM repeatedly instructed KOROEDOV to draw up a fictitious medical report on the signs of a mental disorder in BLUKHER in order to send the report to Moscow. To this end, they tried to use BLUCHER's disease in 1935, however, KOROYEDOV did not restrain this, fearing an alleged failure. In 1936, ARONSHTAM again had a special conversation with KOROYEDOV, convincing him of the need to remove BLUKHER, referring to the fact that authoritative persons in Moscow, including GAMARNIK, wanted this. To facilitate the task, SANGURSKY offered to attach to BLUCHER a member of the organization, doctor BENDERSKY, the head of the Khabarovsk hospital.

KOROYEDOV also shows about the great sabotage work to disrupt the sanitary preparation of the OKDVA, in the event of a war, carried out by him on the instructions of the head of the Investigative Committee of the Red Army BARANOV, he names as members of the organization RAINER - the deputy head of the Investigative Committee of the Red Army and workers of the same Investigative Committee of the Red Army MOGILEVICH and SIVERS Special attention deserves the testimony of Koroedov about the bacterial-sabotage work of the organization. In 1936, at the direction of BARANOV and RAINER, cotton wool contaminated with tetanus bacillus, gas gangrene, and non-sterile dressings were sent to the army. BARANOV warned KOROYEDOV and POLISCHUK, the head of the sanitary service of the Pacific Fleet (a member of the organization), about the distribution of contaminated material. Subsequently, having been afraid of an alleged failure, BARANOV gave instructions on the production of a complete sterilization of these materials. POLISCHUK accepted these materials, as a result, 2 fighters of the Olginsk fortified area died. Frightened by the failure, POLISCHUK explained the death of the fighters with false causes. A fuss was raised around this case, but POLISCHUK took com under his protection. Fleet VICTOROV.

KOROYEDOV shows about participation in the organization SCHREIBER, head. regional health department, and BARON, head. Khabarovsk Regional Health Department. With their participation, wrecking was carried out, which led to a serious state of sanitation. harrow readiness of the region. SCHREIBER carried out sabotage work through the Far East Sanitary and Epidemiological Institute with the help of doctor ANTONOV, a member of the organization, working there. In the spring of 1937, the Institute produced a wreckingly manufactured

328

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

a vaccine that gave a great incidence and even death of one commander. The command suspended the vaccination and conducted an investigation together with the district executive committee. Obvious sabotage was established, but KRUTOV and SCHREIBER covered up this sabotage act and limited themselves to removing ANTONOV from work.

I ask for sanctions *for the arrest of SCHREIBER, BARON, POLISCHUK, ANTONOV*. I suppose to conduct a thorough search at the Epidemic Institute during the arrest, in order to detect bacteria for sabotage purposes. Bendersky was arrested by us earlier. We carefully interrogate him and KO ROYEDOV in order to reveal all the circumstances and accomplices in the preparation of a fictitious medical report on BLUCHER's disease.

LYUSHKOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 319. L. 115-118. Script. Typescript.

On the margins there is a note: "For the arrest. St.". underlined in
__ pencil.

No. 176

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ON THE DETENTION OF THE POLISH AGENT

August 27, 1937 No. 59445 Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

August 22 this year At 4 pm, an unknown person, who called himself BONDARUK Pyotr Ivanovich, appeared at the NKVD pass office and stated that a few days ago he had been illegally transferred to the USSR by political intelligence for espionage work.

BONDARUK said that he was recruited by the police intelligence agencies in the city of Vilna and transferred to the USSR with tasks: to study the procedure for obtaining passports by Soviet citizens, entering and dismissing from service, to study life in the cities of the USSR and settle down to live in the city of Stalino so that in a year

return to Vilna and work in intelligence to instruct spies sent to the USSR.

BONDARUK presented passport MR No. 600610, issued by the IZO at the 7th department of the RK militia in Moscow, and several other documents on service in Moscow institutions. The series and number of the passport and other documents presented by BONDARUK were known to us as being used by police intelligence in a number of cases of detention of police agents with similar documents.

BONDARUK explained his voluntary appearance in the NKVD by his unwillingness to work for the police intelligence agencies.

BONDARUK's statements about the assignment with which he was transferred to the USSR, and the deliberate rudeness of the forgery found in the documents he presented, caused us doubt, as a result of which Bondaruk was subjected to a thorough interrogation, as a result of which he admitted that he had come to the NKVD on assignment polrazvedki, and showed:

His real name is MALINOVSKY Stanislav Rudolfovich, born in 1911, a native of the city of Vitebsk, permanently resided in Vilno, a wandering artist.

MALYNOVSKY was recruited by the political intelligence in Vilna in December 1936 and in January 1937 he was sent to Warsaw for special intelligence.

DOCUMENTATION

329

Internship courses, where for 6 months he studied: photography and radio business, the practice of radio communication, the Russian language and got acquainted with the conditions of life in the USSR. In addition, MALINOVSKII studied a number of methods of cryptography and a special code, both for its use in cryptography and for radiograms.

MALINOVSKY further testified that when he was transferred to the USSR, he received an order from the police intelligence agencies to report to our agencies with a cover story.

After legalization, MALINOVSKY was supposed to recruit people for espionage work and organize radio communications with political intelligence. During the transfer, MALINOVSKY received 3,500 rubles from the intelligence service.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 92-93. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "Find out through which point of our border Malinovsky was transferred? I. St.

No. 177

CODE TELEGRAM SOBOLEV I.V. STALIN AND N.I. Ezhov

ABOUT THE FIRE AT THE MILL

August 27, 1937

No. 1687/sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, vol. STALIN, EZHOV

From Kansk. On August 25, a fire broke out at the Kansk mill, all the equipment burned down. The granary of the plant stored 5 thousand tons of grain, 3 thousand tons of flour. According to inaccurate estimates, at least 30% of the grain died, the flour was completely defended. Personal checks and checks by the NKVD authorities established the exceptional contamination of the plant by enemies. The preliminary investigation shows the evidence of sabotage. We force the corollary. I'll post the results later.

SOBOLEV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 57. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten resolution on the cipher telegram: "Krasnoyarsk. Regional Committee. Sobolev. The arson of the mill must be organized by the enemies. Take all measures to reveal the arsonists. Guilty judge quickly. The verdict is shooting. Publish about the execution in the local press. Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin.

No. 178

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON DMITRIEV"

August 27, 1937

785 - About Dmitriev (Bulatov's telegram).

Approve the decision of the Omsk regional committee on the dismissal of the head of the regional memory department Dmitriev and the transfer of his case to the NKVD.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 990. L. 69. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

330

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 179

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE OF
RESERVES INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESERVES UNDER THE SNK OF THE USSR"

August 28, 1937

824 - On the transformation of the Committee of Reserves in the Office of State Reserves under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

1. To transform the Committee of Reserves into the Department of State Reserves under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with the creation of the appropriate apparatus in the field.
2. To appoint comrade Rozengolts as head of the State Reserves Department under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
3. In view of the importance and secrecy of the case of state reserves, oblige the head of the State Department. Comrade Rozengolts reserves to select all employees without exception for the State Administration. Reserves together with the NKVD.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 990. L. 76. Original. Typescript.

Protocol N2 52.

No. 180

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON INCREASING THE LIMIT FOR
TROIKA IN THE ORENBURG REGION

August 28, 1937

828 - On anti-Soviet elements (PB dated 11.VII.37, pr. No. 51, p. 212).

To change the decision of the Central Committee of July 1, 1937, to allow the Orenburg Regional Committee to refer 3,500 repressed people to the first category.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 96. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

No. 181

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"THE QUESTION OF DALCRAIKOM"

August 28, 1937

830 - A question from Dalkraikom.

Approve the following decision of Dalkraikom:

1. To evict 11,600 Korean households from the border strip, and a total of 61,000 people.
2. From the districts of Posietsky, Suifunsky, Molotovskiy, Grodekovsky, Khankaysky, Khorolsky, Chernigov and Spassky, carry out eviction within a month.

DOCUMENTATION

331

3. Korean communists and Komsomol members living and working in this area, as well as the Korean intelligentsia (teachers, agronomists, doctors), all of them, on a common basis, should be resettled together with the rest of the Korean population in the Kazakh and Uzbek SSR.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 139. L. 96. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

No. 182

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM D.M. DMITRIEV ON THE
"GERMAN" OPERATION (50)

August 29, 1937

No. 59523

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the telegram No. 961 beginning. UNKVD for the Sverdlovsk region comrade. DMITRIEV on the progress of the investigation in the German case.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

People's Commissar VNUDEL - comrade. Ezhov

I am giving a more complete summary of the state of the investigation in the German case as of 25.8.

According to the testimonies of the arrested confessed German subjects and owls of the citizen, a very significant work of German intelligence in the Urals is being established.

Beginning in 1930, the German Reichswehr, later the GESTAPO and the National Socialist organization sent their agents to the Urals, set them the task of penetrating military enterprises and establishing contact with the Red Army. organizations, groups existing in the Urals.

German intelligence is switching its agents to work in the Urals, which had previously been used to decompose and illuminate the communist movement inside Germany ...

German intelligence attracted the director of plant number 98 to its activities

• MALYSHEV*, director of the Molotov gun factory * PREMUDRO VA *, director of the Verkhisetsky plant * KOLIULIKINA *, director of the military plant No. 10 * PETRASHKO *, director of the Berezniki chemical plant * PUCHKOV * and his deputy * RITSLIN, head of the Kaganovich railway * SHAKHGILDYAN *, Secretary of the Molotov City Committee * VYSOCHINENKO*, Chairman of the Molotov City Council * FEDORENKO*, and a number of other leaders. Espionage is widely organized at military enterprises - factories No. 98, 10, 172, 19 and others. The Germans received information about the nature of production, the size of production, the nomenclature of production, and other information. At the same time, a large sabotage organization was organized at the Uralmashzavod, Bereznikovsky, Solikamsk combines, at plant No. 10 and other enterprises.

332

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GU GB NKVD. 1937-1938

The organization broke machines, organized marriages, called, made accidents. Personnel were trained for destructive work during the war.

A number of new organizers of arsons at Uralmashzavod that took place in 1933 have been identified. At one time, the investigation established the guilt of the arson of the German citizen IOSTA, but now the participation of a whole group of German citizens in the preparations for the implementation of this arson is being established. A number of Soviet citizens directly involved in this arson have been identified.

It has been authentically established that VLADIMIROV, director of the Uralmashzavod, previously exposed by us as a member of the counter-revolutionary organization of the right, is a German intelligence officer. He was recruited during his stay in Germany in 1933, was in touch with the responsible employee of the German embassy "TENZEL ", the head of the National Socialist organization within the German embassy in Moscow. Residency at Uralmashzavod, which consisted of 14 German subjects, received from abroad for the deployment of espionage and sabotage work two hundred thousand rubles, which were distributed both among the Germans and among the fellow citizens involved.

The most active organizers in espionage activities from among the German subjects were the officers of the German Reichswehr, who systematically came from abroad with the tasks of the Reichswehr. As soon as they created small cells that could later independently conduct counter-revolutionary activities, the officers of the Reichswehr went abroad.

It has been established that the officer of the Reichswehr GRIMM, who arrived in Solikamsk in 1933, stayed there for about a year, created the necessary connections, after which he was sent by the Reichswehr to Belgium to launch destructive work ...

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 98-103. Script. Typescript.

*

The telegram is published partially.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Which of the named persons

arrested,
who is not arrested - it is impossible to understand from Dmitriev's message. Vladimirov should be arrested. St."

— Surnames are circled.

No. 183

CODE TELEGRAM A.Ya. STOLYAR I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
NEED TO ARREST VLADIMIROV

August 29, 1937

No. 1723/sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

In order to actually implement your instructions in the construction of Uralmash, to fulfill the defense plan, we consider it absolutely necessary to remove Vladimirov from work and arrest, thereby preventing the possibility of a major sabotage at the plant. We have indisputable data on the work of Vladimirov in German intelligence.

JOINER

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 59. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten resolution on the cipher telegram: "To Comrade Stolyar. I propose that Vladimirov be arrested immediately. I. Stalin.

DOCUMENTATION

333

No. 184

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON MESSING S.A."

August 31, 1937

848 - About Messing S.A. (Regulation dated 28.VIII.37, project No. 71, p. PbOrs).

Delete Messing S.A. from the Council under the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and a member of the Presidium of the Chamber of Commerce.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 990. L. 80. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

No. 185

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN WITH
THE APPENDIX OF THE REPORT OF S.G. ZHUPAKHINA

August 31, 1937

No. 59539

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I send a report to the Deputy early 2nd department of the GUGB NKVD comrade.
ZHUPAKHINA. The published book "Moscow in New Districts" is an excellent reference book for all
kinds of spies and saboteurs.

I consider it necessary to urgently withdraw this book from circulation.

I have been given the task of urgently investigating this case and bringing those responsible for the
publication of this book to justice.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Owls. secret

REPORT

I report that the book-reference book "Moscow in New Districts" published in 1936 by Gorplan
and GorUNKhU of Moscow, put on sale in 1937 with a circulation of 2,700 copies, contains information on
all districts of Moscow about each institution and enterprise separately with data on the staff, gross output
in rubles, electricity consumed in kilowatts and the number of major products produced.

This book contains information on areas that are not subject to disclosure, such as: the number of
primary party organizations, members and candidates of the CPSU (b) in them, the number of
workers and employees in Soviet institutions, the average population density per 1 hectare, as well
as information about enterprises and institutions.

Here are some excerpts from the book:

Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR (Administration of Affairs) - staff 192 people.
Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Management of Affairs) - 326 people.

Central Executive Committee of the USSR - staff 111 people; All-Russian Central Executive Committee - 321 people.

Of the paramilitary factories are:

1. Plant "Moselement" NKTP - personnel 1,193 people, including 985 workers, gross output for
12,506,000 rubles, energy consumption 801 kW.

334

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1939

2. Plant "Parostroy". Staff 939 people, including 676 workers, gross output 10,346,000 rubles, consumed electricity 1,387 kW. It manufactures 163 horizontal boilers and 267 vertical boilers.

3. Experimental plant No. 2. Personnel - 401 people, including 295 workers, gross output of 4,825,000 rubles, consumed electricity 270 kW. Produces Ford pistons - 84 pcs. and auto parts 59 pcs.

4. Experimental plant No. 1 of hard alloys. Staff - 32 people, including workers 26 people. Gross output for 1,236,000 rubles. The consumed electric power is 32 kW. It produces dielite 18 kg, stellite 141 tons.

5. Ordzhonikidze Electromechanical Plant. Personnel - 4,255 people, including 3,347 workers. Gross output for 77,381,000 rubles. The consumed electric power is 1,086 kW;

Given that this book is not limited in distribution, it can be used by enemies of the people for economic and military espionage.

Deputy early II Department of the GUGB
NKVD Major of State Security ZHUPAKHIN

August 26, 1937

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 105-107. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Yezhov. I am for the removal of the book, but at the same time on -

I'm standing up so that the authors of the book, who cleverly hid themselves, could be checked and arrested. I. St.

No. 186

CODE TELEGRAM SERGEEV A.A. ANDREEV ABOUT
"wrecking" AT SOYUZMUKA ENTERPRISES

September 1, 1937

No. 1757/sh Voroshilovsk

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. ANDREEV

A survey of Soyuzmuka enterprises in the Ordzhonikidzevsky Territory established sabotage by the manager of the trust, Claudius Ivanov:

1) Systematic decommissioning of mills through wrecking repairs, organization of accidents and sabotage.

2) Damage and destruction of good-quality grain, release of non-standard flour, clogging of flour with broken glass, nails, ropes, etc.

3) Wrecking in the field of safety engineering, as a result of which workers are systematically injured, poisoned - for 36-37 years. 7 workers died.

4) Wrecking in the field of personnel, the expulsion of young specialists by communists, the clogging of the apparatus with anti-Soviet alien elements.

The Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks asks to immediately resolve the issue of removing Ivanov from work and bring him to criminal liability.

SERGEEV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 68. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the telegram: "Ivanov is to be arrested. I. St. *. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T. Yezhov.

DOCUMENTATION

335

No. 187

CODE TELEGRAM R.I. EIKHE I.V. TO STALIN ON THE CANDIDATE
OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE TERRITORIAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

September 3, 1937

No. 1789/sh

Moscow. Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrade STALIN

We ask you to allow me to nominate comrade V.V. Maltsev Ivan Alexandrovich, party member since October 1917, worker. At present, Comrade Maltsev works as deputy head of the UNKVD for the West Siberian Territory.

EICHE

GUSEV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 68. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten resolution on the cipher telegram: "Novosibirsk. Eikhe, Gusev. In view of Comrade Yezhov's resolute protest, reject the proposal for Maltsev and suggest that Comrade Eikhe nominate another candidate for the post of Executive Committee of the West

Siberian Territory. I. Stalin*. No. 1435/sh 7.IX.37

No. 188

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS"

September 3, 1937

872 - On anti-Soviet elements

a) In a change to the decision of the Central Committee of 9.7.7.37, to approve the members of the troika for checking anti-Soviet elements in the Chernihiv region, vol. Mikhailov and Donchenko.

b) In order to expedite the consideration of cases on kulaks and the criminal element in Moscow and the Moscow region, allow the organization of a second troika consisting of: the chairman of the troika, deputy head of the UNKVD for the Moscow region, comrade Yakubovich, and members of the troika: secretary of the MK of the CPSU (b) comrade Tarasov and vr. Prosecutor of the City of Moscow Comrade Koblenz.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 99. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

The text contains a typewritten note about rassik: "Comrade. Yezhov - everything; Khrushchev - b; Central Committee of the CP(b)U, Chernihiv Regional Committee - a.

336

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 189

NOTE N.I. Ezhova, A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. STALIN
AND V.M. MOLOTOV ON EXPANDING
THE RIGHTS OF A SPECIAL MEETING

September 4, 1937

Top secret

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade I.V. STALIN

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

At present, the organs of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office are seizing and correspondingly repressing Polish defectors, former members of the PPS, who conduct anti-Soviet activities, etc. in the administrative order.

We believe that a sentence to imprisonment for ten years, in cases of the above category, should be issued through a Special Conference under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Based on the foregoing, we ask you to approve the following proposal:

"On cases of anti-Soviet activities of former Polish defectors

kov, former members of the teaching staff, etc. to allow the Special Conference under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to impose imprisonment for a term of up to ten years inclusive.

Y. EZHOV
A. VYSHINSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 157. Original. Typescript.

No. 190

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "QUESTION OF THE NKVD"

September 5, 1937

903 - Question of the NKVD.

On cases of anti-Soviet activities of former Polish defectors, former members of the PPS, etc. allow the Special Conference under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to impose imprisonment for a term of up to ten years inclusive.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 156. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yezhov, Vyshinsky.

No. 191

NOTE L.Z. MEHLIS TO THE SECRETARIES OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE EDITOR OF THE NEWSPAPER SOVIET TRADE

September 6, 1937

Top secret

The Press Department asks the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to remove V.A. Nodel.

The reasons for his dismissal are as follows:

1. The editor maintained a conciliatory position towards the leaders of the Tsentrosoyuz all the time, in fact not criticizing the trade organizations.

DOCUMENTATION

337

2. Nodel - an old active member of the Bund from 1915 to 1920. inclusive. He worked all the time under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Bund, edited the Bund

newspaper, etc.

3. Nodel was closely associated with Zelensky for literally a dozen years. He worked with Zelensky in Central Asia, in the Central Union. In 1933, Zelensky specially came to the purge of Nodel and praised him in every possible way.

4. In a number of statements, the name of Nodel is associated with the exposed double-dealers Olsky and Moroz. The Party organization rightly raises the question of Nodel's party membership. One can only wonder why Nodel headed the newspaper Sovetskaya Torgovaya for such a long time and was the rector at KIZh.

We undertake to select a candidate in the next 2-3 weeks.

Head Department of Press and Publishing of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks MEHLIS

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 321. L. 7. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "T. Yezhov. Nodel should be arrested. He can
something

say about Uzbek nationalists and Trotskyists. I. Stalin.

No. 192

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ON
THE FIRST RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

ON REPRESSION OF ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS (51)

September 8, 1937

No. 59750

In accordance with the decision to repress anti-Soviet elements, from August 5, arrests of former kulaks, criminals and counter-revolutionary elements engaged in active anti-Soviet subversive work began. First of all, the most hostile contingents classified in the first category were arrested. Since counter-revolutionary formations began to be uncovered in the course of the investigation into the cases of those arrested, persons belonging to the second category and who were members of these formations were also subjected to arrests.

The first results of the operation:

In total, as of September 1 this year, 146,225 people were arrested. Of these, 69,172 were former kulaks, 41,603 were criminals, and 35,454 were counter-revolutionary elements.

Of this number of those arrested, 31,530 were sentenced to death and 13,669 to imprisonment in camps and prisons.

Already the initial results of the operation show that the blow was aimed correctly and that it was delivered against those most hostile elements which, having been little touched in the past, were the main base for the work of counter-revolutionaries of all stripes.

The arrests made made it possible to open a large number of

counter-revolutionary formations of various political colors in agriculture, industry and transport.

338

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

According to the testimony of those arrested on September 1, the following were opened and liquidated:

- a) Kulak, wrecking, sabotage and insurgent groups and organizations, mainly in collective farms and state farms
- b) Church-sectarian rebel and fascist groups and organizations
- c) White Guard and military-Cossack rebel organizations and groups
- d) Groups and organizations created by members of anti-Soviet parties
- e) Subversive, espionage and terrorist groups and organizations
- f) Nationalist groups and organizations
- g) Bandit formations

2,328 with 19,523 participants.

43 with 710 participants 159
with 2,331
participants

38 with 1,673 participants 48
with 467
participants 24 with 319
participants

37 with 140 participants

Searches of members of these groups and organizations confiscated

machine guns.1

rifles.639

different guns.1007

pistols and revolvers.1069

artillery shells.157

hand grenades.23

explosives.1190 kg

cold weapons. 2,499 units.

Kulak formations in collective farms and state farms

In the course of the operation, a large infestation of collective farms and state farms, almost all regions of the Union, was revealed by former kulaks (who hid from dispossession, served their sentences, fled from places of detention), former participants in counter-revolutionary uprisings, Socialist-Revolutionaries, White Guards, bandits.

These are active counter-revolutionary contingents who have returned from places of imprisonment and exile to their regions. In many cases, with the direct assistance of the right-wing Trotskyist traitors who had settled in the district party and Soviet apparatuses, they managed to build a solid nest for themselves in the collective farms, create sabotage, sabotage and insurgent groups there, and even take the leading positions of collective farm chairmen, members of the boards, brigadiers, bookkeepers, etc., terrorizing collective farmers, they carried out organized active anti-Soviet subversive work: they spoiled and destroyed agricultural implements, destroyed livestock, spoiled seed material, burned harvested bread, decomposed labor discipline, conducted counter - revolutionary agitation, disrupted agricultural campaigns, deliberately confused the accounting of workdays and thereby caused dissatisfaction among collective farmers, created rebel groups, collected weapons, and committed terrorist acts.

In the collective farms of some regions, the kulaks who fled and returned from exile demanded in an ultimatum from the collective farmers the return of property that previously belonged to them, threatening massacre otherwise (Western Region, Gorky Territory, Kursk Region, etc.).

In a number of districts of the Western Region, with the assistance of counter-revolutionaries who climbed into leadership positions in the OBLU, former kulaks who returned from exile were returned estates, houses, gardens, cattle and so on.

In many collective farms, kulak and other counter-revolutionary elements terrorized the collective farmers to such an extent that the latter silently tolerated the arbitrariness and, fearing reprisals, did not tell anyone about it.

The investigation into the cases of the arrested members of the kulak formations, created in the collective farms of the border districts and regions, establishes a direct connection between these formations and foreign intelligence services that led the wrecking and sabotage activities of the kulak groups.

In the Pereslavl district of the Yaroslavl region, a subversive and insurgent organization consisting of 14 people was opened and liquidated. Of these: one expelled from the CPSU(b), two former kulaks, a Socialist-Revolutionary, seven former kulaks who returned from exile, and four former participants in the counter-revolutionary uprising, who were also in exile. Members of the organization carried out active wrecking and sabotage work in the MTS and collective farms, spread counter-revolutionary rumors, carried out insurrectionary and Trotskyite agitation, prepared acts of sabotage during the war in transport, in the MTS system and collective farms.

The organization was the bottom of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist formation, liquidated in the region.

In the Kostroma district of the same Yaroslavl region, a kulak insurrectionary organization was uncovered, consisting of former kulaks - participants in a counter-revolutionary armed uprising. Members of the organization terrorized the collective farmers, incited them to sabotage, and carried out corrupt work on the collective farm.

A counter-revolutionary insurrectionary organization is exposed in the Krasnogorsk district of the Western Region. Created by the priest POLEGONKO and former kulaks - the brothers Ivan, Vasily and Nikolai RUBAN. The latter named to the investigation 17 former kulaks and active churchmen recruited by them into the organization.

In 1935, part of the members of the organization joined the collective farm and carried out wrecking work on it. At the same time, the other part, remaining individual farmers, by means of counter-revolutionary agitation, kept up to 100 individual farms of the village of Nikolaevka from joining the collective farm.

Members of the organization fomented enmity between collective farmers and individual farmers and provoked the latter into unauthorized seizure of collective farm meadows.

In the Sverdlovsk region, in the village of Zapoltsevo, Kochevsky district, a nationalist counter-revolutionary group of former kulaks was discovered, headed by the chairman of the collective farm, the former kulak TETERLEV. The group carried out extensive wrecking work according to a pre-developed plan.

In order to provoke dissatisfaction of the collective farmers with the Soviet government, TETERLEV disorganized the accounting of workdays and supplied bread, first of all, to the loafers. A month before the spring sowing, TETERLEV switched the horses of the collective farm to feed on rye straw. As a result, the horse stock was bred

but out of order and sowing is thwarted.

In the Polnovsky and Gdovsky districts of the Pskov district of the Leningrad region, the testimony of the arrested Estonian CLIMAR, an individual farmer, reveals the presence of a spy and sabotage organization. CLIMAR showed

340 _ LUBYANKA, Stalin and the GU GB NKVD. 1937-1938

that in May of this year he was recruited by an Estonian MUGA intelligence agent, the chairman of a collective farm, and received from him the task of conducting defeatist agitation among the collective farmers, commit acts of sabotage and recruit anti-Soviet persons for espionage and sabotage work.

Kulak formations in industry and transport

A significant number of former kulaks and the organized groups they created have been unearthed at construction sites, in industrial enterprises and in transport. The kulak elements that had penetrated these branches of the national economy waged counter-revolutionary agitation, organized bagpipes, sabotaged new prices, disrupted meetings, waged a struggle against the Stakhanovist movement, engaged in sabotage, and committed acts of sabotage.

At Lozovaya station, a fascist espionage and sabotage group led by a former RAMM fist, a resident of German intelligence, was uncovered and liquidated. The members of the group carried out wrecking work and prepared acts of sabotage and collected espionage information.

At the construction of military airfield No. 77 (Western Region), a sabotage group was liquidated, including 9 former kulaks who fled from exile and returned from camps. Members of the group burned the sawmill and the newly built house for the flight crew.

At the Kerzhensky sawmill (Gorky region), a counter-revolutionary sabotage and wrecking group, consisting of former kulaks, was liquidated, which committed a number of sabotage actions (arson of an oil depot, accidents of units, etc.).

At the Pervouralsk Pipe Plant, a kulak sabotage and sabotage group created by the former kulak KINEV, who had fled from dispossession, was liquidated. The group organized bagpipes at the factory, disrupted workers' meetings, and conducted agitation against the Stakhanovite movement.

In the Kansk district of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, a special settler SINGAEVSKY was arrested for active counter-revolutionary activities, who testified that there was a counter-revolutionary sabotage and rebel organization at the Kansk sawmill, consisting of special settlers working at the plant. Members of the organization committed several acts of sabotage. 18 people have been arrested in the case.

Church-sectarian counter-revolutionary underground

The presence of a broad church-sectarian insurrectionary underground that is being revealed now deserves serious attention. A large number of church-sectarian counter-revolutionary formations are opening up in the Western, Gorky, Moscow, Sverdlovsk and other regions.

As established by the investigation, these formations, consisting of priests, sectarians, monastic elements, former kulaks and White Guards, for many years carried out active insurrectionary work, organized former kulaks, created sabotage and sabotage groups from them on collective farms, prepared to commit terrorist attacks. acts, conducted extensive counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

In the Western region, a large insurgent organization of anti-war Baptists, created by a sectarian preacher POLUFAKI NIM, who was connected with German intelligence, was uncovered. The organization had its branches in 10 districts of the region. 102 people were arrested in the case of this organization.

In the Gorky region, the church-monarchist organization of the former kulak monk SAVIN is being liquidated. The organization covered several districts of the region and consisted of former kulaks, wandering priests, monks

DOCUMENTATION

341

"wanderers", hysterics, etc. Communication between members of the organization was maintained through wandering nuns. The organization carried out counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation, distributed anti-Soviet leaflets, carried out work on the preparation of terrorist acts and amassed insurgent cadres.

In the Chelyabinsk region, in the course of the investigation into the cases of those arrested, a widely branched rebel-terrorist organization of churchmen, representing a bloc of representatives of various religious movements, was uncovered. According to the testimony of the arrested Bishop VYATKIN, the organization has illegal rebel nests, with more than 300 members, in a number of districts of the region. The organization is headed by an insurrectionary spiritual council headed by a priest, a former white officer BORMOTOV. There are district headquarters in the largest districts of the region. The organization set itself the task of carrying out sabotage work and organizing an uprising at the time of the outbreak of hostilities.

The organization was connected in Moscow with Metropolitans VITALI and SERGII.

A church-sectarian insurrectionary organization of the same nature, opened up in the Syksunsky district of the Sverdlovsk region, joined forces in its counter-revolutionary work with right-wing Trotskyite elements.

Rebel organizations

A blow to the most hostile elements of the former kulaks and counter-revolutionary elements also made it possible to open well-hidden insurrectionary centers untouched by previous operations, which had existed for a long time.

In the Chelyabinsk region, a large rebel organization was discovered and is being liquidated, operating in the territories of Kurgan, Kutamysh,

Zverinogolovsky districts, saturated with Cossacks and the White Guard element, and had branches in Petropavlovsk (Karaganda region of Kazakhstan) and in the regions of the Omsk region. The organization consisted mainly of former participants in the uprising.

In Moscow, a former comrade of the prosecutor at Kolchak was arrested, before the arrest, a lawyer-consultant of the Pobeda Truda factory, SM TROITSKY. During the investigation, the latter testified that he was a member of a counter-revolutionary fascist organization, consisting mainly of former officers. The organization was built according to the Zinoviev principle and set itself the task of committing terrorist acts and preparing an armed uprising.

Members of the organization are being arrested.

A counter-revolutionary fascist insurrectionary organization created by the German intelligence agent POPER and consisting of former kulaks was uncovered in the Zeltsky district of the Odessa region of the Ukrainian SSR. 19 people were arrested in the case.

In the Stalin and Postyshevsky districts of the Donetsk region of the Ukrainian SSR, according to the testimony of the arrested German agent GRINKO, a sabotage and rebel organization numbering 40 people was opened.

In the Zhytomyr district of the Ukrainian SSR, a German sabotage and insurrectionary organization created and led by the German consulate in Kyiv through the agents of Ilman, NEISCH and LYAU was discovered and liquidated. The organization consisted of former kulaks, churchmen and German preachers. 25 people have been arrested in the case.

In the Diveevsky district of the Gorky region, a kulak-insurgent sabotage-terrorist organization is being liquidated, numbering in its composition over 40 former kulaks, policemen and other counter-revolutionaries

342

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

tional elements. The leaders of the organization are the chairmen of the Chelatma Village Council and the collective farm of the same name. Members of the organization committed a number of sabotage and terrorist acts.

In the Kirov region of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a counter-revolutionary group consisting of 10 former kulaks and 2 gendarmes, which had existed since 1930, was uncovered. For 7 years, the group carried out wrecking, sabotage and insurgent work with impunity.

The investigation into the cases of arrested former kulaks and other counter-revolutionary elements reveals facts when kulaks, former landowners, White Guards, churchmen and sectarians conducted counterintelligence agitation in defense of the enemies of the people Rykov, Bukharin, Tukhachevsky, Kork and others, nominated them as of their ideologists, expressed direct intentions to render them all possible assistance in the struggle against the Soviet power.

The setting in which the operation takes place.

The removal of active counter-revolutionary and kulak elements and criminals cleansed the countryside, brought about a certain improvement in it and caused a great upsurge in the political and production activity of the collective farmers. As a result, labor discipline on the collective farms improved, absenteeism was sharply reduced, and the productivity and quality of labor increased. Robberies and thefts have sharply decreased in cities and in the countryside.

The operation is taking place in an atmosphere of rising positive sentiments and great activity in identifying and exposing the hiding enemy elements by the population.

Indicators of these sentiments are at least such facts as the submission of applications by individual farmers to join collective farms, active voluntary assistance to the NKVD in identifying and exposing counter-revolutionary elements; initiative appearance in the organs of the NKVD and voluntary testimony exposing those arrested in anti-Soviet activities and revealing counter-revolutionary formations; positive statements approving the measures of the Government.

"The Soviet government correctly arrested the enemies of collective farm construction. We need to arrest even more so that other hidden enemies would be reluctant to harm the collective farms.

(Kurbanov Baisur, collective farmer in the village of Guchum Kale, Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.)

"The NKVD is doing well. I was delivering newspapers yesterday, the people are happy and everyone says that now it will be even easier and better to work on the collective farm, since the collective farms will be cleansed of kulaks ... "

(Letter-bearer of the Evdokimovsky regional communications department, Ordzhonikidze region).

"We, the collective farmers, must help in every possible way to open all the enemies of the people who have climbed into the collective farm and ask the Government to isolate them away from us ..."

(A collective farmer from a group of collective farmers in the village of Krasnogorskaya.)

Worker Abbakumov (shop No. 8 of plant No. 175 in Tula) said: "It's good that they again took up the kulaks and an alien element, otherwise they only harm us and there is little benefit from them. We should only welcome such an event."

A Stakhanovite of the Budyonny collective farm, Ilyinsky district, CHUEV writes: "I ask you to take action against the thief-revolutionary, my brother, who systematically steals from the collective farmers and does not allow them to work in peace."

The collective farmers of the village of Botagi (Western region) ask: "We ask the Velizh NKVD to help clear the collective farm of enemies. Kolkhoz chairman KOSAREV gets drunk. For more than a year there was no revision on the collective farm. We wrote to Raizo, from where there is no answer, no greetings, apparently, Trotskyists are also sitting there.

In the village of Galyugaevskaya, Mozdok district, the next day after the operation, ordinary collective farmers, including 6 people, came to the head of the operational group and said: "We heard about the arrest of Sorokin, Shalny, Serov and others and decided to come to you and testify about hostile moods to the Soviet power and their wrecking activities. According to the testimonies of these collective farmers, a counter-revolutionary organization was opened in the village of Galyugaevskaya.

In the Lyudinovsky and Vyazemsky districts of the Western Region, the collective farmers, on their own initiative, detained the hiding fists and delivered them to the district department of the NKVD.

"As soon as Bugaichenko, Agapov, Krasnobaev and other kulaks returned from the camps, unrest began to grow in our collective farm. Bugaichenko united all the kulaks, loafers and thieves around him and led the fight against the collective farm, thinking of destroying it, but they did not succeed. The authorities did the right thing by confiscating this kulak pack and taking it into their own hands. Now the farmers are very happy with it."

(Collective farmer of the collective farm "Lenin's Way", Leninsky district of the Crimean ASSR.)

"We must send a telegram to Comrade Stalin for taking care of our collective farmers. We had enemies, but the NKVD took them away. Now they won't bother us. We need to pick up someone else."

(Chizhov and Kozlov are collective farmers of the village of Novo-Maryevskaya, Ordzhonikid, Zevsky region.)

"How easy it became to work after the kulaks were taken away from us. After all, they muddled everyone here with their agitation, and in their work they did harm. It is necessary to deepen the question of clearing the collective farms of kulaks, there are still many of them."

(Solomatina is a former laborer of the Mineral-Vodsky district.)

Along with this, there is an activation of counter-revolutionary elements, trying, through agitation and spreading rumors, to provoke confusion, panic, discontent among the masses and attempts to hide those subject to arrest.

In general, the operation is proceeding calmly and there have not yet been any serious, noteworthy excesses.

A large number of kulak-White Guard and church-sectarian insurgent, sabotage and terrorist groups and organizations uncovered during the operation shows that the account of counter-revolutionary elements was far from complete and the figures subject to repression reported by the heads of the NKVD did not correspond to the actual presence in their regions of the most hostile contingents of the counter-revolution. Now all these elements are taken into account and are subjected to a thorough check. The most active of them are arrested.

The operation to arrest the most hostile former kulaks, criminals and other counter-revolutionary elements assigned to the first category has been completed in most regions of the USSR.

In the Byelorussian, Ukrainian, North Ossetian, Kabardino-Balkarian, Chechen-Ingush, Dagestan, Azerbaijan, Kalmyk Republics, Ordzhonikidze and West Siberian regions. Western, Kalinin, Voronezh, Orenburg, Omsk and Kuibyshev regions

You are allowed to proceed with the arrests of former kulaks, criminals and counter-revolutionary elements classified in the second category.

The investigation now unfolding is heading towards an exhaustive identification of all the pockets of the broad counter-revolutionary underground uncovered in the course of the operation.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

CA FSB RF. F. 3. Op. 4. D. 105. L. 101-114. Script. Typescript.

344

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 193

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT WORKERS FOR THE NKVD"

September 9, 1937

13 - 0 workers for the NKVD.

Send the following comrades at the disposal of the NKVD:

- 1) Beley I.T.
- 2) Ezepova T.I.
- 3) Kiseleva D.N.
- 4) Novikova F.S.
- 5) Stepanenko P.G.
- 6) Leonenko A.I.
- 7) Maslennikova V.I.
- 8) Semenova S.M.
- 9) Blagutina L.I.
- 10) Nehorosheva G.F.
- 11) Petrosyan Sh.A.
- 12) Tatzetdinova A.S.
- 13) Frolova A.Ya.
- 14) Ershova N.K.

15) Vovchenko G.D.

16) Mironova V.D.

17) Perevoznikova I.S.

18) Senkina V.I.

19) Dudykina P.A.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 990. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 52.

No. 194

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOVA ON
WRECKING IN THE STORAGE OF GRAIN

September 10, 1937 No.
1452/sh

Strictly secret.

Copy in cipher

TO ALL SECRETARIES OF REGIONAL COMMITTEES, TERRITORIAL COMMISSIONS, NATIONAL
COMPARTIES, ALL CHAIRMANS OF REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES AND TERRITORIAL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES, ALL CHAIRMANS OF COUNCIL COMMISSIONS, ALL PEOPLE'S
COMMISSIONERS AND UNKVD

On August 31, 1937, a decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council
of People's Commissars of the USSR on the fight against ticks and the elimination of the consequences of sabotage in the
storage of grain was sent out.

From telegrams from the localities it turns out that sabotage in the matter of grain storage has not only not been
eliminated, but is still flourishing. Tens of thousands of tons of grain lie in the rain without any shelter, the
elementary conditions of grain storage are violated in the grossest way.

DOCUMENTATION

345

The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars oblige you to arrange * in the region,
the territory from two to three * demonstration trials of pests for grain storage, to sentence the perpetrators to
death, to shoot them and publish about it in the local newspaper.
chat.

Receipt and execution of telegraph.

AND ; STALIN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 71. Original. Typescript.

The text contains a note about the distribution: "T.t. Yezhov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Khrushchev, Redens, Khokhlov, Vysinsky

- Part III," inscribed in Stalin's pencil.

No. 195

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM
A.I. USPENSKY ON ARREST
OF POLISH "SPIES AND saboteurs"

September 10, 1937

No. 59846

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 373 of the head of the UNKVD for the Orenburg region.

He ordered the arrest of all the persons indicated in the telegram.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

Top secret

MEMORANDUM No. 30124, 30156, 30157

From Orenburg

People's Commissar VNUDEL comrade. Ezhov

We arrested the commissar of the training center of the reserve command staff PRIVO, the battalion commissar ANTONEVICH Vladislav Feliksovich, a Polish nobleman. During interrogation, ANTONEVICH admitted that he had been a member of the POV since 1922, recruited by SKARBEEK. In 1924-28. ANTONEVICH, holding a political position in the Red Army units located in Poltava and Kharkov, conducted intelligence work and was associated with LONGVA. In 1928, ANTONEVICH worked in the Intelligence Department of the Headquarters of the UVO to compile an overview of the future theater of military operations with Poland and, at the direction of SCAR BEK, formed a brigade for this, which included members of the POV: PRISTUPA, VOYTYUK, KHOLODNY and others. The list of agents of the Intelligence Department of the UVO in Poland fell into the hands of this POV group. In 1933-1936. ANTONEVICH conducted intelligence work in Moscow, working as head of air defense courses. In Moscow, ANTONEVICH was closely associated with the UNSHLIKHT and the Moscow POV center. On the instructions of the POV center, personally instructed by UN-

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

SHLICHTOM and LONGVA, ANTONEVICH was transferred to Ulyanovsk to work at the PRIVO training center. ANTONEVICH shows that the POV set a long time ago the task of creating a residency in the training centers of the military circles for espionage and military subversive work with anti-Soviet cadres from the reserve commanders. UNSHLIKHT and LONGVA instructed ANTONEVICH to certify the White Guard and anti-Soviet reserve cadres, to raise their categories, at the same time to certify and reduce the categories of reserve commanders loyal to the Soviet government, to exempt communists from training, thereby reducing their military knowledge and militarily disqualify. In 1936, UNSHLIKHT gave instructions to move the PRIVO training center from Ulyanovsk to Orenburg, in order to disrupt mobilization in the Cossack regions through the Mobokrug Administration and to introduce the intelligence work of POV personnel in the Orenburg aviation school, and through it in other air units of the Red Army. In carrying out the installation of the POV center, as a result, the PRIVO training center created a Polish residency consisting of: KLIMETSKY, the head of the training center, a nationalist Pole; KARETSKY, teacher of artillery, Pole; YASUTIS - a native of Poland; RUD - a white officer; teacher OSTROMETSKY - a Pole, an agent of the 2nd department of the PGSH, who, upon the arrival of ANTONEVICH, headed the Polish residency of the training center, working as teachers. ANTONEVICH involved in espionage sabotage work and treasonous actions during the war 20 people of Dutov and Kolchak White Guards from the reserve command staff. In the Directorate of Mobokrug ANTONEVICH recruited the head of the mobile unit - a former officer of TELEGIN and the district military commissariat in the Cossack districts: Orsk - Pole LUKSHA, Orenburg - Pole FEDOROVICH, Soroshaninsky - a fist expelled from the party BARABANOV. Through them, ANTONEVICH carried out disorganization work to disrupt mobplanes. It was planned to disrupt the mobilization by incorrect assignments to recruiting centers, confusion about the terms of mobilization, and so on. In order to cause confusion among the population and conscripts, it was planned, when the mobilization was announced, to hang out in public places the resolutions signed by the enemies of the people RYKOV and CHERVYAKOV, which were published several years ago and were stored with mobdocuments in the District Executive Committees, as being subject to sticking in moment of mobilization. In 1936, ANTONEVICH, in Orenburg, contacted KOVALCHUK, a resident of the 2nd department of the Primary School of Civil Aviation, to establish a POV center, and together with him he began work on planting a spy net in the aviation school. The following were recruited into its composition: PAVLOVSKY - early. aircraft workshops, his brother serves as an officer in the Polish army; Grinkevich - early. aviation school training ground, a longtime Polish intelligence agent; KAMINSKY - squadron commander, Pole, nationalist; TSIKHON - Senior Aircraft Technician, previously served in the Polish Army. In the mountains In Orenburg, ANTONEVICH, together with KOVALCHUK, also had connections with Polish scouts deployed from Poland to the territory of the USSR - DREVNIIK, KREZOVSKII, KRAUZE, KAPLANSKII and ZHAKA. These in turn had a network of Polish defectors. In the districts of the region, 14 Polish sabotage groups were created from among Polish defectors and political emigrants, who sat out in remote areas and were reserves for the war period.

As of 3.IX-s.g. 160 Polish spies and saboteurs were arrested, of which: 115 defectors, 5 political emigrants, 8 former prisoners of war,

local Polish nationalists 17, former Polish officers 1, former Polish members of anti-Soviet parties 3, imperialist refugees

DOCUMENTATION

347

war 11. Deploying the investigation and further operations. Lists for 100 people will be able to submit on September 10-15. I ask you to authorize the arrest of KLIMETSKY, KARETSKY, YASUTIS, RUD, TELEGIN, PANKOVSKY, Grinkevich, Kaminsky and Tsikhon.

No. 373, USPENSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 160-164. Script. Typescript.

— There is a handwritten note in the margin: "To Yezhov. Authorize the arrest of these scoundrels. I. Stalin*."

No. 196

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM
G.S. LYUSHKOVA ON "DIVERSION" GROUPS AT
DEFENSE FACTORIES IN DVK

September 11, 1937

No. 59882

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 62184 of the Head of the UNKVD for the Far East, comrade. LYUSHKOVA.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR EZHOV
MEMORANDUM No. 31055

Khabarovsk
September 10, 1937

Top secret

Arrested under your sanction No. 7863, the director of plant No. 202 SERGEEV testified about his participation in the right-wing Trotskyist conspiracy in the Far East. SERGEEV was recruited into the Trotskyist organization in 1932 in Leningrad by the Zinovievite ZHDANOV (former director of a shipbuilding plant in Komsomolsk, arrested). Leaving in 1933 together with Zhdanov to the Far East, he received an assignment from Pyatakov to create a Trotskyist orchestra

organization at factory No. 202 and launch sabotage work.

In terms of espionage and sabotage activities, SERGEEV was connected in Moscow with MUKLEVICH and STRELTSOV, in the Far East with the regional center, from which he names LAVRENTIEV, DERIBAS, KRUTOV, KOSIORA. The sabotage organization at the plant was led by the Japanese consulate in Vladivostok, WATANABE and MIMUR, on their direct instructions, the construction of warships was thwarted. Communication with the Japanese on the instructions of the organization was maintained by DYATLOVSKY, a citizen of Harbin, recruited into the right-wing Trotskyist organization by ZHDANOV, and by the senior designer of the BOZHKO plant, recruited into the organization by the cadre Trotskyite RATNOVSKI. BOZHKO confessed that since the beginning of 1934 he had been recruited for espionage work in Japan by the resident ARKHANGELSKII, who connected him with the Japanese MORI. BOZHKO legalized ties with the Japanese TAMINAWA and TA KAHASI. Through BOZHKO, SERGEYEV RATNOVSKY was handed over at times

348

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

In the early days of Japanese intelligence, the production plans of the plant for the construction of special vessels, as well as design drawings for the construction of ships of the type "Pike", "LENINET". We arrest the members of the organization named by SERGEEV.

As of September 4, participants in the military-fascist conspiracy Trotskyists in the OKDVA were additionally arrested: KALNIN, chief engineer of the UVS 460 OKDVA, military engineer of the 2nd rank, did not confess. GITEI MAN Samson Lazarevich, an autogenous welder at the workshops of the border base of the UKPVO, did not confess. BOYKOV Grigory Pavlovich early department of the intelligence department of the OKDVA, the captain, did not confess. MALOV Roman Akimovich, assistant early branch of the intelligence department of OKDVA, the captain, did not confess. SOLODUKHIN Isai Iosifovich, technical quartermaster of the 2nd rank, did not confess. YUZEFOVITCH Boris Mikhailovich, head of the maritime border reconnaissance post, major, did not confess.

LYUSHKOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 321. L. 38-40. Copy. Typescript.

On the first page there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "Which plant number 202 is this? Has Zhdanov been arrested in Komsomolsk?"

No. 197

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM D.M. DMITRIEV
ON THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION IN THE
CASE OF THE URAL "REBELLION" HEADQUARTERS

September 11, 1937

No. 59936

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 228 from the head of the UNKVD for the Sverdlovsk region.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR EZHOV
MEMORANDUM No. 31019

Tov. Ezhov
From Sverdlovsk
From 10.9.-37

In addition to our No. 970, I report further results of the investigation into the case of the Ural insurgent headquarters. A direct connection to the c.r. nationalist organization of Komi-Permyaks with representatives of the Finnish government.

A member of the organization, Professor LYTKIN, through an agent of Finnish intelligence of the Udmurt ASSR, the writer GERD, contacted an employee of the Finnish embassy in Moscow, KOHNEN, offering the services of nationalists in order to achieve by any means the accession to Finland of the Finno-Ugric peoples of the Urals. Kohonen, after listening to Lytkin's information about the c.r. activities of the nationalists, invited the latter to go to Finland to report to the government. LITKIN, having achieved a scientific mission for

DOCUMENTATION

349

border, contacted Pastor MAATENEN in Helsinki, who arranged a meeting with an official representative of the Finnish government. The latter approved the plans for the accession of the Komi-Permyaks to Finland and the ongoing k.r. work, proposed to launch preparations for an armed uprising at the time of the "big war", in which the USSR would also be involved. The Finns promised to support the rebellion with money and leadership, suggesting that Lytkin would continue to maintain contacts with KOONEN. The same MAATENEN connected Lytkin with an officer of the German Reichswehr SCHMIDT, who promised support for the insurrectionary movement by German intelligence, a lieutenant of the tsarist army, DARICHEV, a member of a fascist officer organization associated with the arrested Colonel of the General Staff ESTNER, on whose behalf he got a job in Komi-Permyaks and entered to the insurgent organization, testified that he was the commander of an insurgent company, consisting of 4 platoons organized in collective farms. One platoon was organized by DARICHEV in the Tukachevo timber and tractor base. DARICHEV names the platoon commanders: former commander TYAPUGIN, head of a platoon on the Kupros collective farm; chairman of the kolkhoz kulak POSTONOGOL of the platoon commander of the Doezhsky kolkhoz; kulak YAKIMOV - commander of the platoon of the Krokhavevsky collective farm; the former White Guard technoruk of the Tukachevo forest and tractor base PORSEVA - a platoon commander created at the base; non-commissioned officer of the tsarist army, fist BORMOTOV, who deserted to the White Army from the Red Army, personally shot captured Red Army soldiers, named a personal

ny composition of the platoon headed by him, covering the collective farms of the Verkhovsky village council of the Kudymsky district.

BORMOTOV's platoon had weapons: 7 rifles, 1 revolver, 200 rounds of ammunition - everything was taken away.

Arrested deputy. Director of the Konchevskaya MTS GLADIKOV, a member of the insurgent organization, received the task of the commander of the insurgent company AMIRDZHANAYEV Fedor to organize a platoon of rebels in the Kochevskaya MTS. GLADIKOV named the commanders of the insurgent platoons: Kochevsky - the fist PAVLOV, Kushinsky - the kulak Ivan SALNIKOV, Urzhinsky - the commander of the Red Army Vasily Salnikov, Otopovsky - the White Guard BATUEV Stepan, the commander of the insurgent platoon of the Trifonovsky collective farm of the Yusvinsky district. BATUEV named 25 rebels of his platoon, the commander of the rebel company VILESOV, the commanders of platoons that were part of the same company KOTOV, BAYANDIN, GABOV, the commander of the Velvinsky rebel platoon of the Kudymkor region.

SOBAKAEV confirmed the earlier testimonies of the commander of the same platoon, NOVIKOV, as part of the platoon he named the company commander LIKHACHEV, the commanders of the platoons included in the company: DVINSKY, LIKHACHEV, OSH, TUPITSIN, BATUNSKY and DERYABIN.

The arrested rebel MELZHINOV admitted that he was the commander of the rebel platoon of the Ust-Zuzulinsky village council of the Yurlinsky district, and was appointed commander of the company by SAUTIN.

MILCHAKOV showed the composition of his platoon, and also named the commander of the insurgent platoon PIKULEV, who organized the insurgent platoon in Lysva from former fellow villagers living in the indicated place.

The commander of the insurgent platoon, NESHASYDYN, who made up a platoon of collective farmers from the village of Zakharovo, Kuzsky district, named the insurgents included in the platoon.

The commander of the insurgent platoon of the Starikovsky collective farm of the Yusvinsky district, STARIKOV, named the composition of his platoon and the company commander VILESOVA.

350

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Of particular interest are the testimonies of the ensign of the tsarist army MYZNIKOV, arrested in Nadezhdinsk, who is an authorized representative of the insurgent district of the Nadezhdinsky district and the commander of the Nadezhdinsky insurgent battalion. At the same time, MYZNIKOV was deputy to General MIONCHINSKY, the head of the Nadezhdinsky insurgent district, which, in addition to the Nadezhdinsky insurgent district, covered adjacent areas: Ivdelsky, Garinsky, Verkhoutsky, Novolyalinsky. The Nadezhda battalion consisted of 8 platoons, each consisting of 25-30 rebels, and a subversive team. The platoons were led by former white officers in the remaining districts of the district, except for Garinsky, where, due to the remoteness, it was not possible to launch insurgent work. The cadres of the insurgent company were formed.

The representatives of the rebel district and the company commanders were: Ivdolsky district - ARAPOV, leader of the kulak uprising in 1918; Verkhoturk - MELEKHIN, a former white officer; Novolyalinsky - KASYANOV, a former white Cossack worker.

Communications of the Ural insurgent headquarters were carried out by a member of the organization of the right, the former secretary of the City Committee SMIRNOV, through whom the MION CHINSKY received directives from the regional headquarters. The Nadezhda insurgent district developed a detailed plan for an armed uprising, which was personally agreed by MYONCHINSKY with a member of the Ural insurgent headquarters, a former deputy commander of the URVO VASILENKO, the latter was a German spy, received instructions from the German General Staff regarding the operational plan of the rebels. According to the developed plan, the Nadezhda battalion was supposed to capture the city of Nadezhdinsk, disable metallurgy plants and military plant No. 75, and blow up the power plant. The plan of the Nadezhdinsky insurgent district was an integral part of the plan of the uprising in the territory of the Sverdlovsk region, developed by VASILEKO at the direction of the German General Staff, according to which the rebels were to destroy the railway bridges across the Kama, Perm and Sarapul. On the first day of the war, defense plants should be put out of action by sabotage.

In addition, the plan provided for the disruption of mobilization by setting fire to assembly points, poisoning power sources, and destroying the railway fleet on secondary lines.

Nadezhda district was associated with k.r. the ROVS organization in Nadezhdinsk, created by the ROVS agent, the former white officer KOTELNIKOV, from Cossack worker settlers. KOTELNIKOV in 1928 was transferred to the USSR from Manchuria by General DITERIKHS to organize insurgent cells along the lines of the ROVS. KOTELNIKOV contacted General MIONCHINSKY and was appointed commander of the Sosnovinsky platoon, which was part of the Nadezhdinsky battalion. Through MIONCHINSKY KOTELNIKOV he contacted the Ural insurgent headquarters. KOTELNIKOV informed DITERIKHSA in detail about the activities of the insurgent headquarters.

Insurgent cells in the Voroshilovsky district were created at a chemical plant, headed by PUCHKOV, director of the plant, a potash plant in Solikamsk, headed by TSIFRINOVICH, a white officer PUCHKOV, in the area of activity of the Kamo-Berezovskaya MTS, headed by director TEREKHOV, on the territory of Polovodovskaya MTS was headed by the director TARASOV, in the area of activity of the Usolskaya MTS, the second secretary of the City Committee ZLOBIN and the chairman of the District Executive Committee ZOLOTUKHIN were in charge.

DOCUMENTATION

351

In addition, rebel cells were created in Solikamsk and the villages of Usolye, Dedyukhino, Orla, Taman, Ustborovaya and Polovodovo, subordinate to the Berezniki rebel district. Insurgent formations existed in Kizelovsky and Cherdynsky districts. In Cherdyn, the authorized

A member of the organization of the right-wing BUSHMANOV was a member of the organization of the right-wing BUSHMANOV, and the former secretary of the Komsomol organization of the chemical plant KALININ was sent to Kizel to develop insurgent work.

Mullah TAISIN, who was arrested, testified about the presence of a k.r. nationalist-rebel organization of Muslims, in the Perm region associated with the CDU in Ufa, which is a branch of the nationalist-rebel organization operating in Tataria and Bashkiria. The organization was headed by the Perm Mullah Kalitov, who was associated with the head of the Perm rebel district, the Trotskyist DYACHKOV.

Along with the deployment of the investigation to open up all the links of the rebel underground in the Urals, the weapons of the rebels were confiscated. In total, since the beginning of the operation, 3 Degtyarev machine guns, 2 spare barrels, 187 combat rifles, 4,000 propeller cartridges, 224 revolvers of various systems, 11 grenades, 1,334 hunting rifles, 498 kilograms of mine powder, and 498 kilograms of black powder have been seized since the beginning of the operation. 1120 kilograms, ammonal - 1111 kilograms, fickford cord - 3830 meters, detonators - 2451, hemp explosive cord - 180 meters, shells for exploding shells - 6, bladed weapons - 166 units.

In addition, in the Kudymkor district, poisonous poisonous substances were found at the disposal of the ICU, abandoned by a participant in the organization, the former head of Selkhozsnab Tipitsyn, at the warehouses of the MTS. The drug A.A. was seized in the Moscow MTS. - 120 kilograms, Yurlinskaya MTS drug A. - 10-83 kilograms, also potassium cyanide.

In the future, the search for weapons and explosives continues.

ŷ228
8.09.37

DMITRIEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 165-172. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "T. Yezhov. Very important. You need to walk around the Udmurt, Mari, Chuvash, Mordovian republics, walk with a broom.

No. 198

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN I.M. VAREIKIS,

VC. BLUCHER, G.S. LIOSHKOV ON THE EVICTION OF KOREANS (52)

September 11, 1937

No. 1460/
sh Sov. secret

Everything shows that the deportation of the Koreans is quite overdue. It is possible that we are somewhat late with this matter. But if this is true, the faster the eviction should be carried out, especially from the southern regions of Posyet. We invite each of you in your area to take strict urgent action.

on the exact execution of the eviction calendar plan. I sabotage people

352

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

whoever they are, whoever they are, should be arrested immediately and punished roughly. Arrest not only Volsky, but dozens of Volskys. Tell Druskis that exemplary punishment will be inflicted on him if he does not show due diligence and discipline.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union STALIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 139. L. 23. Copy. Typescript.

No. 199

INSTRUCTIONS I.V. STALIN ON ARRESTS,
INTERROGATIONS AND ON OTHER ISSUES (53)

September 13, 1937

- 1) Call Zinoviev and arrest him.
- 2) How to publish a message about the closure of two Japanese consulates? (Potemkin).
- 3) Beat Unshlikht for not handing over Poland's agents in the regions (Orenburg, Novosibirsk, etc.).
- 4) How to change the published decision on the Azov-Black Sea Territory?
- 5) Arrest Volkov.

AP RF. F. 3. Op.24. D. 321. L. 68-69. Script. Manuscript.

No. 200

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ON
THE PROGRESS OF THE POLISH OPERATION (54)

September 14, 1937

No. 60020

Secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

As a result of the further course of the operation to eliminate the personnel of Polish intelligence, on September 10 of this year. from among the Polish defectors, political emigrants, prisoners of war, consular connections and other contingents suspected of Polish espionage *arrested in the USSR - 23.216 people*.

This quantity includes:

According to the Ukrainian SSR. 7,651 (of which 1,138 confessed)

Leningrad. 1 832 (" - " - " 673)

Moscow region. 1 070 (" - " - " 216)

BSSR.4 124

Western region. 837

Western Siberia. 1 325

railway transport 2 943

Along with the deployment of the investigation into the cases described in the first note, the results of further measures for the operation in individual republics and regions are presented in the following form:

Ukrainian

Recently, a number of new espionage and sabotage formations created by Polish intelligence have been eliminated.

The testimony of priest GASHINSKY, arrested in Kharkov, uncovered an anti-Soviet nationalist organization created by GASHINSKY

DOCUMENTATION_ 353

at the direction of the Polish consulate. GASHINSKY named 19 people recruited by him personally.

Arrested deputy. GORODETSKY, chief accountant of a pasta factory in Kharkov, confessed to espionage and sabotage on the instructions of the Polish consulate. Since 1930, GORODETSKII created a spy network at the Kharkov Tractor and Electromechanical Plants.

PONYATOVSKY and SMERCHINSKY, old-timers of sugar factories in the Kharkiv region, in espionage for Poland, testified about the presence of a network of illegal walkers to Poland with spy materials.

Arrested in Olevsk - b. agents of the intelligence department of the KVO LAPKIN, GROB CHUK and IGNATYUK confessed that they had been Polish spies since 1928 and in their activities misinformed and provoked the Intelligence Agency.

Similar testimonies were received in Kyiv from the arrested former agents of the intelligence department KVO BOREIKO and SAVCHUK, who also turned out to be Polish double spies.

In Kyiv, the arrested Polish agent FORNOLSKY, recruited

Polish consulate, confessed that, on the instructions of the consulate, he created a sabotage group of 11 people at the Selivankovsky sugar factory.

In Zhytomyr, the Polish intelligence officer MATSIEVSKY was arrested, transferred to the USSR in 1932 under the guise of a political emigrant. According to his testimony, a POV combat cell in Zhytomyr was opened.

An espionage and sabotage group created by Polish spies KARVA and SHISHKEVICH was uncovered in Slavyansk.

Arrested in Stalino, KULINO-KULINOVSKY confessed that in 1931 he had been transferred to the USSR by the Vilna Expositura for espionage activities. While in exile in Zlatoust, then, while working in Mariupol at the Azovstal plant and in Moscow, KULINO-KULINOVSKY created espionage and sabotage groups everywhere. Through espionage work, he was connected with MALINOVSKII, who worked at the Polish embassy.

In Odessa, the arrested FINSCHWAL confessed to participating in a Polish spy and sabotage organization in Kirovo, created by the Polish engineer Bruno ZIMEK, who is currently in Leningrad. FINIIIVAL named 12 members of the organization.

In the Dobrovelichkovsky district of the Odessa region, a spy-insurgent organization planted by Polish intelligence, headed by a certain THIN and BOZHAKOV, was uncovered. The organization was associated with the Polish consul property.

In Kyiv, the former head of the ammunition supply of the 29th rifle battalion A.A. MIZERNIK was arrested.

MIZERNIK confessed that, while living in Poland in 1924, he was recruited by Polish intelligence agencies and in the same year illegally sent to the USSR for espionage and sabotage work, which he carried out until the day of his arrest.

Before being sent to the USSR, MIZERNIK was used by the Poles as a provocateur among the workers in the mountains. Warsaw.

MIZERNIK was given several visits to Moscow and Kharkov.

Throughout the entire period of his stay in the USSR, MIZERNIK transferred to the intelligence agencies information characterizing the state of individual parts of the Red Army and defense facilities.

MIZERNIK named to the investigation 6 agents of the intelligence agencies living on the territory of the USSR.

354

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938'

The arrested head of the operational section of the Kyiv fortified area DYACHENKO Ye.A. admitted his belonging to the Polish intelligence agencies, in which he was recruited in 1932 by the Polish agent Zheltobryukhov.

Until March 1937, he transmitted to him, as well as to the intelligence courier who came to DYACHENKO on behalf of Zheltobryukhov from Poland, a number of top secret data on the state of defense installations, the combat capability and location of units of the Red Army, as well as the characteristics of the command staff of the Kiev and Vinnitsa fortified areas. ZHELTOBRUKHOV is set up for arrest.

BSSR

The consciousness of the arrested Poles DUDORCHIK Anton and his son Mikhail revealed the sabotage organization of Polish intelligence at the Minsk power plant and the long-term preparation for sabotage work on it.

Arrested in Minsk APPOZNANSKAYA A.I. admitted that she was recruited by the Polish consulate in Moscow. On the instructions of Polish intelligence, she entered into confidence in the families of military personnel and stole various military documents stored in the apartments of commanders. Some of the stolen documents were found in her apartment.

Polish spy OSHKER M.S. arrested in Orsha during the investigation, he named the agents of the Polish intelligence operating at factories near Moscow, in particular at aircraft factory No. 22.

In the Smilovichi district, a sabotage-insurgent rank and file "POV" called "Kulka Pilsudski" consisting of 15 people was liquidated. The organization was headed by Skorobogaty S.K., who was connected in his activities with agents of the 2nd department of the Primary School of Staff BULGAK and VRUBLEVSKII, who illegally came to the territory of the USSR.

In addition to carrying out sabotage and espionage work, the members of the organization prepared terrorist acts against the leaders of the local Soviet and party apparatus.

At section 18 of the border detachment, 7 Polish defectors were detained, Belarusians by nationality. The investigation established that this entire group was sent by Polish intelligence agencies with the task of settling on the territory of the BSSR.

The testimony of the Polish agent DROZDOVICH establishes a mass transfer of an anti-Soviet element to Poland for subsequent processing and recruitment of these persons by Polish intelligence and return transfer to the USSR. DROZDOVICH named several dozen Polish spies who were sent through him for 11 years and settled deep in the rear of the USSR.

In total, according to the testimony of those arrested in this operation in the BSSR, 26 Polish spies were identified and exposed in other cities of the Union.

WESTERN REGION*

24 Polish espionage and sabotage formations were opened and liquidated and 33 Polish agents were exposed. In particular, the arrested engineer of the special ammunition bureau of the Krasny Profintern plant in the city of Ordzhonikid Zegrad II NOVAKOVICH testified that in 1934, while in Leningrad, he was recruited there for espionage in favor of Poland by the Polish intelligence officer PINCHUK (arrested). NOVAKOVICH supplied the latter with a number of secret materials and, in particular, about the technological process of arbitrary

DOCUMENTATION

355

stva 12-inch shells. According to the testimony of NOVAKOVICH, PINCHUK was connected with the executed participant of the military-fascist conspiracy FELDMAN in counter-revolutionary espionage activities.

At the Roslavl car repair plant, a spy-sabotage group consisting of 3 people was liquidated. The Pole PROKOPO-HIV arrested in the case - deputy. early In 1933 he was recruited for espionage work in favor of Poland by the Polish defector KISLYAKOV, and together with the latter he recruited a number of other persons for espionage and sabotage work. The latter are arrested.

Arrested Polish defector MIHNYUK M.A., pom. depot driver st. Unecha of the Belarusian Railway, confessed that in 1930 he was recruited by the assistant chief of the Mikoshevik political police YANUS E. and illegally transferred to the USSR. Here MIKHNYUK, as a resident, established contact with a number of Polish spies deployed by Polish intelligence, in particular, working on the Belarusian railway.

The arrested Pole KRAVTSEVICH S.I., who worked as a mechanic at the Bytsha glass factory, confessed that in 1929 he was recruited by the refugee LOBADINSKY into a spy-sabotage group. On the instructions of the latter, he, in turn, recruited the political defector MACHULSKI. Everyone is arrested

The arrested political defector KOSACH Ivan Ivanovich confessed that in 1929 he was recruited by the confidants of Polish intelligence, the brothers RU BANIK Gerasim and Zakhar. In the same year, together with intelligence agents RUBANIK Zakhar and ZAKRUTO, they were transferred to the USSR with the task of setting themselves up for recruitment by our border guards.

In Vyazma, the border guard CHUEVSKII I.K. was arrested, who since 1928 has been a Polish spy, having been recruited by the Polish intelligence officer RADKEVICH, who fled to Poland.

LENINGRAD

The investigation into the case of the arrested Poles uncovered a number of POV sabotage groups at military factories in Leningrad: at the fuse factory No. 4, at artillery No. 7, at the Bolshevik, Izhora, Kirovsky and shipbuilding factories. Marty. These groups were intended to blow up and set fire to the most important workshops of factories during the mobilization period.

So the engineer of plant No. 4 LABINSKY showed that he was one of the leaders of the POV sabotage group that exists at this plant. For espionage and sabotage work, he was recruited in 1934 by an agent of the 3rd department of the PGSH PODVYSOTSKY. LABINSKY named 11 members of the sabotage group who were preparing acts of sabotage at the assembly shops of the plant.

Independently of the LABINSKY group, at the same factory No. 4, another Polish intelligence station, YURCHAK, was discovered. The last one was completed

bovan in 1930 as a Polish defensive officer and sent to Germany for espionage work among Polish political emigrants. Then, under the guise of a political emigrant, he was transferred to the USSR and, on the instructions of the resident of the 2nd department of the PGSH BRUKOVSKY, entered Leningrad at Plant No. 4, organizing the collection of espionage information and the preparation of sabotage. On behalf of Polish intelligence, he facilitated the penetration and placement of two German intelligence officers, MIKHALEVSKY and ALEXANDER, at the plant.

356

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

At the Izhora plant, the arrested engineer LOSITSKY testified that he was a member of the POV and a resident of the 2nd department of the PGSH. He confessed to preparing acts of sabotage at a number of workshops of the plant and gave out the composition of the sabotage group of POV at the Izhora plant, including 12 people.

According to the shipyard Marty. A former employee of the UNKVD LO VUITSIK, who worked at the plant, confessed that since 1920 he had been a member of the "POV" and that he was associated with the Polish consulate in Leningrad through espionage work, creating two subversive groups at the plant on the instructions of the latter.

At plant No. 7. In addition to the sabotage group PONEVCHINSKY discovered at the beginning of the operation against the Poles, a spy group of master BAKHRUSHIN, recruited in 1936 by an officer of the 2nd department of the Primary School of Staff CHELEVINSKY, and a sabotage group of master Omerchik, created in the amount 7 participants - a resident of the 2nd department of the PGSH STANKEVICH.

As for the Kirov plant, the chief mechanic GLAVDETSKY testified that he was one of the leaders of the sabotage group POV, which was preparing explosions in the energy facilities of the plant. He named 11 members of this sabotage group who had been arrested and some of them had already confessed.

At the Bolshevik plant, the head of the electric power facilities of the plant, SHAICHINSKY, was arrested, who testified that he had been a member of the POV since 1929 and was part of a sabotage group that planned to disable the electric power facilities of the plant. The sabotage group POV was associated with the liquidated Trotskyist organization operating at the plant.

Along with the "POV" groups uncovered during the operation, a number of individual spies and saboteurs were arrested, whose testimony establishes an exceptionally wide front for the penetration of Polish intelligence into Leningrad enterprises and military institutions of the Leningrad Military District.

So, BORTKUN, ex. The secretary of the party bureau of the 15th military warehouse of the LVO testified that he was recruited for espionage work by the Polish spy KOHANO VICH and passed him secret information about the operational work of the warehouse. Arrested in connection with this lekpa of the same warehouse, KOHANOVICH confirmed that he was a Polish intelligence officer and that he was connected with a resident of the 2nd department of the PSh, DOGEL, on whose instructions, in addition to collecting espionage information, he prepared the arson of the 15th warehouse, receiving for execution this task special tools.

Khintsev, a pilot of the 101st squadron, testified that he was a member of the

insurrectionary organization created by the arrested Polish spy Bartaszewicz.

TALAN, a technician of the 53rd air brigade, testified that in 1935 he was recruited by the Polish vice-consul of KARS, to whom he transmitted data on the state of the 53rd air brigade.

MERZHVINSKY, a military engineer of the 9th mechanized brigade of the LVO, testified that in 1925 he was recruited by the priest GASHINSKY for intelligence work in favor of Poland. I handed over to GASHINSKY data on the work of the Luga artillery range.

Significant results are also yielded by the operation in a number of districts and regions that are neither bordering on Poland, nor saturated with a population of Polish nationality.

So, in the Kazakh SSR, the arrested head of the power plant of the Pribalkhashstroy - MONCHUNSKY I.Yu., the head of the water supply of the Pribalkhash building KRASOVSKY V.I. and an employee of the North Aral motor fishing station ROSENBERG V.K. confessed to being Polish spies.

DOCUMENTATION

357

In the city of Gorky, a number of formations created by Polish intelligence at the automobile plant named after. Molotov, Dzerzhinsky defense chemical enterprises and Vyksa metallurgical plant.

The testimony of the arrested LOPATA A.D. - Head of the open-hearth shop of the Vyksa Metallurgical Plant, b. a member of the CPSU (b), expelled for the collapse of the work of the workshop, it was established that he was recruited by the Polish defiance in 1925 and was transferred to the USSR for espionage and sabotage work.

Arriving in Nizhnedneprovsk, LOPATA contacted the Polish spy VENETSKI, who at that time was the director of the plant named after. Comintern, and on the instructions of the latter launched espionage and sabotage work.

With the move to the Vyksa metallurgical plants, LOPATA contacted K.-R. Trotskyite sabotage organization and until the day of his arrest he carried out sabotage and wrecking work at the plant.

Arrested in Stalingrad b. head the pantry of the Barrikady factory was a Pole SHE REIKO V.L., who confessed that in 1932 he was recruited by an employee of the Polish embassy SLYAZHINSKY, who specially came to Stalingrad for this purpose. Shereiko handed over to the Polish intelligence the location plan of the Barrikady plant, a description and the number of artillery systems produced by the plant, as well as the number of guns shipped for the Red Army for 1932-36. SHEREYKO was handed over by SLYAZHINSKY to contact Stankevich, a resident of Polish intelligence, the legal adviser of Neftetorg (arrested).

SPOKEN R.V. was also arrested there. (Pole, kulak, railway track maintenance worker), who testified that in 1932 an employee was recruited

by the Polish consulate in Moscow, BARZHANOVICH, during his visit to the consulate on the issue of leaving for Poland.

Carried out tasks for the collection of intelligence data on railway. road structures, the passage of goods, in particular military ones. Information was systematically passed on directly to the Polish consulates in Moscow and Minsk, as well as to agent Kostyukevich, who was visiting from Minsk.

In 1926, on the instructions of the Minsk consulate, LOZCHNIK legally traveled to Poland, where he graduated from a special intelligence school in Baranovichi (the head of the school, Dzhembitsky), and in 1927 returned to the USSR with espionage and sabotage missions. Subversive activities were timed to coincide with the beginning of Poland's military attack on the USSR. First of all, an explosion of roads was planned. bridge across the river Medveditsa and derailed trains.

Together with Lozhechnik, they graduated from the intelligence school in Baranovichi and a number of other spies named by him were transferred to the USSR.

In the mountains Grozny arrested a number of Polish spies who had penetrated the oil fields of Grozneft. So arrested b. platoon commander of the Red Army Pole IVASHKO S.G. testified that in 1926 he was recruited by his brother Vladimir IVASHKO, who had come illegally from Poland. For a number of years, on the instructions of the Poles, he carried out espionage and subversive work, both in the ranks of the Red Army, and after demobilization at the Groznetfzavody enterprises. In particular, he systematically stole plans and secret documents for Polish intelligence.

A Polish spy, lieutenant of the Polish army KVIATKOVSKIY, who worked as a head. school number 18 and hiding under a false name. KVIATKOWSKI was associated with a group of Polish spies and defectors.

In the mountains Ivanov arrested YEREMA-EREMIN Yu.Ya., a Polish emigrant, a worker of the rolling shop of the Kolchuginsky metalworking plant, testified that since 1931 he had been engaged in espionage and sabotage

358

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

work in favor of Poland. JEREMA-EREMIN was recruited by a Pole BUGAN, who worked as an accountant at a radio station.

On assignment, BUGAN IEREM-EREMIN gave him information about the production capacity and range of products manufactured by the Kolchuginsky plant, and also informed him about the mood of the workers.

In the month of April of this year. for the purpose of sabotage, he disabled the electric crane of the heating furnace, and also tried to break the Trio rolling mill in the rolling shop, but this act of sabotage was prevented by the workers of the shop.

Arrested legal adviser of the Bolshevik factory in the town of Rodniki, Ivanovo Region. PRUSS-ZHUKOVSKIY testified that since 1926 he had been a Polish spy. He named a number of accomplices, some of whom lived in Moscow. This group of persons, in addition to espionage, also prepared for the commission of

racts. The spy KRASNOPOLSKII, in particular, studied the area of Kuntsev highway and the movement of vehicles on it, preparing a terrorist attack against comrade. STALIN, MOLOTOV AND KAGANOVICH. KRASNOPOLSKII instructed PRUSS-ZHUKOVSKY to select a person capable of committing a terrorist act.

In Yaroslavl, the arrested political emigrant SHIKOV testified that in 1926 he was recruited by the 2nd department of the General Staff and, on the instructions of the latter, created an insurgent organization of 67 people, of which 39 were former white officers. and active participants in the Yaroslavl rebellion 20, and espionage and sabotage groups at the Konstantinovsky oil refinery 7 people, Yaroslavgres 3. Arrested according to the testimony of SHIKOV 77 people, 27 people confessed.

In the case of the Ural POV center opened as a result of this operation, sabotage and espionage groups organized by this center were revealed in Sverdlovsk, Nadezhdinsk, Perm, Tagil, Voroshilovsk, Pervouralsk and other areas.

In addition, the arrested head of the center MALINOVSKII named 5 terrorist groups, headed by Polish defectors DAVIDOVICH, KOSACH, MUSHINSKY, ELENBERG and PRUSSAK, who he recruited for this work.

The general leadership of the terrorist groups was entrusted by MALINOVSKII to the chief of staff of the 189th regiment of the internal guard troops of the NKVD Klochko.

The latter, being arrested, confessed that in 1923 he had been recruited in Poland for espionage work and transferred to the USSR with a special assignment to infiltrate the Red Army.

KLOCHKO reveals that he involved pom. the head of the department of the Internal Security Department of the NKVD Troops EMELYANCHIK and the head of the ammunition supply of the 239th escort regiment GODYVSKY. KLOCHKO named a number of POV participants from among the military personnel of the Ural Military District.

According to the testimony of the arrested members of the Ural POV Center, active sabotage groups of the POV were also liquidated at the Uralmashzavod, Ural vagonstroy and Novotrubny plant. A number of unexposed Polish spies are being installed at factories No. 172, No. 9, Perm, Uralenorgo, as well as in military units of the Ural Military District.

All collected espionage materials were sent by the head of the Ural POV Center Malinovsky to Moscow and handed over through special couriers to the assistant military attache of the Polish embassy in Moscow HARLAND.

In Novosibirsk, members of the committee were arrested in connection with the case of the opened underground Siberian Committee of the POV: former PPSovets FILIPPOVICH, personal

DOCUMENTATION

but associated with the spy DOMBAL, the priest, the papal administrator of Siberia ZHUKOVSKY, the captain of the 2nd department of the PGI SOSENKO and the political emigrant PLEBANEK. It has been established that the "Polish military organization" was created in Siberia as early as 1918, actively participated in the Kolchak movement and created illegal Polish legions in Siberia. On the basis of the old cadres of this organization, in 1930, an asset of the illegal Siberian committee of the POV was formed, which contacted those who came to Siberia in 1936 under the pretext of collecting land for the grave of Pilsudski from the place of his Siberian exile by an employee of the Polish embassy LAGODA and former. Pilsudski's adjutant LIPITSKY. The latter gave the task to the committee to prepare an armed action of the Poles in Siberia in the event of a war.

The Siberian Underground Committee of the POV organized Polish rebel legions, sabotage and terrorist groups in the cities of Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Barnaul, Biysk, in the Naryn Territory, etc.

As a result of operations against the Poles, a number of espionage and sabotage groups created by intelligence agents of other states from among Polish counter-revolutionary and nationalist elements were uncovered and liquidated.

So in Leningrad, the arrested Pole PERESVET-SALTON confessed that in 1930 he worked in the Far East, was recruited there by an agent of Japanese intelligence OGAVA. On the instructions of the latter, he created a sabotage network in the electrical industry consisting of 13 people. He maintained contact with Japanese intelligence through specially arrived couriers. PERESVET-SALTON betrayed the safe house of Japanese intelligence.

In Alma-Ata, during the arrest of a Pole of the KINTS, he was found to have Japanese currency, a supply of typographical type, and documents exposing him as a Japanese spy.

In Smolensk arrested filed operation pom. the battery commander of the 85th division of the regiment G. N. SOSNITSKY, who testified that in 1928 he was recruited to work in favor of the Romanian intelligence service by his cousin Alexander SOSNITSKY-GAIDUKEVICH. The latter in 1929, during the next transition from Romania with assignments of a sabotage and terrorist nature, was detained by the Moldavian border detachment and, while under arrest, committed suicide.

After the arrest of SOSNITSKY-GAIDUKEVICH, G.N. until the day of his arrest, he maintained contact with the resident of the Romanian intelligence KU NETSKI N.P. - a teacher in the village of Karantin.

From the moment of recruitment, G.N. SOSNITSKY transmitted information to the Romanian intelligence about the state of the Leningrad, Vitebsk garrisons, 25th and 29th rifle divisions and the Sevastopol anti-aircraft school.

In total, by September 10 this year. 1251 Polish agents were convicted and shot.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs General
Commissar of State Security Yezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 173-188. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "From comrade Yezhov"; "**T. Yezhov*. Very good!

Dig and clean up this Polish-spy dirt in the future. Destroy it in the 'interests of the USSR*. I. Stalin. 14/1*ÿ—37*.

—
underlined in pencil.

360

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 201

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. EZHOVA TO I.V. STALIN
ABOUT THE INVENTOR A. MAISEL

September 16, 1937

No. 60107

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a statement by the inventor Comrade Meisel about the disruption of his invention on air mines.

People's Commissar of
Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. Ezhov

Nikolay Ivanovich!

Already 5 months have passed since the meeting of the Politburo, which discussed issues of invention and the question of delaying work on air mines.

I would not disturb you if I did not know that air mines are at the present time the only weapon of long-range air combat that will decide the fate of air battles in the coming war, that in the field of air weapons the blatant deception continues to this day.

My statement to the Politburo about sabotage and malicious delay of the most important inventions was confirmed. Almost everyone who decided and on whom the implementation of the invention depended, during this time were identified as enemies of the people.

Even 5 years ago, I wrote that Kurchaevsky's guns cannot solve the problems of long-range air combat. However, referring to the guns, the work on the mines was hampered in every possible way. Recently, the UVVO "discovered" that it takes 200 to destroy one enemy aircraft! their aircraft armed with cannons. Now the same wrecking line continues. Didn't even bother to come up with something new. Tov. Alksnis, justifying the destruction of my work, reported to Comrade Stalin that rocket projectiles solve the problem of long-range air combat, citing as evidence that 24 shells shoot down a barrage balloon, which is allegedly very good. In fact (what Comrade Alksnis

silent) it turns out that if 24 shells are needed to shoot down a balloon, then from 1,200 to 1,600 shells are needed to shoot down an aircraft, or in other words, the same hundreds of aircraft as with Kurchevsky's cannons.

Within 2 years, despite 2 decisions of the CPC and direct instructions from Comrade. Stalin at the Politburo on April 7, 1937 about the resumption of work at the last moment, each time the start of work was disrupted by someone. All my new inventions, as a rule, get to the same pests from the department. UVVS weapons, where they die.

My new project "air curtain", which makes it possible for one fighter to destroy an entire squadron of the enemy, did not bother to consider.

I ask you to help, because time is running out, and the threat of war is increasing. During this time, the mines could have already been completed.

I beg you: 1) To help the issue of the resumption of work from the field of written decisions to be put into practice; 2) to order the corresponding employee of the UNKVD to listen to me about the evidence I have about sabotage, which is available in the department. weapons of the UVVS.

DOCUMENTATION

361

While working from home, I completed a new engineering project for a mine. Taking into account the increased speed of aviation during this time, he made a number of significant improvements.

I ask temporarily, until the issue is fully resolved, to give me shelter in some design bureau of the NKVD in order to have a place to store the drawings and calculations that I have made again, and to give 2-3 designers to detail the design of mines and air curtains.

Inventor A. MEISEL.

Member of the CPSU(b), b/w No. 1252535.

09/13/1937

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 343. L. 92-95. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there is a resolution: "It is important, comrade Yezhov. We must try to take Comrade Maisel into our care. I. Stalin.

No. 202

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.F.
GORBACH ON THE "SPY" ORGANIZATION IN THE
WESTERN SIBERIAN REGION

September 16, 1937

No. 60126

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 7828 dated 13/IX— this year. Beginning UNKVD for the West Siberian Territory comrade. GORBACH.

I have given instructions to urgently establish and report to Moscow the exact names and location of RUBTSOV's agents.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

ENCRYPTION

From Novosibirsk

People's Commissar Vnudel - comrade. Ezhov, Deputy People's Commissar - comrade. BELSKY,

3rd Department of the GUGB - comrade. MINAEV

We have liquidated the undercover case "Notables", according to which Vasily Antonovich RUBTSOV, a German company in Primorye "Kunst and Albers", was arrested in Novosibirsk. RUBTSOV's testimony reveals a widely branched espionage and sabotage organization created by Japanese and German intelligence services in the Far East, the East Siberian Region, the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and in a number of other cities of the European part of the USSR. RUBTSOV testified that he was a scout of three intelligence agencies: German since 1903, Japanese since 1918, English since 1920. On the instructions of these intelligence agencies, RUBTSOV created a wide spy network in the Far East, which he led until his first arrest in 1930. During the period of cleaning the Far East of the anti-Soviet element, the agents recruited by RUBTSOV, being evicted from the Far East, settled in a number of cities in the East Siberian region, Krasnoyarsk Territory, ZSK, Kazakhstan, European

362

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

part of the USSR, some of the agents remained in the Far East. After being released from exile in 1933, RUBTSOV arrived in Novosibirsk, contacted the secretary of the German consulate in Novosibirsk, KREMER, on whose instructions he again began intelligence activities. In the same year, the Japanese intelligence officer FEDOROVICH left Harbin for the USSR with broad assignments, established contact with RUBTSOV on espionage and sabotage work. From Novosibirsk, FEDOROVITCH went to Rostov-on-Don, where spy materials were sent by special courier to RUBTSOV. From Rostov-on-Don FYODOROVICH sent the received spy information directly to the Japanese embassy in Moscow. In the order of implementation of tasks, no

German, Japanese intelligence RUBTSOV restored contact with 17 old agents in the cities of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Cheremkhovo, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Kuzbass, Alma-Ata, Tula, Ivanovo-industrial region, Moscow and Rostov-on-Don. Maintained contact with agents through personal visits. Over the past three years, RUBTSOV has collected and handed over to the Japanese-German intelligence services valuable espionage information about the Red Army, railway transport and heavy industry. Details by mail.

13.9.37 No. 7828

GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 190-192. Script. Typescript.

No. 203

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM

G.F. GORBACH ON THE PROGRESS OF THE POLISH
OPERATION IN THE WEST SIBERIAN REGION

September 16, 1937

No. 60129

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 7827 of the head of the UNKVD of the West Siberian region, comrade. Gorbach.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

September 13
From Novosibirsk

In pursuance of your Directive No. 00485 on the Polish operation. As of September 10, a total of 1,490 people were arrested, of which: 944 Polish defectors, 30 Polish prisoners of war, 30 political emigrants, members of the PPS, and other Polish K.R. nationalists - 471. Of this number, they worked: in the defense industry - 144, in transport - 22, in the defense industry - 368, in agricultural and other institutions - 954, the Red Army - 6.

According to the testimonies of prisoners of war of the Austrian army of Polish nationalists VOLINEPETSKY, SCHEPANKEVICH, an underground safe house of Polish intelligence in Novosibirsk was opened, where agents were received by the head of the Novosibirsk branch, comrade. PLEBANEC. PRIEST

DOCUMENTATION

363

KIY named 9 people of Polish agents. Shchepankevich testified that he was a member of the Novosibirsk Committee of the POV and a recruiter of the organization, led a group of Polish saboteurs on railway transport and collective farms adjacent to Novosibirsk in the amount of 20 people. Arrested in the Tomsk branch of the POV, members of the PPV ZOMBEK, SHMULSKY and the Polish nationalist KHAKATSKY testified that they were recruiters of the organization, created sabotage and terrorist groups from among Polish defectors and nationalists and directed their activities. According to the testimony of SHMULSKY, DMITRICHENKO, KHOKATSKY, connections were established between the Tomsk branch of the POV * with a group of spies * of the 78th Infantry Division through the former officer of the Polish legions Kolchak, captain of the Red Army LUKASHUK, a member of the Biysk branch of the POV. A defector officer of the Polish army IGNATOVICH testified that he had been transferred to our territory by Polish military intelligence, he named Polish spy-sabotage **residences** in Minsk, Astrakhan, Omsk, Biysk.

09/13/37

GOVBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 193-195. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Yezhov! We need to clarify the questions (see the text of Gorbach's notes). St*.

There are Stalin's handwritten notes on the margins:

* "what kind of groups of spies?"

__ "Who exactly did you name?"

No. 204

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF M.D. BERMAN ON THE POLISH
MILITARY ORGANIZATION

September 17, 1937

No. 60147

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the note by direct wire No. 718/SN of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR comrade. Berman.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

People's Commissar VNUDEL comrade. Ezhov

As a result of the Polish operation in Vitebsk, the POV organization was uncovered, which carried out active espionage and sabotage work, prepared poisons for sabotage purposes (seized by search), weapons (partially seized) and prepared a central terrorist act. The leaders of the organization are: VRUBLEVSKY Anton Vatslavovich, teacher of mathematics and radio engineering, member of the POV since 1919, recruited in Kyiv by the Polish consul; SNARSKY Alexander Alexandrovich, engineer, member of the POV since 1918, recruited by the Polish consul in Leningrad; DIAKEVICH

364

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Frants Romualdovich, electrical technician, member of the POV since 1932, recruited in Vitebsk; MAKOSEVSKY Georgy Ivanovich, teacher of mathematics, member of the POV since 1931, recruited in Vitebsk; VANIDOVSKII Mikhail, technician, member of the POV since 1925, recruited in Vitebsk. The testimonies of those arrested who confessed revealed long-term sabotage activities at a number of Vitebsk enterprises. The most important acts of sabotage were repeated (over 50) accidents at the Vitebsk substation of Belelectroenergo and the burning of a furniture factory. The organization was guided mainly by the Polish mission in Moscow through the sister of the aforementioned VRUBLEVSKII, who lives in Moscow, VRUBLEVSKAYA Maria Vatslavovna, married to the chemical engineer *BOGDANOV* Mikhail, also a Polish agent. The testimonies of those arrested identified 44 members of the organization, including *KOKHANOV* Lev Isaevich, who lives in Moscow, the first husband of Maria VRUBLEVSKAYA. When VRUBLEVSKY Anthony Vatslavovich was in Leningrad in the period 1920-1924. was a courier for intelligence work. *SNARSKY* Alexander Alexandrovich, 28 years old, civil engineer, lives in Astrakhan, is the son of Alexander Alexandrovich, who was arrested in Vitebsk SNARSKO, the second son Georgy Aleksandrovich SNARSKII, 23 years old, graduated from the Kharkov State Trade Institute, lives in Kharkov. ORLOV Ivan Mikhailovich, ORLOVA Antonina Tikhonovna and NIKOLSKAYA Evgenia Ananievna, living in Leningrad and connected by intelligence work with SNARSKII, who is in Astrakhan. LEWANDOVSKII, a teacher at a Polish school in Vitebsk, who left for Moscow (installation data are being clarified), and MALINOVSKII Romuald, a former officer of the Polish army, a defector, moved from Vitebsk to Moscow in 1934. SNAR are connected with the organization's terrorist work. In 1934, they had meetings with Mikhail Nikolayevich SNARSKII, a member of a foreign terrorist organization, who came from Poland on false documents in the name of BERDICK. All identified members of the organization who are in Belarus are arrested. In Polotsk, Adam Kazimirovich, an accountant of the district collective farm, arrested on the Polish line of NEMIRO, confessed to being recruited and transferred to the USSR by Polish intelligence agencies in 1924. Communication was maintained through an agent of Polish intelligence, his cousin NEMIRO Florian, who illegally visited Soviet territory. In 1927, on the instructions of the Polish intelligence NEMIRO, Adam Kazimirovich left for the Donbass, where he was contacted by the resident of the Polish intelligence ALTMAN Isaak Efimovich, together with whom he recruited a ventilation foreman for sabotage work at the mine named after Karl Marx, Yenakievsky district, VOROSTYANSKY Alec

sandra and foreman of the timber warehouse of the mine named after Karl Marx GUTNIKO VA Georgy Timofeevich, who staged an explosion of the mine in 1929 and a collapse in the mine NR-2. In July 1932, NEMIRO returned to Belorussia, where a Polish intelligence courier, SEREDEVSKII, established contact with him, to whom NEMIRO later passed espionage materials on military construction.

BERMAN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 196-199. Copy. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Confusing message. Is everything on the invited persons were found and arrested, it is not clear whether they need to be arrested. I. Stalin.

"*—* Surnames are circled.

DOCUMENTATION

365

No. 205

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM

G.F. GORBACH ON THE "SPY" ORGANIZATION IN THE
WESTERN SIBERIAN REGION (55)

September 17, 1937

No. 60162

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 7837 of the Head of the UNKVD for the West Siberian Territory, comrade. GORBACH

ENCRYPTION

From Novosibirsk

People's Commissar Introduced Comrade Yezhov

We have arrested an active member of the Polish organization of "military brothers" captain of the 2nd Department of the Polish General Staff PETROVSKY Peter Do minikovich, who worked in Novosibirsk in the canteen of the UNKVD.

According to the testimony of Petrovsky, a number of * spy residencies * are opened in Kyiv, Moscow, Siberia and the Shepetovsky district of the Ukrainian SSR, planted by the brother of the arrested captain of the 2nd Division of the Polish main headquarters

Petrovsky and an employee of the Polish embassy in Moscow. Petrovsky for intelligence work in favor of Poland was recruited in 1930 by an employee of the Polish embassy YANISHEVSKY in Moscow. On the instructions of JANI SHEVSKOY, he was engaged in sending money to Polish intelligence officers in Kyiv, Odessa and Sverdlovsk. In 1931, while trying to illegally cross the border, Petrovsky was tried. After his release from the camp in 1934, PETROVSKII was contacted by an employee of the Polish embassy YANISHEVSKY who came to Siberia and gave him the task of creating spy residences in Novosibirsk and Mariinsk. YANISHEVSKY connected Petrovsky with the head of the Novosibirsk branch of the Polish Military Organization, a political emigrant, PLEBANEK. On the instructions of PLEBANEK PETROVSKY in July of this year. went to work in the dining room of the UNKVD, prepared the mass poisoning of UNKVD employees by using poisonous substances that the Japanese consulate in Novosibirsk promised to give. On instructions from PLEBANEK, PETROVSKY contacted a POV member, UNKVD hairdresser VERTINSKY, from whom he received espionage information about the work of the UNKVD. VERTINSKY in June of this year. dismissed from work. When arrested, VERTINSKY testified that he had been recruited for espionage work in favor of Poland by the defector SCHLESINGER in the summer of 1932.

On VERTINSKY's testimony, he told SCHLEZINGER information about the structure of our organs, the layout of the house of pre-trial detention and the rooms of the NKVD, the characteristics of the leading officials, the life of the employees, the operations carried out on holidays, stole and handed over the list of those arrested. In 1932, VERTINSKY got in touch with PET

366

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

ROVSKY, to whom he also gave a number of espionage information. Details by mail.

September 15, 1937 No. 7837

GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 200-202. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "T. Yezhov. Not everything is clear (see text)". there is a note in the margins:

"What kind of residency? Names, surnames. Art.*.

No. 206

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTION OF THE NKVD" WITH THE APPENDIX
OF THE DRAFT OPERATIVE ORDER No. 00593 (56)

September 19, 1937

107 - Question of the NKVD.

Approve the draft closed letter of the NKVD of the USSR and the order on measures in connection with the terrorist sabotage and espionage activities of the Japanese agents from the so-called Harbinites.

OPERATIONAL ORDER OF THE
PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

The NKVD authorities recorded up to 25,000 people, the so-called "Harbinites" (former employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway and re-emigrants from Manchukuo), who settled in the railway transport and in the industry of the Union.

Accounting intelligence and operational materials show that the overwhelming majority of Harbin residents who left for the USSR consist of former white officers, policemen, gendarmes, members of various emigrant spy-fascist organizations, etc. The vast majority of them are agents of Japanese intelligence, which for a number of years sent them to the Soviet Union for terrorist, sabotage and espionage activities.

Investigative materials can also serve as proof of this. For example, in the railway transport and industry over the past year, up to 4,500 Harbin residents have been repressed for active terrorist and sabotage and espionage activities. The investigation of their cases reveals the carefully prepared and systematically carried out work of Japanese intelligence to organize sabotage and spy bases from among the Harbinites on the territory of the Soviet Union.

Sending out, under this order, a closed letter about the terrorist, sabotage and espionage activities of Japanese agents from Harbin, in order to defeat the spy cadres from Harbin, planted in transport and in the industry of the USSR,

DOCUMENTATION

367

I ORDER:

1. Starting on October 1, 1937, a broad operation to eliminate the sabotage, espionage and terrorist personnel of Harbin residents in transport and industry.

2. All residents of Harbin are subject to arrest:

a) exposed and suspected of terrorist, sabotage, espionage and wrecking activities;

b) former whites, remigrants, both those who emigrated during the years of the civil war, and military personnel of various white formations;

c) former members of anti-Soviet political parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks)

ki, etc.);

d) members of Trotskyist and right-wing formations, as well as all Harbin residents associated with the activities of these anti-Soviet formations;

e) members of various emigrant fascist organizations ("Russian All-Military Union", "Union of Cossack Villages", "Union of Musketeers", "Yellow Union", "Black Ring", "Christian Union of Young People", "Russian Student Society", "Brotherhood of Russian Truth", "Labour Peasant Party", etc.);

f) who served in the Chinese police and troops both before the capture of Manchuria by the Japanese and after the formation of Manchukuo;

g) who served in foreign firms, primarily Japanese, as well as White Guards (firm CHURINA and others.);

h) graduated from the well-known courses "International", "Slavia", "Prague" in Harbin;

i) owners and co-owners of various enterprises in Harbin (restaurants, hotels, garages, etc.);

j) illegally entered the USSR without Soviet documents established by law;

k) who took Chinese citizenship, and then transferred to Soviet citizenship;

l) former smugglers, criminals, dealers in opium, morphine, etc.;

m) members of counter-revolutionary sectarian groups.

3. Arrests to be made in two stages:

a) first of all, arrest all Harbin residents working in the NKVD, serving in the Red Army, in railway and water transport, in the civil and air fleet, in military factories, in the defense shops of all other factories, in the electric power facilities of all industrial enterprises, at gas and oil refineries, in the chemical industry;

b) in the second place - all the other Harbin residents working in Soviet institutions, state farms, collective farms, etc.

4. Harbin residents who do not fall under the second category listed in paragraph 2, regardless of the presence of compromising data, should be immediately removed from railway, water and air transport, as well as from industrial enterprises, while taking measures to prevent further access to these objects.

5. Investigate the cases of the arrested Harbin residents to deploy in such a way as to fully expose all participants in subversive espionage and terrorist organizations and groups in the shortest possible time.

A new network of spies, wreckers and saboteurs revealed during the investigation of the Harbin residents - IMMEDIATELY ARRESTED.

368

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

6. Divide all arrested residents of Harbin into two categories:

a) to the first category - to include all residents of Harbin exposed to sabotage and espionage, terrorist, wrecking and anti-Soviet activities, who are subject to execution;

b) to the second category - all other, less active residents of Harbin, subject to imprisonment and camps, for a period of 8 to 10 years.

7. For residents of Harbin, classified during the investigation into the first and second categories, to compile an album every ten days (a separate certificate for each arrested person) with a specific presentation of investigative and undercover materials that determine the degree of guilt of the arrested.

The album should be sent to the NKVD of the USSR for approval.

The assignment of the arrested Harbin residents to the 1st and 2nd categories is made on the basis of intelligence and investigative data - by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the republic - the head of the UNKVD, region or territory, the head of the DTO UTB NKVD, together with the relevant prosecutor of the republic, region, edges, roads.

8. After the approval of the lists of the NKVD of the USSR and the prosecutor of the Union, the sentence should be carried out - IMMEDIATELY.

9. Release from prisons and camps of previously convicted residents of Harbin who are serving sentences for espionage, sabotage and sabotage - STOP.

For these persons to submit materials for consideration at the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR.

10. Use the Harbin operation to acquire qualified agents, taking measures to prevent doubles from entering the secret apparatus.

11. Complete the operation by December 25, 1937.

12. With regard to the families of the repressed residents of Harbin, be guided by my order 00486 of August 15, 1937.

13. Report the progress of the operation to me by telegraph every five days (5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th and 30th of each month).

p.p. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 223-228. Copy. Typescript.

Published: Memorial Aspect, 1993, No. 1(3).

Protocol number 53.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yezhov.

No. 207

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.S. LYUSHKOVA
ABOUT THE OPERATION TO REMOVE KOREANS
FROM THE FAR EASTERN TERRITORY

September 19, 1937 No.
60205

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 8241-8250 of the Head of the UNKVD for the Far Eastern Territory, comrade. LYUSHKOVA.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION

369

People's Commissar VNUDEL comrade. Ezhov

I report that as a result of the investigation into the case of the crash of the echelon of Koreans, the driver of the train BARAKHTIN and the chief conductor ROMANOV confessed to having committed the crash. ROMANOV testified that in 1934, while working on Sakhalin in the oil concession fields, he was recruited to work in favor of the Japanese by the geologist LAUTHENSTREGER, I repeat LAUTHENSTREGER. In 1935, on the instructions of LAUTHENSTREGER, ROMANOV went to work on the railroad with the aim of espionage and finding out possible points of sabotage work. While working on the Far Eastern railway. contacted the head of the station Dormidontovka KOLODTSU KOM, who, having found out his address, attracted him to the Trotskyist organization. 10.IX. KOLODTSUK instructed ROMANOV to crash the train with the Koreans being evicted. I.IX ROMANOV received an order from the Vyazemskaya station, train No. 505, in which the Koreans were traveling. At the same time he learned that the train was being driven by the driver BARAKHTIN (expelled in 1934 from the purge party, with whom they had conversations during a number of trips, later they opened up to each other in their K.-R. activities). Upon arrival at the Dormidontovka station, where the train was delayed, ROMANOV told BARAKHTIN that he had the task of wrecking the train.

They agreed on such a plan of the crash, in which they themselves would be saved: on the stretch between Dormidontovka-Khoka on level ground while the train was moving, ROMANOV would uncouple the train. Disconnect the coupler. This will cause emergency self-braking of the front cars of the detached train and a strong pressure of its tail section, as a result, the middle cars will be squeezed out with an inevitable catastrophe, since, wandering, cars without a steam locomotive at high speed should not stay on the way. BARAKHTIN at the moment when the train passes the rise on the specified stage without slowing down

while moving, it will give a small brake, which will induce ROMANOV to uncouple the automatic coupling. It was agreed that during the investigation BARAKHTIN should declare that he did not feel jerks, knew nothing and noticed the incident when he saw that there was no train. When we left Dormidontovka, ROMANOV sat on buffers between cars 3 and 4. After the rise, when the train reached a level place, thanks to the unevenness arranged by BARAKHTIN, ROMANOV, standing on the third car, uncoupled. When the locomotive and three carriages began to move away, ROMANOV, in order not to move away from the crash site, jumped to the ground. Approaching the crash site and seeing that the fallen first car had knocked out a piece of rail, ROMANOV began to spread rumors that the crash had occurred because of the track. Barakhtin showed the same. ROMANOV shows that KOLODTSUK told him that the organization includes Nach. 2nd Department of the movement service SLEPKOVNIN, and also called him, as members of the organization, early. station Volochaevka, whose name ROMANOV does not remember. KOLODTSUK told ROMANOV that this early. station in July of this year, the freight train crashed. When checking, it was established that indeed at that time there was a wreck of a freight train at the Volochaevka station, 18 wagons were broken. The machinist BARAKHTIN gives completely similar testimony about the time and nature of his connections with ROMANOV and the circumstances of the crash. BARAKHTIN testifies that back in 1929 he worked together with GOLBERT (former deputy chief, shot), with whom in 1932 he was recruited into a Trotskyist organization. To the questions posed by us without reference to a specific case, the experts gave an opinion on the possibility of committing a wreck of the law.

370

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

known by the ROMANOV and BARAKHTIN method. Very important is the testimony of VOLSKY, who today filed an application in your name, in which, not knowing about the perpetrators, he reveals the organizers of the crash, committed on the instructions of the Japanese.

VOLSKY reveals that he is a Japanese spy. He was recruited in the city of Nikolsk-Ussuriysk (now Voroshilov) in 1920 under the following circumstances: being the Plenipotentiary of the Primorsky Military Council for the Nikolsk-Ussuriysk garrison, upon the entry of Japanese troops, he was arrested. Prior to his arrest, he came across on various issues with the N. of the division, General ODAGIRI, who, after his arrest, offered him to work on assignments from the Japanese General Staff. VOLSKI agreed and was released. After the departure of the Japanese, they set before VOLSKII a task designed for long-term work to create conditions for the future capture of Primorye. Being in a responsible leadership position in the region, VOLSKY promoted by all means the settlement of Primorye by Koreans and the complete economic capture of Primorye, selected for this the appropriate cadres of nationalistic Koreans for responsible positions. VOLSKY names as a major Japanese resident in the Korean regions Kim Afanasy, with whom LAVRENTIEV himself was associated. KIM secretary of the District Committee of the CPSU (b) Posyet. In his Nos. 7900 and 07905 of 10/IX he reported on the testimony of DERIBAS to the task of LAVRENTIEV to save KIM Afanasy in connection with his arrest. When checking, I found that at the end of 1935 the K.R.

botniks, including 18 people. During the investigation, KIM Athanasius, LU-KU-SEN and others began to testify that among them the question of separating the Korean regions into an autonomous region was being discussed. LU-KU-SEN stated that one meeting was held at LAVRENT'EV's apartment, during which ministerial portfolios were distributed, etc. However, on the instructions of BARMINSKY, everything was turned into a joke, the case was closed, they were sent to a Special Conference, and they all got off with exile and a camp. In recent years, VOLSKI received instructions through the Japanese consul general in Vladivostok, VATANABE, and then in Khabarovsk, through the consul SIMADA. VOLSKY testifies that he informed SIMAD about the government's decision to evict the Koreans, who already knew about it from the DRUSKISA road. SIMADA told VOLSKI that the surprise of the eviction had taken the Japanese by surprise. The Bolsheviks, he said, chose a good time for this, since the events in China diverted significant forces of the Japanese army. However, there is no time to waste, because the measures of the Bolsheviks in the Far East (arrests, deportation, etc.) narrow the base for Japan. Since, according to SIMADA, the eviction creates great nervousness, even among Soviet-minded Koreans, this provision must be used. SIMADA instructed VOLSKI to confuse all cases of eviction, to embitter the Koreans, and at the same time to launch agitation against the eviction. SIMADA told VOLSKI that in order to completely disorganize the eviction and create a traffic jam on the road, DRUSKISU was given the task of organizing a series of train wrecks from the very first days, and then delaying the removal, referring to the disruption of traffic. According to SIMADA, many Japanese agents from among the Koreans were transferred to the Korean regions to prepare an uprising, that by the time the population was notified of the eviction to the shores of Posyet, under the guise of fishing on scows and boats, several thousand Koreans would be thrown out, who would land on the Soviet coast at night. and scattered throughout the regions. SI

DOCUMENTATION

371

MADA agreed that at the right time the corresponding section of the border would be opened for landing by the head of the Posyet border detachment, Gorkin, who is known to the Japanese as a participant in the organization of the border unit and is associated with him. There is evidence about Gorkin that when he was in Moscow studying at the Higher School of Staff, he was noticed in Trotskyism, but who worked in Moscow as the head of the Political Department of the OSNAZ BOGDANOV division, helped him get out. While on vacation, GORKIN was on a Trotskyist sortie, but was again rescued by BOGDANOV (we interrogate BOGDANOV about him). SI MADA said that the uprising would begin with a provocative murder of a Korean by one of the border guards during the eviction, and this would be used as a pretext for an uprising. The rebels must turn to Japanese Korea for help. Korea has prepared weapons and detachments of Korean "volunteers" who will immediately cross the border. It is important now, according to SIMADA, to draw the attention of the Bolsheviks to their own affairs, to divert them from the events in China and from Manchuria, SIMADA also agreed that in the troops of the Primorsky group, and especially the Pacific Fleet, despite the arrests, there are people in major posts that will help. VOLSKY shows in detail about the work he carried out to sabotage and disrupt the operation of part of the notification of recalculations of the population, the reception of livestock, etc., as well as the role in this matter of the former secretary of the Posiet District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, SINKOV (at my suggestion, the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) previously expelled from the party, arrested for sabo-

type of operation).

With regard to DRUSKYS, VOLSKY testifies that he first learned about his involvement in the organization from LEMBERG, when DRUSKYS was still on the Molotov railway, this was then reported by SIMADA, who told him about his connection with him. DRUSKIS also handed over VOLSKIY to WESTERN, saying that DRUSKIS, while working in the Ukraine, was attracted to the organization by LIFSHITS. WESTERN stated that DRUSKIS is equivalent to the deceased LEMBERG. Following SIMAD's instructions, VOLSKI discussed with DRUSKIS the schedule for transporting the deportees, and they agreed how everyone in their industry was disrupting the operation. DRUSKIS said that he would personally go to the place of eviction and "prepare such surprises that the sky would be sick." DRUSKIS said that under all the conditions of the crash, the train from the first echelons, he would pass through STEPIN (head of the Khabarovsk department of the traffic service of the Far Eastern Railway, member of the CPSU (b) since 1927). This is the same STEPIN, who was shown by the performer of the crash ROMANOV. It was reported to STEPIN that there were testimonies of five convicts, formerly members of the Trotskyist organization on the road: GRE CHIHO, SHAKHNO, KALASHNIKOV, LANDO and KHOLOPOV, I requested a sanction for his arrest from the 6th Department of the IUGB No. 44552 of September 5. Noteworthy in this connection is VOLSKII's testimony that Zapadny told him and KRUTOV that shortly before Lifshitz's arrest, he had received instructions from Moscow to organize surveillance of Lifshitz, who was in Khabarovsk. According to ZAPADNY, he warned Lifshitz about this, who destroyed a number of documents in his presence. At the same time, Lifshitz and Western agreed on a line of conduct in the event of Lifshitz's arrest, the latter assured Western that he would not extradite him. After Lifshitz's arrest, Western, with the knowledge of DERIBAS, again summoned Lifshitz to his office, where he promised not to extradite him. VOLSKY showed about the work of the organization, named the center consisting of LAVRENT'EV, KRU TO-VA, DERIBAS, KOSIOR, SCHMIDT, SANGURSKY. The center was connected with GAMARNIK and RYKOV. Arrival played a very important role.

372

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

RYKOV to the Far East in 1936. VOLSKY calls it a general inspection tour of the representative of the joint center in Moscow before the implementation of plans for a conspiracy in alliance with the Japanese. On LAVRENT'EV's instructions, everyone tried to receive RYKOV with the greatest pomp, in order to show the Japanese that the rightists were the force in the Far East. VOLSKY - names the members of the PTUKHU organization, which was processed by LAVRENT'EV, who used his dissatisfaction with the removal from the post of the first Secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU (b). After the arrest of LAVRENT'EV, KRUGLOV and others and the departure of DERIBAS, a new center was organized consisting of PTUKH, SLINKIN, VOL'SKIY, WESTERN, and VAINERO SA (the former head of the Political Directorate of OKDVA). VOLSKY names a number of regional, regional and military workers as members of the organization: PETROV, 'PATRIKEYEV', CHERNIN, LIBERBERG, LEIKIN, LEBEDEV, POTEMKIN, PASHKOVSKY, NOVLYANSKY, OVCHINNIKOV, VASILEVICH, SHRAIBERG, SMOLIN, CHEMANOV, BERKOVICH, CHAPEL YGINA - all arrested, MINSKIKH, 'GRINEVICH', Buzin, "Frenkel ** (head of Bamlag), SHCHENENOVICH (committee of reserves of the UNKVD), 'ANDRIANOV * (Glavvryba, about whom I reported No. 62248 of 16 September

October (all arrested).

Worthy of attention is the testimony of VOLSKY about the last meeting of SI MADA - in September, during which SIMADA showed dissatisfaction with the disruption of the uprising in the Korean districts, in relation to this due to numerous arrests, increased security of the resettlement district and measures along the border. SIMADA instructed me to contact DRUSKIS and convey the need to organize the collapse of the echelons, which, in his opinion, could cause a sharp anger of the Koreans and push them to active actions. However, on 10/IX VOLSKY was arrested. Speaking about the sabotage of the eviction, VOLSKY shows that he was able to carry out subversive work, since through the Regional Executive Committee the work of resettlement was actually shifted to the assistant secretary of the Regional Committee 'SOKOLOV*', who unconditionally carried out his instructions. In this regard, VOLSKY shows that, despite his expulsion from the party for his connection with the enemies of the people by the primary party organization, he met with a good attitude towards himself from the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, continued to remain in the post of acting Chairman of the Regional Committee, that when he turned to VAREIKIS with the question of whether to continue the work, he answered him that he would work, we will analyze the matter in the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, since the decision of the primary instance is not yet final. Back in the summer, when VOLSKY returned from Kamchatka, in connection with the arrests of KRUTOV and others, he raised the question of the inconvenience of leaving him in the post of deputy to VAREIKIS. Chairman of the Regional Executive Committee, but, motivating his closeness with the arrested, VAREIKIS replied: "Sit down and work, we trust you." VOLSKY shows that he was surprised by such unexpected support, since not only did he not think about retaining his post, but he was also afraid of being exposed and arrested. Shortly before his arrest, having been expelled from the party, on September 6, VOLSKY came to the podium for a fashion demonstration with regional leaders. I must note that shortly before VOLSKII's arrest, I received from VAREIKIS an order from the regional troika for eviction for signature, which, in addition to what had been agreed upon, was signed by VOLSKII. I introduced amendments and told VAREIKIS that I did not intend to put my signature together with VOLSKI, only then this signature was withdrawn. At the same time (simultaneously with the sending of telegrams No. 7900 and 7905 reported to you) he raised the question at an open meeting of the bureau of the regional committee

DOCUMENTATION

373

VKP(b) about the sabotage of the resettlement and the unsatisfactory leadership of VAREIKIS in this important operation. At my insistence, the secretary of the Posyet district committee of the CPSU(b) was expelled from the party for sabotage, a severe reprimand was issued for inaction and disruption of loading to the secretary of the Primorsky regional committee of the CPSU(b) and the chairman of the regional executive committee, and a reprimand to DRUSKISU. VAREIKIS objected to these measures for a long time, but was forced to agree. I consider it necessary to dwell in detail on these circumstances of my information to you, since, in general, it is not felt that the regional committee of the CPSU (b) actively joins itself and mobilizes party organizations to actively expose enemies or picks up arrests carried out by the NKVD to identify all connections. In all this, the style of work of VAREIKIS himself is of great importance, which does not correspond well to the atmosphere of the Far East - too much concern for oneself and one's leisure. I ask you to authorize the arrests of the heads of the Dormidontovka and Volochaevka stations. Arrest immediately upon notification

deputy road chief. Please note, WINEROS has been suspended from work.

17/IX. No. 8241-8250

LYUSHKOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 203-215. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are Stalin's handwritten notes: "T. Yezhov. It is necessary to arrest: 1) Gorkin (head of the border guard in Posyet), 2) Stepin (head of the traffic department in Khabarovsk), 3) Grinevich, 4) Vaineros. I. St.; What Frankel are you talking about? St.".

— Surnames are circled.

— There is a handwritten note in the margin: "Is Frenkel arrested?"

No. 208

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM L.B. ZALINA
ON THE RESULTS OF THE POLISH OPERATION IN KAZAKHSTAN

September 19, 1937

No. 60217

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 2222 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Kazakh SSR comrade. ZALINA.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

From Alma-Ata

People's Commissar Introduced comrade Ezhov, deputy. People's Commissar Comrade Belsky,

3rd department Comrade MINAEV

As of September 15, 405 people were arrested in Kazakhstan in connection with the Polish operation, including 49 people in Turksib, 2 in the NKVD troops, and 2 employees of the NKVD of the Kazakh SSR. Out of 405 we have: 210 defectors, 2 former prisoners of war, Polish K.-r. assets - 162. Among those arrested we have: UVO - 2, POV - 6, PPS - 2, ESDEK - 1, "Ridna Khata" - 2,

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

selrob - 4, archer - 2. We have 44 people who confessed, 30 of them were espionage, k.-r. 14. Noteworthy testimonies for the five-day reporting period: 1) Pole PLASHKEVICH NIKIFOR VIKTOROVICH, a former administrative exile, at the time of his arrest without specific occupations, confessed to being recruited in 1927 in Leningrad by Polish intelligence, in Moscow by Polish spies OSHANIN, ERLOVI, NIKOLA GRUSHEVSKY, VYACHESLAV SVITKOVSKY (Leningrad informed). In 1933, while in Khabarovsk, he was recruited by Japanese intelligence and had contact with the Japanese spy SIBLUKOV Anatoly (Khabarovsk was informed), on assignment from foreign intelligence, he collected espionage information about the defense industry and aircraft engine building. In 1934, at the station N.V. Plashkevich committed an act of sabotage - the collapse of a military echelon. 2) The defector MALCHEVSKY MAXIM PLATONOVICH (see our No. 2127) admitted to being recruited by the Polish political police - the commandant of the town of Gosha - Zheznik. On assignment, he recruited people for espionage and terrorist activities on the territory of the USSR. They recruited and transferred: BONDARETS Stepan Alexandrovich, SOLIMCHUK Roman Petrovich (arrested), PANAI Arseniy Ivanovich (established), IVANIN Petr (established), KURUNETS Afanasy, who has been working at a tractor plant in Chelyabinsk since 1935 (Chelyabinsk informed). In 1935, Malchevsky himself, on the instructions of Zheznik, crossed illegally to the USSR to conduct espionage and subversive work. 3) The Pole RIESENBURG Robert Fridrichovich, before his arrest, the land surveyor of the regional ZU showed that he was in reality a Polish officer Yavorsky Vladislav Yanovich, who was recruited by a defiant in 1920 and, under the guise of a convicted person by a specially staged court, was left in Minsk prison during the retreat of the Polish army, with the aim of espionage activities on the territory of the USSR, when recruited by Major DOMBROVSKY, he was given the task of collecting information on the economy of the border regions of Ukraine, railways and highways, and training insurgent personnel. Maintained contacts with intelligence through the Kharkov Polish consulate. The last meeting with the Polish intelligence officer KSHIVATSKY (wanted) was in July 1937 at the Ushtobe Turksib station. 4) The defector STAKHOVICH Andrey Mikhailovich testified that in 1923 he served in the Polish police and was recruited by the chief Yablonsky to be transferred to the USSR for espionage and sabotage purposes. In January 1924, STAKHOVICH illegally crossed the border, having the task in Kyiv to contact the priest Sokolsky, he received the password: "I came from the 9th district" or "I came from Ternopil." From Sokolsky to receive documents and a specific assignment for espionage activities. 5) POUKH defector Vyacheslav Osipovich testified that in September 1931 Stanislav, a Polish intelligence officer, SHAREIKO, recruited him and transferred him to the USSR for espionage activities. POUKH crossed the border with fellow villager BOLTACH Nikolai, who was sent back to Poland by the border guard. POUKH received a report to his sister *DURMANDINA Efimiya and her husband DURMANDIN Ivan*, living in Bobruisk. Through them, he was supposed to contact and receive specific assignments from a resident of Polish intelligence (Bobruisk is informed). 6) Defector, deserter of the Polish army GURSKY Stanislav Ivanovich, aka KI LESHCHIK Franz Ivanovich testified that in 1924, while serving in the border command of the Sarpensky district, he was recruited for work abroad by the Shepetovsky border detachment, after a failure he was recruited by captain ZEDENSKY and

DOCUMENTATION

375

transferred to the USSR with the task of taking advantage of the confidence of the Soviet border authorities to settle in Shepetovka, where to get a job on the railway transport and organize a safe house for Polish intelligence.

15.09. No. 2222

ZALIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 254. L. 216-220. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten resolution: "To Yezhov. Someone needs to be arrested (cf. in tex those). St.".

— in the margins there is a mark: "Ar.".

No. 209

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhov to I.V.
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM O.Ya. NODEVA
ON THE TROTSKIST ORGANIZATION IN TURKMENIA

September 19, 1937

No. 60238

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 1644 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Turkmen SSR comrade. Nodeva.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov
MEMORANDUM No. 32673

Ashgabat

September 18, 1937

In addition to report No. 75398 dated August 31, I report that the arrested editor of Turkmengosizdat Kultiev Dangatar testified that back in 1919, during the retreat of the British and Whites, Sakhat Muradov gave the directive to formally abandon the fight against the Bolsheviks, join the Communist Party and start subversive work from within.

Ishan Khodzhanov, Rakhimbaev, Khadzhibaev, Ryskulov, Khadzhanov, Sikezbaev, Atabaev, known to you, participated in the conspiracy.

The leading role of Sakhat Muradov in all subsequent k.r. work in Turkmenistan, including in a bloc with the Trotskyists, is indisputably proven by the testimony of many of those arrested, including Sakhatov and Aytakov. The latter admitted his participation in the c.r. organizations since 1924, but so far evades detailed testimony.

I ask you to expedite the arrest of Sakhat Muradov and his wife Levina and transfer them to Ashgabat together with Atabaev.

17.XI-37, No. 1644

NODEV.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 322. L. 11-12. Copy. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Sakhat Muradov and his wife should be arrested. I. Stalin.

376

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 210

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE COMMANDANT OF THE KREMLIN"

September 22, 1937

126 - 0 commandant of the Kremlin.

1. Release comrade Tkalun from the duties of the commandant of the Kremlin with his transfer to the People's Commissariat of Defense.

2. Appoint the commandant of the Kremlin comrade. Rogov.

3. Oblige comrade Tkalun to hand over the cases, and comrade Rogova to accept the cases within three days. Handover and acceptance of cases will begin on September 22.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 991. L. 25. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 53.

No. 211

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON KOREANS"

September 23, 1937

22 - About Koreans.

1. To evict all remaining Koreans from the entire territory of the Far East. The eviction should be carried out during the month of October in the manner prescribed for the first stage of eviction.
2. To carry out the eviction, as well as the first stage - to the territory of the KSSR (within the Aktobe, West Kazakhstan, Karaganda, South Kazakhstan regions and Guryev district) 10,000 families and the Uzbek SSR (to the north of the railway) 5,000 families.
3. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to issue funds to the DVK, the KSSR and the UzSSR according to previously approved calculations for an additional number of 15,000 families and building materials at the request of the SNK of the KSSR and the UzSSR.
4. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Water and the People's Commissariat of Transportation to submit, at the request of the Regional Executive Committee, the DVK and SNK of the KSSR and UzSSR for the transportation of resettled sea, river and railway transport.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 139. L. 31. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 54.

No. 212

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS" (57)

September 24, 1937

25 - On anti-Soviet elements. (PB dated 1 June 1, 37, pr. No. 51, p. 212).

In order to cleanse Armenia of anti-Soviet elements, allow the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Armenia to increase the number of repressed people in the first category by 1,500 people.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 112. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 54.

DOCUMENTATION

377

No. 213

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO YA.A. DEICH ON THE
"COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" ORGANIZATION

AMONG THE MILITARY IN THE AZOV-BLACK SEA REGION

September 24, 1937

No. 60346

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 161681 to the head of the UNKVD for the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory, comrade. Deutsch.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Yezhov

Rostov

September 22, 1937

Members of the counter-revolutionary organization of the right in the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory, Dmitriev (former brigade commander of the cavalry) and Kirichenko (former commander of the partisan detachment), testified. These testimonies establish that the organization of the Rights carried on a great deal of work among the decomposed section of the former partisans. Dmitriev and Kirichenko named a number of members of the organization who were former cavalry commanders and partisans in Rostov, Taganrog, Sochi, Maykop, and a number of districts of the region. Among the members of the organization who carried out insurgent work, Dmitriev and Kirichenko name Apanasenko. Kirichenko, in addition, calls also yGorodovikov*. The organization was connected in the region with the commander of the Cossack corps Kosogov, the assistant commander of the Cossack division *Akotov* and counted on receiving weapons from the participants in the military conspiracy. Dmitriev and Kirichenko show about the plan for preparing an armed uprising, which was developed by the organization. Noteworthy is Dmitriev's testimony about his and Zhloba's connection with the counter-revolutionary group of former partisans and horsemen in Moscow, in particular with the chairman of the Military Tribunal of the Moscow Military District *Plavnik*.

Dmitriev also testified about the great wrecking work that the members of the organization carried out in the equestrian business, and about their connections with saboteurs in * Glavkonupra * in Moscow.

We are starting to seize the members of the organization by cities and districts of the region, the investigation continues, we are sending the protocols.

22.IX. No. 161681

DEIC

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 322. L. 13-15. Copy. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "To Yezhov. Note. It is necessary to arrest Plavnik, Akotov. We need to dig out Glavkonupr."

— Surnames and words are circled.

378

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 214

CODE TELEGRAM KUZNETSOV TO THE SECRETARIES OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE TERRORIST ACT IN THE CITY OF RUZAYEVKA OF THE MORDOVIAN ASSR (58)

September 24, 1937

No. 2050/sh — Saransk

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, vol. STALIN, ANDREEV, ZHDANOV

On the night of September 22, in the city of Ruzaevka, during a meeting of the primary party organization of the Masloprom base, where the decision of the plenum of the regional committee and the district committee of the party was raised and specific facts of sabotage and predation at the base were discussed, a terrorist act was committed. Two shots from a revolver through the window killed the party organizer, who is also the director of the oil depot Mokrousov, and a member of the party, the director of the procurement office, Zaitsev. Mokrousov and Zaitsev waged an active struggle to identify and expose pests and plunderers of socialist property at the oil depot and procurement office.

A group of wreckers and thieves was arrested, most of whom were exposed by Zaitsev and Mokrousov and expelled from work.

The investigation has already established that they were embittered against Zaitsev and Mokrousov and agreed among themselves on terror against them.

The following people have been arrested:

1) Svetlichny Ivan Nikitich, in 1919 he deserted from the Red Army, went over to the Whites. After the liquidation of the Whites, he was accepted into the party, but in 1922 he was exposed and expelled from the party. In 1922 he was sued for embezzlement, was sentenced to 5 years. Recently returned from the camp, worked as an assistant to the accountant of the base.

2) Nevlyudov Suleiman Yakupovich, was the head of the stall, dismissed, a speculator, forged seals were found during the search.

3) Musalov Saberzhan Yakupovich, on September 20, Zaitsev dismissed the head of the raw materials warehouse, he was repeatedly convicted of large-scale theft and speculation.

4) Eremkin Zakhar Ivanovich, accountant, expelled from the Komsomol. In 1934 he was tried for embezzlement.

It was a closely knit wrecking-predatory group. A number of other hostile elements adjoined it - all were arrested. There are partial confessions.

On September 22, meetings of the working people were held in Ruzaevka, which were held with great enthusiasm. At meetings, workers demanded harsh measures against terrorists. On this issue, the regional committee made a decision and sent a special letter to all regional party organizations. In the same Ruzaevsky district, in recent days, the former secretary of the district committee Strokin and the former chairman of the RIC Taraskin have been exposed as enemies of the people and arrested.

Acting Secretary of the Mordovian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

KUZNETSOV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 78-79. Script. Typescript.

On the telegram there is a note: "Arch. St."

DOCUMENTATION

379

No. 215

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO M.I. LITVIN ON THE
"NATIONALIST" ORGANIZATION

September 25, 1937

No. 60396
Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the telegram from Yerevan from comrade LITVIN No. 15 and 16 of 24.IX.37

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

Arrested AKOPOV Anesgat, the former second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, whose departure to Moscow was delayed for two days due to the lack of a carriage in Yerevan, confessed that upon arrival from the Tolmachev Academy (where he was a member of the military opposition) on work in the Armenian division in 1928, he created a Trotskyist group in the division, which included DAVTYAN, ALEXANDRYAN, GEORGIEV, ASOYAN and others. Later, going to work in Baku, in 1934 AKOPOV was attracted to Trotskyist work by BELENKY and was a member of the leadership of the Trotskyist organization in Baku. As members of the leadership of the Trotskyist organization, AKOPOV names the following persons: BELENKY, AMATUNI, SEF, BONDARENKO, NARIMANOV. AKOPOV also names a number of individuals recruited into the organization by him personally. The leadership of the Trotskyist organization in Baku was linked through SEFA with PYATAKOV. AKOPOV himself

was connected in Moscow with KOSTANYAN. AKOPOV testified that the Trotskyist organization and he personally carried out wrecking work on oil, causing fires in the oil fields and so on. In recent days, he admitted that he was a member of the anti-Soviet nationalist right-wing Trotskyist organization of Armenia and carried out wrecking sabotage and espionage work in various sectors of the national economy and in the Red Army with the following persons: GUMEDIN GURGEN - People's Commissariat of Agriculture; construction of electrification in Armenia, MELIK-GAIKAZYAN Iosif - chief engineer of the People's Commissariat of local industry, HOVHANISSYAN Arshak - director of the Armenian cotton trust, KARAGAZ Aygaz - authorized foreign. of the Armenian Relief Society, mediated in negotiations between Khandzhan and the foreign center of the Dashnak party of Ramkavars, SHAKHNAZARYAN Arshak - head of the livestock sector of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, SHOPURYAN Edward - director of the State Publishing House, MELKUMYAN Vagan - chairman of the State Planning Commission, Balyan Haykaz - director of the Ararat fishery, DULGAROV Onim - gosar bitr, * ATOYAN * Hakob - commander of the Armenian division, * ABRAMYAN * Khoren - head of the political department of the Armenian division, * AVAKYAN * Bagrat - chief of staff of the Armenian division - agent of Polish intelligence, 'MIKOYAN * Suren - head of the first part of the headquarters of the Armenian division - English intelligence officer, * KHACHATURYAN * Stepan - chief of staff of the artillery regiment of the Armenian division - English intelligence officer, * SCHMIDT * Alexander - veterinarian of the 59th regiment of the 20th division - Polish intelligence agent. In agreement with MIKOYAN and on the basis of the testimony of the arrested MUGDUSI, GULOYAN, EREMIN, JALATYAN, they were arrested as members of the counter-revolutionary nationalist

380

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

organization: YAGUBYAN Gaik - Narkomfin, ALMAZYAN Sarkis - head of construction of the city council, KURGENYAN Nagapet Jan - chairman of the district council, DEMIRCHYAN Boliya - secretary of the district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, DAVTYAN Hovhannes - head of the airport, MELIK-OSIPOV Sergey - director of Soyuztrans, ISHESYAN Akop, KALANTARIA - professor, AIVAZYAN Kostya - head of the communal department of the UK, APANYAN Armen - Narkomkhoz. 5 emigrants were arrested for espionage. As accomplices in the crimes of MUGDUSI, the following were arrested: the head of the Lankaran GO NKVD - LEVON MARKARYAN, the deputy head of the FINO NKVD - SILDIRYAN, the head of the internal prison - OSLANOV, the commercial director of Dynamo - BABAYAN Sergo, the head of the Akhta RO NKVD - Gaykaz VOSKANYAN. A significant number of active Dashnak emigrants who were at large were revealed. We make arrests. I ask you to telegraph where to investigate the arrested former secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia AMATU NI and AKOPOV - in Yerevan or send to Moscow.

LITVIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 322. L. 43. Original. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten resolution: "Comrade. Yezhov. It is necessary to immediately arrest all the military named by Akopov (see in the text).

* _ * surnames are circled and there is a handwritten note in the margins: "All these ar-

Miang military should be arrested."

No. 216

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN

In the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan

ABOUT THE ARRESTS OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NAKHICHEVAN ASSR

September 26, 1937

ÿ1566/sh

Baku. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to BAGIROV

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks authorizes the arrest of Usein Rakhmanov and Gasan Rakhmanov. We ask you to thoroughly clean the Nakhichevan Republic, polluted by Gasan Rakhmanov, from all evil spirits. Keep in mind that the Nakhrepublic is the most dangerous point in all of Transcaucasia. It is necessary to put a real Bolshevik proven leadership there. Yusuf Kasimov will be sent to you.

STALIN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 99. Original. Typescript.

No. 217

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT JAPANESE CONCESSIONS ON SAKHALIN"

September 26, 1937

50 - 0 Japanese concessions on Sakhalin.

2. Establish that bringing to justice and arrest of employees of Japanese concessions on Sakhalin can be carried out in necessary cases only with the permission of the Prosecutor of the Union or the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in agreement with the NKID and the NKVD.

DOCUMENTATION

381

Instruct the Prosecutor of the Union, by way of supervision, to review all the cases of already convicted employees of the Japanese concessions from the point of view of the expediency and possibility of mitigating sentences and submit their proposals to the Central Committee of the AUCP(b).

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 47. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 54.

No. 218

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF TELEGRAM G.F. GORBACH
ON THE DISCLOSURE OF THE "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY"
ORGANIZATION IN THE WEST SIBERIAN TERRITORY

September 27, 1937

No. 60457

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 8500-4304 of the head of the UNKVD for the West Siberian Territory, comrade. Gorbach.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR EZHOV
MEMORANDUM No. 33693*

Delivered from Omsk to clarify a number of issues related to our region, the former head of the Omsk railway, Fufryansky, confessed to the active CR. activities and showed:

1. While working in the Ukraine, in 1920 he became a member of the Trotskyist organization, conducted active counter-revolutionary work under the leadership of Rakovsky in Chernigov, Podolsk and Kharkov.
2. In 1932, while working as the head of the Samara-Zlatoust railway, he established contact with the party organizer of the road, the Trotskyite Kamensky, entered the Trotskyist organization that existed in the Middle Volga Territory, headed, according to his testimony, by the secretaries of the regional committee Shubrikov (arrested) and Milch. Among the participants, Fufryansky in Samara named "Sorokin * - chairman of the Samara City Council, "Kabanenko * - deputy. head of the Samaro Zlatoust railway, "Plakitin * - deputy. chairman of the doprofsozha, "Kulzhinsky * - head of the planning department of the road, "Mayorov * - instructor of the party committee of the road, "Verbin * - head of the traffic service, "Elisov * - deputy. early road for the technical part, "Svitge*" – second deputy head of the road...

In July 1936, Fufryansky established an organizational connection with Lifshitz, who, in connection with Fufryansky's departure to Omsk, informed him of the presence on the Omsk railway. Trotskyist organization...

Fufryansky in 1936 established a connection with the right-wing "Kondratiev ** - chairman of the Omsk Regional Executive Committee and "" Butkevich ** - deputy. chairman of the regional executive committee, whom he informed in detail about the sabotage work on the Omsk railway. Kondratiev and Butkevich, in turn, informed Fufryansky about the presence on the Omsk road of a deeply concealed right

382

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Trotskyist organization headed by a leading group consisting of: Kondratyev, Butkevich, Podgayets - head of the regional memory department, Doryshev - authorized Komzavok of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Salyn ** - early. UNKVD, Zdorovtseva - deputy. early UNKVD for the Omsk region and Zheltovsky - chairman of the Omsk City Council. According to the testimony of the arrested Fufryansky, this Right-Trotskyist organization in Omsk also included the secretary of the Leninsky district committee of the CPSU (b) Ryzhik and Staiko, head of the 6th department. UTB UNKVD in the Omsk region, with which he (Fufryansky) was directly connected by k.-r. work.

We send interrogation protocols.

25.IX. No. 4304

GORBACH

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 322. L. 47-51. Copy. Typescript.

'Published in part.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Ezhov. Chekists Salyn and Staiko arrested? Report. Art.*.

"

—* last name circled.

** _ "" the surname is circled, the sign "X*" is put in the margin

No. 219

CODE TELEGRAM I.V. STALIN IN THE
FAR EASTERN TERRITORY ON
THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE CC AUCP(b)

Orders N.I. Ezhov on the arrests

September 28, 1937

No. 1596/
sh Khabarovsk
Vareikisu

First. One of these days we will send to Dalcra the workers you require for secretarial positions.

Second. Yezhov's orders for arrests in Dalkrai are usually carried out with the sanction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. (59)

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-
Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks STALIN RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 108. Original. Typescript.

No. 220

CODE TELEGRAM P.P. Postysheva I.V. STALIN AND N.I.
Ezhov about the sanctions for the arrest of an employee of the NKVD

September 29, 1937

No. 2100/sh

Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, vol. STALIN, EZHOV

The former head of the Penza department of the NKVD, Filippov, together with Frenkel's deputy Berzon, in Filippov's office, had a counter-revolutionary conversation that "we are excluding many from the party,

DOCUMENTATION

383

Nists are pouring in like peas", "Comrade Stalin would not have written a second article on dizziness from success", and so on.

This counter-revolutionary conversation was concealed from the party until September 29. The regional committee of Filippov expelled from the party and asks for a sanction for his arrest. We are sending the resolution on Berzon to the Central Committee.

POSTYSHEV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 112. Original. Typescript.

The text contains handwritten notes: "For the arrest. St. "; "T. Postyshev. We agree to Filippov's arrest."

ÿ221

CODE TELEGRAM L.P. Berii I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
AUTHORIZATION FOR THE ARREST OF THE HEAD OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT

September 29, 1937

No. 2108/sh

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The materials of the NKVD of Georgia, the head of the Political Directorate of the Kharkov Military District, Bluashvili, are exposed as an active Trotskyist since 1925, who did not stop counter-revolutionary illegal Trotskyist work until his departure from Georgia in 1933.

I ask for your instructions on his arrest and transfer to the disposal of the NKVD of Georgia.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party (b) of Georgia BERIA RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 85. Original. Typescript.

There is a resolution on the telegram: "Summon to Moscow and arrest here. Cr.*. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T. comrades Yezhov, Voroshilov.

ÿ222

CODE TELEGRAM A.A. Andreeva I.V. TO STALIN ON
REPRESSIONS IN TAJIKISTAN

October 2, 1937

No. 2133/sh

Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I got acquainted with the situation in Tajikistan. It can be seen that the enemies here worked hard and felt quite free. Arrested and not yet replaced: the presovnarkom and deputies, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee and the secretary, almost all people's commissars, 15 secretaries of district committees, a significant number of participants in the anti-Soviet organization will still have to be removed and arrested.

The most affected by the work of the enemies were the border regions, both in terms of personnel and the settlement of these regions by kulak and Basmachi elements. The border is very poorly guarded, the passage to Afghanistan and back presents no difficulties. *The NKVD should be instructed to clear the border strip of kulaks and Basmachi, and also to strengthen the border guard.*

384

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

The same picture of sabotage as in Uzbekistan in cotton and industry. But the picture is especially difficult as a result of wrecking with schools, technical schools and universities. Many schools are simply closed, there are not enough teachers and there are no translated textbooks.

With personnel for promotion in Tajikistan it is much more difficult than in Uzbekistan. We plan:

1) To take the best first secretaries and chairmen of the RECs to staff the people's commissariats, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee, to put forward second secretaries and workers of the Komsomol in their place.

2) Transfer to Tajikistan part of the Tajik workers from Uzbekistan. In addition, I ask you to help Tajikistan by sending 30 employees of the scale of secretaries of district committees, they can be used mainly in border areas in the positions of second secretaries with the task of training national personnel.

Yesterday a plenum opened at which the material on the uncovered anti-Soviet conspiracy in Tajikistan was presented in detail. Debate is going on, Ashurov and Frolov are criticized for patronizing enemies and inattention to signals exposing Rakhimbaev and others, clamping down on criticism in the organization. Frolov should certainly be dismissed, as for Ashurov, it is necessary that the plenum still discuss it, but it could be tried, after they have thoroughly beaten, left as the first secretary, there is no evidence of his participation in the anti-Soviet organization yet, except for nationalist ties in 23- 24 years old, Ikramov and Maksumov, who is close to Ashurov, were questioned; they deny Ashurov's involvement. Ershov, who came with me from the ORPO of the Central Committee, can be nominated as the second secretary.

**

Candidates for the chairman of the Central Executive Committee and the presovnarkom cannot yet be announced, we need to take a closer look and check the people. Since there is no one in the Council of People's Commissars, I ask permission to appoint *** Protopopov as deputy chairman. SNK, it will certainly fit ***.

Having been instructed by you to visit Turkmenistan, I ask for instructions on what to do—whether to go to Moscow for a plenum, or to visit Turkmenistan, and how to be Belsky. In Turkmenistan, we received the following information in response to our request: "In addition to Atabaev, Aytakov and Sakhatov known to you, 7 people's commissars, 5 heads of departments of the Central Committee, 3 secretaries of district committees, 7 secretaries of district committees were arrested as an asset of the counter-revolutionary organization. Most confessed. ÿ The secretary of the Central Committee Anna-Mukhamedov and it is unlikely that the chairman of the Central Executive Committee Batyr-Ataev are connected with the Trotskyists and counter-revolutionary nationalists.* The question arises of bringing them to justice. A counter-revolutionary Trotskyist-sabotage organization in transport was opened up, headed by the "head of the road Yeremeev" and the heads of all the main services.

ANDREEV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 117-118v. Script. Typescript.

There is a handwritten resolution on the cipher telegram: "Stalinabad. Andreev. I authorize Protopopov as first secretary, Iskanderov as second, pres. SNK - Kurbanov, before. Central Executive Committee - Shigodaeva. Ashurov and Frolov will have to be arrested. You will have to go to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the hope of being in Moscow on October 10th. Let Belsky go to Turkmenistan in a few days for cleaning. He will receive instructions from Yezhov. Stalin*.
__
underlined in pencil.

** _" the surname is circled and the number "1" is put.

__ The surname is circled and the number "2" is put.

DOCUMENTATION

385

No. 223

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM TO K.N. VALUKHINA

ABOUT THE ARRESTS OF THE RIGHTS

October 6, 1937

No. 60822

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 643 beginning. Directorate of the NKVD in the Omsk region Comrade VALUKHINA.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

People's Commissar Introduced Comrade Yezhov

In the right-wing case, additional arrests were made:

1. Former head. The agricultural department of the Regional Committee is the director of the trust "Obllesrest" SLYUNKOV.
2. Predgorsoveta Omsk BOBKOV.
3. Head. Oblvnugorga KIRICHENKO.
4. Head. "Zagotzerno" GONCHAROV.
5. Director of IPKKNO SUSLOV.
6. Head. IVANOV Pharmacy Administration.
7. Deputy head of the regional health department PREOBRAZHENSKY.
8. The head of the planning department of the regional administration, KUZNETSOV, and a number of other members of the counter-revolutionary organization of the right, all confessed, gave detailed testimonies about the activities of the organization and its counter-revolutionary subversive work: SLYUNKOV, GONCHAROV, PREOBRAZHENSKY, SUSLOV and BOBKOV, who betray a number of new members of the counter-revolutionary organization, in particular, the deputy chairman of the Regional Executive Committee, BUTKEVICH, who was removed from his job and expelled from the party. BUTKEVICH in Arkhangelsk.

SLYUNKOV testifies that he was involved in the organization by Vasily Kuzmich, who had left the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks *FOMIN*, the former second secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Members of the organization in the Odessa region were arrested and confessed - the former secretary of the Komsomol KARNIKOV, the chairman of the district executive committee SLEPCHENKO and others.

The organization was created on behalf of the Regional Center by the secretary of the District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, CHABROV, who shot himself.

In the Pavlograd region also confessed: head. rayZU KUNDYS and others, here the organization was created by the former secretary of the District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks PIDSUHA on behalf of the Regional Center. A similar prospect of expanding the case in other areas.

I continue the investigation and operations.

VALUKHIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 323. L. 83-85. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Vasily Kuzmich Fomin must be arrested. I. St.

— Last name circled.

386

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

No. 224

A. Frenkel's note to I.V. STALIN AND N.I. Ezhov
ABOUT THE WORK OF THE TROIKA IN THE KUIBYSHEV REGION

October 7, 1937

Owls. secret Only
in person

Tov. Stalin Tov.
Yezhov

I must bring to your attention the following facts reported to the party control.

1) According to the military prosecutor at the special construction site in the Kuibyshev NKVD, b. the chief of the latter, comrade Popashenko, very often entrusted the solution of issues to his operational secretary, comrade Akimov, whom he brought with him to the Kuibyshev Territory, and the deputy. Prosecutor for Special Affairs Comrade Zarubin. Tov. Popashenko was often absent, the two mentioned comrades remained on the troika, who made decisions, moreover, Comrade Zarubin was not a member of the troika. Tov. Popashenko then signed the already prepared sentences. Despite the prohibition of Comrade Andreev, who came to Kuibyshev, Comrade Popashenko allowed this practice until recently. Comrade Zarubin reported the above to the party control.

2) A few days ago, in one of the collective farms of the Kuznetsk district, the collective farmers complained to the visiting instructor of the regional committee that a massacre had taken place not far from them at night. The check revealed that 8 enemies of the people were shot in the forest at night by the verdict of the special construction. The head of the RO NKVD, who had been expelled from the party the day before for communication and bonding with the exposed enemies of the people, committed a provocative act of hostility by not taking measures so that the executed were buried in the ground.

The chief was arrested, the shot enemies of the people were buried.

3) Due to the poor security of the investigation rooms, Kuibyshevsk. UNKVD had two cases when the interrogated enemies of the people jumped out the window, one jumped out into the street and crashed badly.

A. FRENKEL

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 122-123. Script. Typescript.

No. 225

CODE TELEGRAM A.T. 3ALIKINA I.V. TO STALIN ON
INCREASING THE LIMIT ON THE "KULAK" OPERATION FOR
BASHKIRIA (59)

October 12, 1937

No. 2225/sh - Ufa

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The testimonies received from members of the Trotskyist-Bukharin and bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolutionary organizations revealed a network of military insurgent detachments on the territory of Bashkiria. The limit that was given to Bashkiria in the first and second categories is clearly insufficient. Please increase the limit.

ZALIKIN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 88. Original. Typescript.

The telegram contains Stalin's resolution: "T. Yezhov. It is necessary to increase in both categories by ... "

DOCUMENTATION

387

No. 226

PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION YA.A. YAKOVLEVA

October 15-18, 1937

YAKOVLEV (EPSHTEIN) Yakov Arkadievich - born in 1896, native of Bialystok (Poland), former People's Commissariat of the USSR; before arrest, head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; former member of the CPSU (b) since 1913.

Question: You are under arrest as one of the leaders of the fascist espionage Trotskyite organization. In a statement dated October 14, 1937, you admitted in general terms your guilt in the charges brought against you. We are now proceeding to interrogate the merits of all your and your accomplices in anti-Soviet activities. For the time being, take the trouble to answer the investigation a number of questions about your biography, which cause us doubts.

When and where did you join the party?

Answer: I joined the party in 1913 in Petrograd, where I studied at the Polytechnic Institute from 1913 to February 1917.

Question: Under what circumstances did you join the party?

Answer: At this institute I became close friends with the Bolshevik students VASILEVSKY, PRESEDKO and BOGOLEPOV, who drew me into revolutionary work and into the student Social-Democratic Bolshevik circle.

As a party member, he carried out a lot of underground work from 1913 to February 1917. During this period in Petrograd I led an economic student circle and two circles of revolutionary workers in Petrograd enterprises.

For my active revolutionary work, I was persecuted by the police and arrested.

Question: When and why were you arrested by the police?

Answer: I was arrested among several thousand demonstrators near the Kazan Cathedral on the eve of the February Revolution. The arrest took place on February 25; I spent three days in the police admiralty unit and, in connection with the revolution, was released.

[...]*

Question: You are lying now during the investigation. We know for sure that you were summoned to the security department and interrogated about revolutionary work. We also know that you gave evidence to the Okhrana on these issues.

Answer: You cannot have such data, because, I repeat, no one has ever interrogated me.

Question: We understand such a "categorical" statement of yours. Obviously, you have a special sense to hide this fact. Try to answer the question directly.

Answer: I once again categorically state that I told the truth. My past is well known to many comrades with whom I worked underground. Ask VASILEVSKY, STETSKOY and, finally, MOLOTOV. They will confirm my impeccable party past. I insistently ask you to show me the data that you have about my interrogations in the secret police.

Question: You are referring to witnesses in vain. They just speak negatively about your past. STETSKI, in particular, filed a statement that at one time he was warned by TOLMACHEV to be more careful with you, since he (TOLMACHEV) suspects you of provocative activities.

What can you say?

388

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

Answer: It is difficult to answer this question.

Question: Your wife, SOKOLOVSKAYA-YAKOVLEVA, who lived with you for many years, also filed an application in which she says that, from your words, she is aware of your cooperation in the Petrograd Security Department.

What can you answer to this?

Answer: I ask you to give me the opportunity to think it over, then answer.

Question: Why is this?

Answer: You just need to gather your thoughts, remember everything. For me, all this is so unexpected.

Question: Quit clown. Take the trouble to answer the questions of the investigation and now. All the same, you can't get away from the answer, no matter what new tricks you come up with.

[...]

Question: Tell me in detail about your entire anti-Soviet struggle against the Party, against the Soviet people.

Answer: In 1922-1923. I worked in Moscow as the head of the press department in the Agitprom of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Agitprom at that time was headed by one of the active Trotskyists - SOSNOVSKY, and then BUBNOV. At the same time, I was a member of the editorial board of the Krasnaya Nov magazine, where I worked together with the active Trotskyite VORONSKII.

At that time I became very close to VORONSKII. Our rapprochement was facilitated by the commonality of our Trotskyist views. In 1923, I took the position of TROTSKY, who fought against the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. On this basis, my rapprochement with the Trotskyists SOSNOVSKII, VORONSKII, and ELTSIN, who was working at the same time in Krasnaya Novi, took place.

At that time, I took an active part in the factional meetings of the Trotskyist group, which took place mainly in the apartment of VORONSKY, in the 1st House of Soviets - the National Hotel. An employee of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Trotskyist POPOV N.N. At meetings we discussed the tasks of the Trotskyists in the fight against the Party and practical measures in this direction.

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I, VORONSKY and ELTSIN made extensive use of our position on the editorial board of the Krasnaya Nov magazine. This publishing house, with our help, published the pamphlet "Lessons of October" and a number of other Trotskyist materials and works propagating Trotskyist views.

In connection with the defeat of the Trotskyists in 1923, I went underground and, under cover, continued the treacherous anti-Party struggle.

Question: Tell us how you managed for so long, since 1923, to hide your Trotskyist anti-Soviet activities?

Answer: This can be explained by the fact that since 1923, in accordance with the personal instructions of TROTSKY, I have withdrawn from open struggle with the Party. He maneuvered and immediately switched to a secret position. Outwardly, I immediately severed ties with the Trotskyists and carried out all further anti-Soviet work under the banner of double-dealing.

As early as 1923, TROTSKY, foreseeing the possible failure of an open attack against the Party, considered it necessary to carefully cover up some of his supporters so that, while remaining in the Party, in Party work, they would gain a foothold, enter into the confidence of the Party masses and the Party leadership and advance gradually to the leadership of the party.

TROTSKY then already raised this question in connection with the fact that at the right moment in the party leadership to have his own agents who would inform

DOCUMENTATION _ 389

would bring him down and help him seize power. Such tasks were
tavlenny and me.

Question: That is, the same tasks of betrayal, provocation, espionage, in the performance of which you already had experience from cooperation with the secret police.

Answer: Yes.

Question: Continue reading. Where and when did you contact TROTSKY?

Answer: In 1923 SOSNOVSKII brought me together with TROTSKY. The meeting took place at VORONSKY's apartment in the First House of Soviets in the National Hotel. They gathered there - TROTSKY, SOSNOVSKII, VORONSKII and I. Speaking of the prospects for the work of the Trotskyists, TROTSKY pointed out that the possibility of a temporary, as he put it, victory of the Central Committee was not ruled out; he went on to say that in politics, as in war, one must take into account the possibility of a temporary defeat, and therefore it is necessary to secure oneself in advance on enemy territory.

TROTSKY especially pointed out that the circumstances of the struggle showed what decisive importance the party apparatus had acquired. Proceeding from this, he set before us the task of striving in our future work, not only to infiltrate the party apparatus, but also to gain a foothold there, to advance, select and recruit cadres of supporters of the TROTSKY line from the party apparatus. TROTSKY stated bluntly that we must conquer the party apparatus. Proceeding from this, TROTSKY proposed to me that outwardly all ties with the Trotskyists should be cut off; in the future, everywhere and everywhere to proclaim oneself as a firm supporter of the Central Committee, a merciless enemy of the Trotskyists, to use everything to increase one's influence in the party, at the same time extremely carefully and secretly, through second and third hands, to carry out work to involve carefully selected people into a Trotskyist organization.

After this conference and instructions from TROTSKY, I ceased open communication with VORONSKII and SOSNOVSKY, as people who had been compromised; On the other hand, I instructed the people connected with me and who stood on the positions of Trotskyism in the spirit of the instructions received from TROTSKY.

Question: Who are these people?

Answer: POPOV N.N., MIKHAILOV M.L., and then already in 1924 VA REIKIS - they all stood on the positions of TROTSKY. After my meeting with TROTSKY, they, like me, went over to a conspiratorial line.

zhenie. The period of 1924 convinced me of the correctness of TROTSKY's prognosis
- of the possible failure at this stage of the Trotskyists and the need for a part of the Trotskyists to go underground for a double-dealing struggle against the Party.

I kept this group of people as my cadres until the last days. For many years they, together with me, waged an active struggle against the Party and the Soviet people.

In 1924, I became especially close to VAREIKIS (a former decisist), who was then appointed head of the press department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

From a series of conversations with him, I became convinced that he was an adventurous, unprincipled person, a careerist who literally changed his beliefs on the go. At the same time, I became convinced that he was on the positions of TROTSKY, inasmuch as this contributed to his—VAREIKIS—plans.

I recruited VAREIKIS and recruited him into my leading group of the Trotskyist organization.

390

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

From this period, in fact, a leading core was formed, a group of hidden Trotskyists, which included myself - YAKOVLEV, VAREIKIS and POPOV, who acted on the instructions of TROTSKY - in the position of a particularly conspiratorial group of double-dealers, maneuvering, adjusting, by any means achieving their own goals. goals in the struggle against the party.

These forms of struggle against the party, pointed out by TROTSKY, were acceptable to me also because VAREIKIS and I believed that even if Trotskyism did not win, we would nevertheless remain, thanks to our disguise, in a leading position. in the party.

Until about 1927, our group was consolidated in the party and Soviet apparatus. At that time we did not launch espionage and wrecking work, considering the tactics of waiting and maneuvering to be the most expedient under the conditions of that time. The defeat of the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, De-Cists and other anti-Party formations ended, as is well known, in 1928 with a stream of double-dealing statements by the participants in these organizations, recognizing the correctness of the Party line and promising to stop the struggle. Our group, having direct instructions to that effect from TROTSKY, developed a line of infiltration and consolidation in the Party.

The correctness of this line was personally confirmed to me by Pyatakov when I met him in 1928.

[...]

Question: With whom, besides PYATAKOV, among the leaders of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist organization in the USSR, were you connected at that time?

Answer: In addition to Pyatakov, I had in 1930-1931. established first

very close personal, and then organizational and political connection with one of the leaders of the Trotskyist organization, Jan Gamarnik.

Question: How did you establish contact with Gamarnik?

Answer: This happened under the following circumstances: I knew GAMARNIK from the time of the civil war through joint work in Ukraine. My wife SOKOLOVSKAYA was a friend of his family. As a result of my family's personal rapprochement with GAMARNIK, close personal and later political relations were established with GAMARNIK. Beginning in 1930, we systematically met both in the city, at the apartment, and at the dacha.

Approximately at the end of 1931 - at the very beginning of 1932, in one of the conversations at my dacha - in a conversation about the situation in the Far East and the internal situation in the USSR - Gamarnik told me that he knew from the Trotskyist center my connection with the Trotskyists, my position in the leadership of the Trotskyist organization, as a specially conspiratorial leader of a special group of Trotskyists who are in the leading sections of the party. GAMARNIK said that he wanted to be completely frank with me, he wanted to establish constant contact with me, as with a person in a leading position, in charge of agricultural issues, which have a decisive weight in our country.

Gamarnik told me about the existence of a large Trotskyist underground in the army, organized into a military conspiracy, uniting all anti-Soviet elements in the army, whom the leaders of the conspiracy are preparing for an armed uprising against the leadership of the party and government.

I, in turn, told Gamarnik about the Trotskyist organization, about the group led by me and VAREIKIS, which by that time had expanded its ties by attracting a number of leading party workers, including those from the periphery, standing on right-wing Trotskyist positions.

DOCUMENTATION

391

In subsequent meetings, GAMARNIK told me that in the leadership of the anti-Soviet military conspiracy there were such people as TUKHACHEVSKY, YAKIR, UBOREVICH and a number of other prominent commanders, that the conspiracy, preparing an armed uprising, had two main plans for seizing power: the first was by preparing defeat The USSR in the war and the second - by organizing a coup and destroying the leaders of the party. GAMARNIK also informed me that the military conspiracy had close ties with the right-wing Trotskyist bloc, headed by the right-wing and Trotskyist organization.

In addition, GAMARNIK told me that the military conspiracy was connected with the Chekist group of conspirators headed by YAGODA, and that YAGODA and his group should take an active part in organizing the "palace" coup.

Gamarnik and I agreed on further communication and on regular mutual information.

Gamarnik's idea of uniting all anti-Soviet forces was not new to me. According to TROTSKY's instructions, I personally, through the members of my group, was connected with right-wingers, leftists, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists.

Question: How did you make all these contacts?

Answer: My main connections went up - to TROTSKY (who directed my activities) and from me down - to the members of the Trotskyist organization. At the same time, from about 1933, when I was the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, I believed that my position, especially under the conditions of the first five-year plan, under the conditions of the socialist restructuring of the countryside, had become stronger and gave me the opportunity to increase my connections and authority in the party and the country. Therefore, while maintaining contact with TROTSKY, guided by TROTSKY's instructions, following the path of expanding ties (thus, I established an organizational connection with the military conspiracy through Gamarnik), I, first of all, strengthened my group of especially secretive Trotskyists in the party apparatus.

I began to think that I myself could play a greater independent role in directing the underground work, in the future coup and seizure of power; that I myself will be able to take one of the leading positions in the country, if the coup is successful. Proceeding from an analysis of the situation in the country, making a bet on the possible victory of the right-wing Trotskyist bloc, I also took into account the possibility of the defeat of the right-wing Trotskyite forces. That is why I, together with my group (which had already grown by that time), acted in such a way as to expose myself as little as possible to a blow, to the danger of failure, in order, by maneuvering, not only to retain my position in the Party, but also to strengthen it more.

Thus, being in the leadership of a Trotskyist organization and following TROTSKY's instructions in underground work, at the same time I had some "my own plans", put together my own group and used and expanded my connections (not so much myself, but through the second and third parties) and towards the Trotskyists, and towards the right, and towards the nationalists.

Question: Your savage double-dealing and cynicism of a traitor are very colorful, nevertheless, try to answer the specific question of the investigation: - how was your connection with the anti-Soviet organizations you mentioned was built?

Answer: Before answering this question, I want to tell you about how our anti-Soviet organization was formed, in the leadership of which were myself, VAREIKIS, POPOV, and later BAUMAN.

392

LUBYANKA. Stalin and the GUGB NKVD. 1937-1938

By 1933, I and VAREIKIS established an organizational connection with BAUMAN. From several conversations with BAUMAN, I caught his dissatisfaction with the party and began to get closer to him. Having revealed his anti-Soviet face, I introduced him to the work of our anti-Soviet organization, after which he entered its leading core.